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Ar~ersinger v . Hamlin
Cert to Fla SC: Roberts , Drew , Thorna1 , Carlton ; dissenting :

~QYQ , Ervin , Adkins

Petr was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor punishable~
under Fla law by not less thanlt three and not more than 6
l·
months or by a fine not less than $500 and not more than $1000 .
Petr pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 , and
in default of payment to be imprisoned for 3 months .

lJe was

indigent , and therefore was ordered to prison .
With the assistance of an attorney , he filed for state
habeas corpus the day after his sentence began .

---

on bail where he remains .

He was released

His claim was that when he pled

/

guilty he was unrepresented but that he had not waived his
right to assistance of counsel .

He also claimed that he had

CCDNTROLLING CASES : GIDeon v . Wainwright , 372 U. S . 335 (1963).

- 2a defense to the charges against him ,
vote, discharged the writ ,

The Fla SC, by a 4-3

It ruled that an indigent offender

accused of a misdemeanor is entitled to court-appointed counsel
only where the offense Jmi: with which he has been charged
carries a possible penalty of more than 6 months imprisonment .
Since petr was charged with a misdemanor which was not punishable
by more than 6 months, he was not entitled to relief ,

Petr

sought cert to this Court, and the Court granted ,
This is going to be , hopefully , a brief memo , because
I do not think I can say anything here that will improve on
the amicus brief filed by the SG in this case ,

I recommend

that you read that brief and rely on it rather than the
petr's brief x as your source for that side of the case ,
The right KNXB~~NXNKRNXN~MXX of indigents to have appointed
Efg!KN XXR

Jl& was

couns 1

Wainwright ,

recognized by this Court in

~!R

Gideon v .

Although neither the reasoning nor the precise

holding of the case is limited to felonies , Gideon had been
convicted of a felony ,

It is therefore argued that the Court

has not held that indigents are entitled to appointed counsel

in mi.s:NN misdemeanor cases ,

The Fla SC and most of the persons

supporting the state ' s position , do not argue that

ax

in all

RlX.S:Na:nnRNH misdemeanor cases , there is no right to counsel .

They instead , relying on the line drawn in Duncan v . Lousiana ,
391 U. S . 145 (1968) , and baldwin v , New York , 399 U. S . 66 (1970) ,
argue that there is no such right in non- serious cases , i . e .,
cases in which the maximum~ imprisonment that can be imposed
does not exceed 6 months ,

-3In the right-to-counsel precedents, there is little
~ /4f? -~
~. I
kXE®M~ comfort forx ~!R roop'o line , K.S:XXXKHXN+XKN!RXXN In

/;t/e

the right-to-counsel area the Court has never taken an historical
approach of trying to determine wNxxxkiNx in what kinds of
cases counsel was afforded at the time the Constituti,a n was

-

----------

written.

If

\,\

It's approach has been fundamental fairness,

Very

simply put, it has held that the right to counsel goes to the
integrety of the fact-finding function, and that atria~ in
which the def end ant has been denied the right to counsel_J ~

.,u,-,r.

It has never limited this reasoning according to whether the
offense charged is serious or not.

Indeed, there is substantial

evidence for the proposition that the fact-finding process
in non-serious cases requires the assistance of counsel to the
same extent as does the fact-finding process in serious cases.
There are some interesting figures cited in the arnicus brief
of the Legal Aid Society of New York , at 16-18, which show
that rix:NxKN!RXN.s:.s:xx:kHN~Rx~f in non-serious cases in which the
society represents indigents in New York, it obtains either an .
acquital or dismissal of charges 45% of the time, whereas in
felonies, ix.s:xx!R it is successful only 9% of the time.

This

suggests that the occurance of errors is far more frequent in
rAra.~ ni "-1

the non-serious cases, and it is not xu strains judicial notice
too far, I think, to E:©NN conclude that substantially less of
these errors would have come to light had there been no assistance
of counsel.

Other studies could be, and indeed are, cited for

the proposition that the quality of justice handed out by the
lower criminal courts of this country ~~MXNX!R benefits fx@ when

- 4-

the accused is represented .

Over- burdened courts , often

presided over by judges who are poorly trained , do not aid
a def who is wi~ without assistance .

Therefore , I think it

is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that the system
works better if the accused is represented in non-serious
cases .
In addition to this due process reason in XMf~~ support
of the indir,ent's right to
equal protection ~

N~NM

counsel, there is a quasi-

- (Resp argues that this argument was

not advanced in the court below and cannot therefore be raised
1

here .

In support of this claim , ~ cites the petr's ~andid
,,
acknowledgement at p 36 of petr ' s brief . I see no such
acknowled~ement on that page .
raised below , ~

t'oreover , due process was clearly

I think that if this arguemtn is properly

classified as an equal protection argument rather than a due
process argument , that it is certainly on the hazy borderline
between those two doctrines .

Ihe Court has acknowledge that

the concept of e~Jal protection is inherent in the fundamental
fairness N~X concept of due process.)

The arguemtn is simply

that it is fundamentally MNfaxixx~ unfair to permit persons
who can afford attorneys to be represented while persons who
cannot afford them are not .

In support of this argument , petr

cites the ~riffin v . Illinois , 351 U. S . 12 (1956) , line of
cases .
Thus, petr is able to marshal two powerful constitutional
' po~

--i_e_s_ i_n__
f ...
a_v,..o.._r;....,.o:.,:f: _,:
t :,:h:.e....:
.;. r:.:i:,:g~h:.:,t,:_,:o.:f....:i:n.:.:d:.1.:· g'.:e=n~t~s~ t::,:o:.._:h::,:
a.:.v.:e:_:a:_!p~p::;o:.::
in t e d

counsel in non-serious cases .

There arc , however , counter

- 5policies .
The strongest of these is the argument that to appoint
counsel in every misdemaenor case in which an indigent is
unrepresented would be to place an insurmountable burden on
the x judicial systems.

RNx~xxxgiX~XKNRx~x~~~xixi~Nxx Resp

cites the number of traffic offenses , or charges of jaywalking
or spiiting on the sidewalk , in which counsel would have to
be afforded .

The state asserts that it would be imposiible

for all these persons to be represented .
often acquires a delicate balance

E~~

Since due process

between the rights of

the accused and the interest of the state , it is not inappropriate
.
.
to consider
these logistical
pro b lems .

~
..
t,J.groevCJ:: , t l1e 1 ogistical

argument also serves to refute the quasi-equal protection argunori-serious
ment advanced by petr .
In most/cases, the potential liability
is only a fine .

It is often not worth while for persons who can

afford one , to NXRXRxxxxa hire a lawyer; legal fees are likely
to be higher than the potential fineJ

But if an indigent has

a right to appointed counsel , we would face the anomalous situ~tion
in ~1ich all indigents would be represented because they could
most
have free assistance while/axx non-indigents would be unrepresented
because it would not be ~
attorney .

inteJligent to NiRx hire an

Furthermore , resp argues , if indigents have a right

to appointed counsel in all misdemeanor cases , why would they
not also have the same right in xi civil caseso

The potential

liability in a civil case will often exceed the maximum fine

-6 i~posable in a misdemanor case .

If assistance is provided±N in

the latter to protect the indigent ' s iNN interests , logic

- 6d ictates that assistance be provided in the former where the
same or

even greater interests are involved .

But here the

logistical problem wou1d truly prove insurmountable .

t

There is no denying the force to ~Rkx*xxaxg resp ' s logistical.

arguments , but much of that force is dissipated by the rule
suggested by the SC in his brief .

He suggests that the right

to counsel exist only in cases in which a sentence is imposed .
If at the outsetx of the process , the judge believes that
a conviction wil1 likeJy

~

a jail sentence , he must~

advise the def of his right to appointed counsel .

This is

essentially the rule proposed by the ABA , RE except that this

)

one has an ad&itional wrinkle .

The SG says that if N the

offense is one which would not normally bring a sentence
and if a judge , accordingly , does not offer an indigent appointed
counsel , he cannot then later change his mind and sentence
the man after all .
procedur~

Instead some other , as ~Ra yet unspecifie1

would have to be devised .

XNXKXXNXRXKNEKRHNkixxx~xxx

KNRXNXXXNNXKXN®WNX@NXKNRXX®5XKKXNHXX~XNMXRm

The SG ' s proposed rule would

~ ~ r y reduce the

logistical problem by eliminating crimes like jaywalking
from tho ~ in which indigents must be furnished counsel .
~N~R There is considerable~ reason to ExR± believe that the

remaining logistical problem would not be ixNNmaNgax unmanagable .
Several states have comparable rules at the present , including
New York and California .
'

While New York is not the best

example one could cite for efficiency , there is no reason to
think that the appointment of counsel in non-serious misdemeanor

- 7cases contributes substantially to the problem.

If New York

can handle the problem, it is reasonable to assume that other
states could.
the sr•s rule.

Indeed , Alaska in its amicus brief, endorses
Seconc,l, the SG says that his rule would

Qresent no insurmountable problem for the federal system .

-

~ , wh ile the SG cannot :s:10exEk speak for the a states, he
Thira
points out that the recent cases that have expanded the right
./4)-a.~

to counsel ~o R that it app_:}*s in many other stages of the
criminal process have not presented any insurmountable logistical

(

n barrier.

I'

Finally , the ABA and a federal study have concluded

that s irnilar rules are feasible .
:s:e~mXK~XNiKXRXXNXlOXXKXENXXXXXX It is reasonable to assume that
the ABA in particular was not unaware of the magnitude of
resulting logistica;ei problemso
The

t

SG's rule is also the answer to the argument of

resp that if indigents have a right to counsel in all misdemeanor
cases, they must have such a right in all civil cases.

~1 -

R~x the SG's rule distinguislhes a situation where there is a
pssibility of imprisonment from those in which the only penalty
is f±Naprn financial .

This distinguishes the ~x±ml::NiK civil cases.

Wh ile it, like all rules, is not x~~xx10exfREK perfect--there
may be some cases in which the financial interest at stake
is af higher imporaance than the possibility of a few days in
jail, although it is difficult to think of such a case involving
indigents--it does seem both workable and effective in removing
the inet!{l.lities.

As a genera l rule, the thing we think unfair

._ 8is the possibility of going to jail without having been
represented .

The magnitude of the unfairness is diminished

where the only penalty is monetary .
There is one solid workability argument advance against
the SC's position by the state of Virginia in its amicus brief .
It says that in cases where :i1iuiigHNKxx indigents are fined

\l

and cannot or will not pay the fine , they are sent to jail .
Therefore it argues that there is a possibilty of jail in almost
every case .

That is not an easy objection to answer .

of course:N; not before XNXXXE the Court in this case .

It i~
(It is

true that petr was sentenced to jail because he could not pay
a fine , but the charge involved in this case , carrying a concealed
weapon , is one that would N~xm.axjqq::xixaxx1~.nniR:. often , I a s sume ,
resu1tx in a sentence , so under the SG's rule , petr would have

- --f.evr, ~ o-/ ¼
L

~

J

Aright to appointed counsel . )

Moreover , ~

ase

presents itself , I think there is a possible avenue of distinction .
I~

that

~

jail sentences imposed in lieu of fines could

} be analagized to contempt or something 1 ike it .

Then you migh_t ,

a say that he was sent to jail not beaause he violated the

criminal statute , but because he failed to pay his fine and was
therefore in contempt .

But even if there is no distinction ,

I do not think that the p roblem is insurmountable .

\

In reality

theec are going to be very few cases in which the fine is so
large and the defendant so poorx: that he cannot pay it .

Most

of the EHX!R kinds of misdemeanors we are talking aboltlt--jaywalking

or traffic violations--do not involve fines of $500 such as was
imposed in this case .

Moreo~er , in its opinion of last term ,

lOl U .S. 395 (1971), the Court ruled that it
gal to automatically send a man to jail because he
was too poor to pay his fineo

-

It said that alternatives, such

as installment payments, had to be tried first.

Only then if

the rnan still could not or would not pay, could he be sent
Thus , in the future there should be xi&s::s:x@fx:trnx
fewer of these cases.m

So even if the rule must

r

lfi__ t h .at

1.·

f

the fine cannot be paid and the def is then sent to jail, he
had a right to counsel, the rule :s: will still clear w away a
lot of the minor cases in which jail sentences, as a prai.ctical
matter, are N!RXi&xximJO@:S:!RNX not a realistic possibility.

I

One benefit that might result from such a rule, incidentally,

is the elimination of a lot of criminal statutes ·that are not

properly criminal matters.

I do not know what one could call

them, if not crimes, blta lot of traffic ©ff!RN:S:XR offensese
E@NNX could be better handled by a

process that did not invoke

all the cumbersome mechanisms of the criminal law.

A rule

such as that suggested by the SG, might encourage states to
redefine a lot of "crimes."
Thus, I would concll.iAf that striking the logistical balance,
under the

k~.,tks-1,:t,,4 ~

s---mfggested r ~ w~

1--~

the interest of indigents

in obtaining a fair ttial, would result in a holding that
indigents have a right to N@N@N counsel in all cases in which
they are sent to jailo That is rdally th guts of this
1/4 017-f?
but there la.Fs a fsJ incidentai.1 :s- issues that need to be treated •

..fir.:,)' /.;.esp argues that~ the line for right

©K to appointed

;'•,

-10counsel xbus1N« should be drawn at offenses punishable by not
more than 6 months because that is the line drawn in the jury
cases.

The right to counsel like the right to a jury trial is

a part of the 6th Amenmento

If kNHXRxixxNNxxi~NKXRNxaxtNx~

the 6th Amen~ ent does not require a right to a jury in a case,
/I

it ought not require the H}slJslNXlnnnR appointment of counsel.
This argument assumes that the Court adopted :Mr. Justice Black's
position of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the 14th Amenment.

B~t the Court did not adopt that position.

It selectively incorporated according to what it fx felt were
the dictates of fundamental fairness.

And i:x it turns out that

the reasons for incorporating some part of the 6th Amenmcnt
do not apply to others.

for example, the right to a jury trial

does not, at least to the same extent, reflect the policy
behihd the right to counsel which± is that without the assistance
of counsel, the integrety of the fact-finding process is weakened.
This is why the right to a jury trial was not made retroactice,
\ while the right to counsel was.

Thus, all the parts of the 6th'
the f ac*'E t hat
amend ment do not have the same force, so/xNaxxwNi:x!R a jury may

not be required in non-serious misdemeanor trials does not
necessarily mean that counsel. is not required.

It is very doubtful

that the Court would tolerate limiting the other rights
guaranteed by the 6th Amendment NXK~XN~NKS:i&XXNNxx«ax!R--right to
speedy trial, right to public trial, right to know nature and
cause of accusation, right to confront witnesses, right to
compel favorable witnesses--to serious offenses.

fN For one

thing, the logistical problems that are claimed to exist in

-11this case , and which certainly would exist if juries were
required in non-serious offenses , do not exist if the right
to confront witnesses , for example , is guaranteed in nonserious cases .

Thus, in the case of each right , a balance

must be struck .

In this case , as I have already argued ,

the balance should be struck in favor of the right .
(Although I promised , j o tbe paragraph bsfor"9 last , that

_.(;.:.:>....._

.,.t;hcrc were a"few" tncidental issues that needed treating ,

'<-__

I reverse myself ;;ind limit the di:3cussiot1 to the one in

,9______

th@ last paragraph , J

Q

In conc1usion , let me reiterate that ki::::s: this is really
a balancing case--the interest of the accused in counsel
vs . the interest of the state in efficieny .

I think that the

sr•s rule offers a proper method of striking that balance .

REVERSE

Fox

r•.: ,.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 2, 1972

Re: No. 70 -r 015

-

/

Argersinger v. Hamlin

.,

Dear Chief:
I have devoted further attention to this case.
I write this note merely to let you know that my vote,
this time around, remains just as tentative and just as
unsure as it was in December. I am particularly concerned, of course, because mine seems to be the swing
vote, and at the moment I feel I could draw the line
either at imprisonment or at the six-month mark. The
latter has the obvious advantage of relating to Baldwin.
It is possible that I shall come to rest only after something is written out.

'

'

l

Facetiously, one might conclude to send this
case back because of the Boykin error and let it go at
that.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

cc:

The Conference

...

j;u:µutttt QJomt af Urt 'Jlfuildi ~tctit.e-

'Jjla:s qiugton. l'J. QJ.

2llffeJl-.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

March 27, 1972

Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin

Dear Bill:
Although your draft opinion is persuasive, I am not yet
persuaded to change my vote. Accordingly, I now plan to write
something.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss 4/3/72 1cc

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Hamilton Fox

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: April 3, 1972

No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin
Your draft opinion of 4/1/72 is great - well written and well
reascmed.
I will, of course, do some revisions because lawyers are
incapable of accepting something another lawyer writes without changing
it. The result in this case will probably not be as good.

)..

1

<

I would appreciate your seeing whether additional facts are
available as follows:
The majority relies on a single study (as I understand it) to

,.,•:

the effect that fewer than 2300 lawyers will be needed to accommodate

' .
'

all indigent petty crime cases. You translate this into $23, 000, 000
assuming $10,000 per year. The minimum charge per hour .. prescribed

~

by any state law with which I am familiar or in any law office - is
$15. 00. If you assume 30 hours per week - which is certainly a
minimum in litigation - my arithmetic results in $22, 500 per lawyer.
If public defenders were used, perhaps you would not have to pay this

much on the average. The starting minimum wage for lawyers in

~

..

government and law firms is about $14,000 per year•
•

;"

,

2.
But I question the basis assumption that 2300 lawyers would be
adequate or that the cost would be as low as even my figures would
project.
You might do the following: (i) read, if you have not done so,
the article relied upon by the majority and see how solid it looks; (ii)
obtain the actual figures appropriated by the Congress for the OEO
Legal Services Program, going back to the first year 1965 and record
the steady increase in the requests and the appropriations - which
all of .us who worked with that program considered inadequate; (iii)
see if there are studies by NLADA as to the increase in cost on a
national basis of legal aid - both private and state provided - prior
to and since Gideon; and (iv) take a look at the briefs in No. 71-11
I

( James v. Strange). My recollection is that these briefs will reveal perhaps the record does too - that Kansas spent about $600, 000 a year
providing indigent services 1n felony cases, an amount which has been
increasing annually. The FBI shows the number of felonies in each ,
state in its annual reports. It may show the number of misdemeanors,
although I doubt this. If one compared the number of felonies committed
In Kansas, and the cost per felony for this legal service, you might
\

come up with a figure to be applied nationally. This would be w~ on
the, low side, as obviously Kansas - with few urbanized areas - is
\

·""-

'

'

,.

·.•..
3.

not a high crime state as compared with many others. Whether this
sort of analysis is worth the trouble is a debatable question. I
certainly would not spend any large amount of time on it. The cost
problem is not what concerns me most, but 1 am convinced that reliance
upon the single study - cited in the majority opinion - presents an

,.'•·

,, .

..

unrealistic assessment of costs.
The consequences of the majority's position which concern me
the most are (a) the impact on the smaller communities, with all of
their diversity across the county; and (b) the impact on the criminal
justice system primarily 1n terms of aggravating the already acute
problem of "delayed justice" and intolerable cOJj-estion in court dockets
at all levels. On this latter polbl - which 1s the single most important
one in my thinking - I hope you can find some statistics which reflect
the impact of Gideon in these respects.. I retlize that statistics do not
measure any single cause of the present overburdened condition of

-,.
,
,,

the system. Decisions of this Court have certainly contributed
singificantly. But I suspect that the real "watershed" was Gideon

..

(which I firmly support), but which has created problems which the
system has not yet managed to master. As you and I have discussed

•'
/,

.{
~

,.
"·

I

4.
young lawyers recieve most of the appointments (except where public
defenders are provided); they are fresh out of law school, full of the
latest constitutional ''wisdom"; they are eager to make a reputation;
they often have plenty of time; and, when paid on a hourly basis by the
state, this is lucrative and attractive work. The result is that the
simplest felony case, often without a truly substantive issue, may be
litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court - a,t just
once but 10 or 20 times through state and federal habeas corpus.
I am sure studies are available somewhar~ possibly through
the Administrative Office of the Federal Court. I have seen references
to studies on the escalating flood of habeas corpus petitions, but this
is only a part of the story.

While the experience in felony cases is not completely analagou.s, it
is the best indication of what is likely to be the overburdening of the

••.

system ... in terms of delay frivcilous defenses, petitions and appeals.
I have one or two other ideas but we can talk about these.
L. F. P., Jr.

·,

'I::,,•

I

lfp/ss lee 4/7/72

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Hamilton Fox

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

April 7, 1972

Re: Argersinger v. Hamlin No. 70-5015

Here is your first draft, with a certain number of suggested
changes and with a couple of fairly verbose riders.
I would appreciate your developing a secood draft, which tries
to blend together - both in substance and sty le - our respective
contributions.

Feel free, as always, to change my verbiage and

challenge my reasoning.
Specific points - some quite minor - which have occurred to
me include the following:
1. My terminology is not always consistent. I think you used
the term "petty" offenses, and I sometimes used both petty and
,.

misdemeanor offenses. Perhaps it would be well - near the outset -

J

to define petty offenses a little more specifically than you have at
present. This might be done in a footnote, which might also refer to
18 U.S. C.

§

1 defining petty offenses under federal law.

Another example of inconsistent terminology is my use of
"the majority", the "majority opinion", and the "Court's opinion".

'>,;••

----····
)

2.
t

.

"

If there are any ground rules here as to how one should refer to the

prevailing opinion, feel free to make the necessary changes.
2. The Douglas draft makes some use of lower federal and
state court decisions. I am aware of a conflict (see ABA Standards
on "providing defense services" pp. 38 and 39 ), and wonder whether
we
have anything to gain by citing any of these cases.
I
3. &ilould we not make some reference to the fact that a number
ofistates, by statute, have extended the right to counsel into the mis1"
/

1

demeanor categories? I aave not looked at any of these statutes. I
wooder whether we could derive support from any of them for our view
that it is unnecessary to create a new, arbitrary constitutional line.
Perhaps, as a minimum, we might refer to state statutes as an example
of one way to deal with this problem without imposing on all 50 states

a new hard and fast rule?
4. In discussing cost, would it not be well to note .. without
,.

emphasis - that paying for counsel at the first trial stage is only one

'

element. Counsel will be required in all subsequent stages. In
addition a transcript of the evidence will have to be made, preserved
and made available to the accused. This would be quite impossible
in many misdemeanor courts in the smaller communities across the
..
,_:I'·

country, where neither recording facilities nor stenographers are
available.
I

/ "•·

..

.' .

.

;

3.
5. I am still tempted to include, at least in a footnote, the
SG' s suggestion that - in view of the obvious burden even his rule
would impose oo the legal profession - the requirement could be met
by using social workers and clergymen. If you have the time, take a
look at the transcript of the SG's argument. It seems to me that this
suggestion ccntradicts the basic premise that lawyers are needed.
I think the average defendant would be better off with no lawyer than
with the average social worker or clergyman - at least that would be
my own decision.
6. We have discussed Section 11 of your draft, and how you will
restructure it.
L. F. P., Jr.

fox/ss 1cc 4/8/72

No. 70-5015 ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN
Mr. Justice Powell, cmcurring in the result.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.

s.

335 (1963), held that the

states were required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to furnish counsel to all indigent defendants charged
1

with felonies. The question before us today is whether an indigent
defendant charged with an offense carrying a maximum punishment
of six months imprisonment or a fine of $1, 000 or both is entitled
as a matter of Constitutional right to the assistance of appointed
counsel. More generally, we must determine whether the Due
Process Clause requires that an indigent charged with a state petty
2
offense be afforded the right to appointed counsel.
In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida

agreed that indigents charged with seriou~ misdemeanors we re
entitled to appointed counsel, but by a vote of four to three, it
limited that right to indigents charged with offenses punishable by

2.

.

,

3

t

r

.•

,...

more than six months imprisonment. The state court, in drawing

'•,

~

a six-month line, followed the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 45 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970),

,,

.,

decided shortey after the opinion below, in which we held that the
due process right to a trial by jury in state criminal cases was limited
to cases in which the offense charged was punishable by more than six

·.

.months. It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be
drawn, it must be drawn so an indigent has a right to appointed counsel
in all cases in which there is a due process right to a jury trial. An

,'•

.,

unskilled J layman may be able to defend himself in a non-jury trial
before a judge experienced in piecing together disassembled facts,
but before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is needed to marshal

-. ,
the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on
behalf of the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to counsel,
the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the offense

•.

charged is punishable by more than six months imprisonment does

.

'·'
'

..
" ,·

3.
not compel the conclusion that the indigent's right to appointed counsel
must be similarly restricted. The Court's opinion in Duncan, Baldwin
and District of Columbia v. Claways, 300 U.S. 617 (1937), reveal
that the jury trial limitation has historic origins at common law.
No such history exists to support a similar limitation on the right
to counse; to the contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was
4

available in misdemeanor but no felony cases.

Only as recently

as Gideon has an indigent had a right to appointed counsel in felony
cases. Moreover, the fundamental value protected by the right to
jury trial - tempering the possible arbitrary and harsh exercise of
power by judges - while important, is not as fundamental as the due
5

process guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that

an indigent defendant, charged with a petty offense, may, in every
case, be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel.
Nor can I agree with the new rule of due process, today enunciated
an
by the Court, thatfe,ccused indigent is entitled to have counsel provided

'

I

4.
'(',~·.

by the state in all cases where ''the statute makes any imprisonment

'..'
,.·~.

'.

6

'

,-

t..,,

a permissible penalty. " It seems to me that the line need not be

·-~ . .,

drawn with such rigidity. I think a middle course, between the
extremes of Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule as to

',,

.

imprisonable offenses, comports both Wlith the Constitution and
with the practicalities of the administration of criminal justice.

,

'

.

.,
•"', ...
,

'

I.
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need
for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when
he is charged with an offense punishable by six months or less.
7
8
In both Powell v. Alabama and Gideon , both of which involved felony

.•.-h

prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen could adequately
present their own cases, much less identify and argue legal questions
that might inhere in their cases. Many petty offenses will also
present complex legal and factual issues that may not be fairly tried
if the defendant is not assisted by counsel.

Even in relatively simple
••. ~ ..I'

cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some ether handicap,

•...

r

5.

'..

will be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences of a
misdemeanor conviction, whether they be only a brief period served
under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or
the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of
9

sufficient magnitude not to be easily dismissed by the label "petty".
As the Court notes, serious consequences also result from convictions
not punishable by imprisonment. In the fact of such consequences,
to deny the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of

;

,.

".

,

defending themselves, is to deny them a fair trial.
Whereas, a flat six-month rule would result in harsh and
unfair consequences, the rigidity of the Court's rule as to imprisonable ·

~

,,·1

offenses is also unsatisfactory. Such rules fail to reflect many
>·

relevant considerations. Some petty offense cases are complex,

..

.

others are exceedingly simple. Counsel is often essential to a
,.

fair trial but this is by no means a universal fact. As a justification

'

for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court
na:ed, "That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to wet e defend are the strongest

.,
·":~

'

,.

...,. '

...,

' '

...

6.
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts

...

f:

10

are necessities, not luxuries." Yet government often does not hire
lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the arresting police

'

..

officer presents the case. Nor do all defendants who have the money
hire lawyers to defend them on all petty charges; where the possibility
d. a jail sentence is remote and the probable magnitude of a fine
', '

seems small or where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the
11

benefits of assistance of counsel may exceed the costs.

Indeed,

. ,.

it is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend the right
of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in

.

"

cases where

the right 1K to counsel would rarely be exercised by non-indigent

-,•'

defendants.
A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are tried
'

showed that procedures were often informal, presided over by lay
12

' judges. Jury trials were rare, and the prosecution was not vigorous.
It is as inaccurate to say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial
without the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say that

,.'

'

,,

.

,,....

7.
·>

.

., '

no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the offense charged
is only a petty one.

,·

,

Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be a

/

prophylactic rule that would require the appointment of counsel to
indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is
appealing because it could be applied automatically in every case,

,J

'

I
but the price of pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in
terms of its impact on the administration of the criminal justice
systems of 50 states. This is apparent when one relfects on the
.,

wide variety of petty or misdemeanor offenses, the varying definitions

'

thereof, and the diversity of penalties prescribed. The potential
impact oft state court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their ;ju:IPElll«•A jurisdictions, ranging from
jisttces of the peace and part time judges in the small communities
/

\' -..i
·

..

(

' /' to the elaborately staffed police courts which operate 24 hours a day
l .

in the great metropolitan centers.

',.,

I

'.•

.
}·

I

I

, '

.'

I

I
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'

,
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8.

'. ,,

,

We should not adopt a rule with consequences of unknown
dimensions unless it is clearly mandated by the Constitution. The
the
majority adopts a view of/due process clause that requires the state

..

',

. .•

~

·,,:.'·

to furnish counsel to all cases where "any imprisonment (is) a
permissible punishment. " This means that wherever a state statute
or municipal ordinance authorizes imprisonment, even of the briefest
duration or as a rarely used alternative to the customary fine, an
indigent cannot be tried in any court in the land, or before any justice
of the peace or lay judge, unless counsel is knowingly waived or
provided. I find no basis in the Constitution for such a far-reaching
new interpretation of the due process clause. Nor is there any policy

•.

or administrative justification for putting the system of 50 states

.:' :·
.
'

in such a strait jacket.

'

•.

~-.,·
'

The majority opinion cites with approval the reports of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration

~

I•

•.

13
of Justic~ and the American Bar Association Project on Minimum

14
Standards for Criminal Justice.

Both of these studies recommended

.'•
\

,\

'

.... ,

~

·•·

~.t·

,,

'

" •

9.

abandonment of distinctions based on whether an offense is

.

'

characterized as felony, misdemeanor {petty offense), or traffic
violation, a recommendation in which I concur. Both studies also
emphasize, as every lawyer would agree, the importance of extending
the right to counsel beyond the arbitrary felony/misdemeanor line.
But neither went as far as the Court goes today. The President's
Commission recommended that:
The objective to be met as quickly as p~sible
is to provide counsel to every criminal defendant
who faces a significant penalty, if he cannot afford
to provide counsel himself .•. The immediate
minimum, until it becomes possible pssflpla to
provide the foregoing, is that all criminal defendants
who are in danger of subs\,rttal loss of liberty shall
be provided with counsel.

,

..

The American Bar Assocld:ion Standard relates only to
offenses punishable ''by loss of liberty", and states that "counsel
should be provided " in all such cases except for those ''types of

16
offenses for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed. "
Both studies recommended desirable goals. Neither concluded that

,.'

due process required the drawing of any particular Constitutional
line. Indeed, a central thrust of both recommendations was the
,,:

..,

•

,,

10.

.

}··

abandonment of the then existing line between felonies and misdemeanors

'

~·~·

and a recognition that the seriousness of the likely punishment is a
critical factor. 'The President's Commission spoke of "a significant
'

<
~

,.

.

penalty" and a "substantial loss of liberty". The American Bar
Association standard, addressing only imprisonable offenses, would
not extend the right of counsel to cases where "such punsihment is

'•

'

not likely to be imposed." They do not support a new inflexible
Constitutional rule.
,;

The majority opinion does not limit the right to counsel in

·.
petty or misdemeanor cases to those involving a possibility of jail,
it goes on to hold that counsel also must be provided in bther classes
of cases in which the offense is not imprisonable but the consequences
of conviction are potentially serious. Examples mentioned incillde

..••

the revocation of one's driver's license, and convictions for

.

"drunken driving or a hit-and-run escapade." The court then states:
Thus while the right to counsel extends to the
imprisonable class of offenses .. whatever they may
be called by local law - the same right must extend
also to other classes of which we have given some
exmmples. Only experience and time can give
shape and content to the entire class.

.'

I
J
.....

11.
The distinction which the Court makes between imprisonable
offenses and other "classes" of serious misdemeanors implicitly

.

'

recognizes that the due process clause does not require an absolutist
17

rule with respect to any specified class of cases.

The result

of the holding today is to create three categories of petty or
misdemeanor offenses: (1) where there is any possibility of

a jail sentence, however remote its imposition or brief its duration;
(11) "other classes" - of which a few examples are given - which
"only time and experience" can define; and (iii) offenses labeled
"de minimum" which, although not precisely defined, presumably
include minor traffic charges. As to the first category, a lawyer
must be provided in every case regardless of circumstances; as to
the other two, a lawyer must sometimes be provided. I cannot find
in the due process clause of the Constitution any justification for
this potpourri. Admittedly, the question presented in this case
is an extremely difficult one, involving fundamental rights which
,

'

must be protected and the day-to-day viability of the diverse court
systems of 50 states. But it seems to me that the solution lies

,..

~

.

'

12.
.....
"
(

~

in adherence to principle - not In the drawing of inflexible lines
V

,,

which are nowhere delineated In the Constitution. The due process

;

n'

principle of :lhndamental fairness In trials should be our guide.
I conclude that the only rule required by the Constitution
' J,

is one of fairness hccrimtnal trials. Although this ts not a rule
of exactitude, it is in accord with the principle of fundamental

fairness long recognized as Inherent in the meaning of due process.
Unless due process requires the line drawn by the majority, we have
a duty to consider the consequences of disruption of the criminal
justice system and seek an accommodation which abalances the
~

desirability of counsel in all criminal cases with what is feasible
in the thousands of courts which must live with the rules prescribed

,

'

--

by this Court.

.

,,

II.

The majority's treatment of the practical impact of today's
decision seems to me to be entirely inadequate. It over looks two
very important factors.

First, it ignores totally the potential impact

,,

,,
''

.

'

'

13.
111
on our already overcrowded local court systems of the all-too-

common tactic of exhausting every possible legal avenue without
regard to its probable pay-off. In some cases this may be done

19
for purposes of delay.

More often, the absence of direct economic

impact on the client plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim motivates such a choice. It is often the case that
young lawyers, fresh out of law school receive appointments in cases

deemed by the courts to be of little significance. The admirable
zeal of these men; their eagerness to make a reputatb'.>n; the time
their not-yet crowded schedules permits them to devote to minor
legal prbblems; their desire for courtroom BbpBd exposure; the

..
availability in some cases of hourly fees as lucrative to the novice
lawyer as other work; along with the recent constitutional explosion
in procedural rights for the accused - all these factors result in
the devotion of an inordinant amount of time to simple and insigificant
20

cases.

Affording indigents the right to counsel in felony cases,

I

(with which I am entirely in accord, has nevertheless resulted, as

'·.

'l

'
';
...

14.
... ~.

every member of this Court can testify, in even the simplest felony
case, oftenwwithout a truly substantive issue, being litigated through

..
,.

a denial of a write of certiorari. Increasing the already serious

21
problem of clogged court calendars - including our own calendar,
cannot serve the ends of justice.
Second, the majority's interpretation of the practical consequences of today's ruling focuses on the aggregrate problem
and ignores the ability of various states and localities to furnish
counsel. That ability varies widely. Even if it were true that the
country as a whole could bear up under the strain of today's decision,
some local communities could not. Many state courts have previously
ccmsidered the question before the Court in this case. Many have

·,

.....

concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not
extend to all misdemeanor cases. In reaching this conclusion, the
state courts have drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places,
and most have acknowledged that they were compelled to do so,

22
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further.

In other

...

,,.

15.
states, legislatures and courts through the enactment of laws or
23

rules have drawn the line short of that adopted by the majority.
I think that these cases and statutes reflect the clear- j11t11e Judgment

.

'

of the courts and legislatures of many states, who understand the
tolerance of the local judicial systems far better than this Court,
that the rule announced by the Court today has far reaching
24

practical drawbacks.
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for
certiorari serve as an example of the severe impact today's
ruling will have in some localities. In November, 1971, the case
of Wri@lt v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was filed with this Court.
The case, arising out of a South Dakota Police Magistrate Court
for the municipal offense of public intoxication, DB raises the
same issues before us in this case. The Court requested that the
town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, a lawyer
occasionally employed by the town filed with the Clerk an affidavit

'***"* explaining why the town had not responded.

He explained

16.

that Wood, South BDakota, has a population of 132, that it has no

sewer or water system and is quite poor, that the office of the
nearest lawyer is in a town forty miles away, and that the town could
not afford to litigate the case.
Wood is certainly not the only town in the United states with
>•

'J..

<.

a small population, with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial
resources, but with the need to have some sort of local court system

.

t

~25

to deal with minor offenses.

Indeed, it is quite common for the

more numerous petty offenses in such towns to be tried by local
courts while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-wide

,.,. '

26

court located in the county seat.

It is undoubtedly true that some

injustices result from the informal procedures of these local courts
when counsel is not furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished
to some indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
.. ·...

furnished every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense or
every indigent who might be imprisoned, would be a practical
-\•,

,

impossibility for small town courts. The community could simply
~·· '
~

..

.!

''

7

17.
27

not enforce its own laws.
'.

Even the figures cited by the majority indicate the tremendous
impact on the present judicial structure today's ruling will have.
28

The majority cites one source which estimates that fewer than
2, 300 full-time counsel would be required to represent indigent
misdemeanants, excluding traffic violators. In comparison to the
steadily increaing number of attorneys, this figure is said to
be "insignificant'".

Furthermore, the majority notes that the

Supreme Court of Oregon has estimated that the cost of providing
counsel to indigent misdemeanants in that state will be about
29

$300,000 per year.

Apparently the majority concludes this is

a tolerable expense.
At no place does the majority demonstrate that there are
enough lawyers willing or able to do the not always rewarding work
30

of defending indigents in petty cases.

Nor does the majority
'•

..

suggest'\lhat the total cost of such a program would be. The source
I:,.,

cited by the majority estimates the cost of defending all indigent
I•

,..:

.

•,
;,

,....

,, .

.
'

,

.
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18.

misdemeanants, a:xm excluding traffic offenses, to ax total between
~

'

31
$31. 5 million and $46 million per year.

.,

.

·«·
~~.

,.

If indigent traffic offenders

were afforded counsel, something which the majority does not
totally reject, the cost shoots up to between $392, 920, 000 and
$415,560,000 or between $260,120,000 and $274,620,000 if counsel

I'.

32
is furnished by expanding public defender offices.

..

' .

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United states, urged
the Court to adopt a new constitutional rule which would require

33
counsel ( or a new trial) "before any imprisonment is in fact imposed. "
Although this is less stringent than the rule announced today by the
Court, the Solicitor General was nevertheless concerned by the
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the expense of
compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement
of defense counsel will "require more pretrial time of prosecutors,
more courtroom time and this will lead to bigger backlogs with
present personnel Court reporters will be needed as well as
34
counsel, and they are one of our worst bottlenecks."

r,.

i..'·

19.
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule should not be
made retroactive, the Solicitor General commented on the "chaos"
'

which could result from any mandatory requirement of counsel in

.

-i:.,.

misdemeanor cases:
If ••• this Court's decision should become fully

applicable on the day it is announced, there could be
a massive pile-up 1n the state courts which do not now
meet this standard. This would involve delays and
frustrations which would not be a real contribution
to the administration of justice. 3 5
Finally, the degree of the Solicitor General's proper concern was
reflected by his unique suggestion with respect to the extraordinary
demand for counsel which would result from the new rule. Recognizing
implicitly that, certainly in many sections of the country, there simply
will not be lawyers available for this demand either in the short or
long term, the Solicitor General made the unique suggestion that
"clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persoo.s
of that type" be used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving

36
small sentences. "

Quite apart from the practical and political

problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 states which require

'

'

'

,,,'/

"

·,-.

. ,:

20.

~,~

I

"....

a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion

J"

with the meaning of the term "assistance of cwnsel" long recognized

,,J..

h

l, .

.,
,,

in our law.

···-,·,~

.'

'
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If I believed that due process required the assistance of

counsel in every case or that the only workable method of insuring
justice was to adopt a prophylactic rule, I wwld not hesitate to
join the majority opinion. But I believe that the majority's rigid
rule is a departure from due process. Although the full consequences
of that departure are difficult to foresee, it is evident that there
will be serious problems of availability of counsel, of costs, and

,•

an
especially of intolerable delay 1n n already overburdened system.
In my view the concept of dmdamental fairness leads to a middle way

which will better serve the ends of justice and the practical realities
of the judicial system.

I

\

m.

\
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~

I
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Under the general rubric that due process requires the

..

I
1

appo1ntment of counsel in all cases punishable by more than six
\
I

~

~

I \

\
I
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moo.tbs and in some petty cases, I would permit trial courts to decide
y

cm. a case-by-case basis whether fundamental fairness requires that

37

the accused be accorded the assistance of counsel.

The determination

should be made before the accused formally pleads; many petty cases
are resolved by guilty pleas in which the assistance of counsel may
38
be required.

.

>

Indeed, the Petitioner pled guilty in this case. If the

trial court should determine that the assistance of counsel is not
\

required in any case, it should state in some manner so that tile
issue is preserved for review its reasons for so concluding. 'l"'he
trial court then becomes obligated to scrutinize carefully, the
subsequent proceedings for the protection of the defendant. When
the unrepresented defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the
Court should examine the case against him to insure that there is
admissible evidence tending to support the elements of the offense.
, If a case goes to trial without defense counsel, the court should

intervene, when necessary, to insure that the defendant adequately
brings out the facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from

\
\
\

1\

,,

'

22.

being overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly
against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate courts should
carefully scrutinize all decisions not to appoint counsel and the
.,,

~.

"•'•-

proceedings which follow.
.,

..

·t ~--.

It is, of course, impossible to create a precise set of

.

"'

guidelines for judges to follow in determining whether the appointment

';•'.... '

of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three
,,.

.·,, .
.
.

.

'

.11.

'\

(.

.

·'1'·'..
}

consider the complexity of the offense charged. Charges of exceeding
·,

'..

1he posted speed limits will rarely present complex legal or factual

...,

~_

questions, but charges that contain difficult intent elements or which
\
I,

•

often raise collateral legal questions such as search and seizur~
\

,·,.

\

problems, may be too complex for an unassisted layman.

'
I

.,:_ '

'\

\ ·,

\

\

'-.·, \

Second, the court should consider the probable senten~e

I),

I
\

that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The more serious tbe

\
likely consequences, the greater is the probability that a laW)e r
....••, .

sbrould be appointed. Imprisonment is not the only serious
I

,, .....

'

\

,:...

,·\·
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consequence the court should consider; to some indigents, a
substantial fine or a drunk driving conviction may be more serious
39

than a few days in jail.

The revocation of a license under certain

circumstances could result in grave consequences.
Third, the court should consider the individual factors peculiar
to each case. These are, of course, the most difficult to anticipate.
One relevant factor is the competency of the individual defendant to
present his own case. The attitude of the community toward a
particular defendant or particular incident is another consideration.
But there may be other reasons why a particular defendant has a
peculiar need for a lawyer which wruld compel the appointment of
counsel in a case where the court would normally think this unnecessary.
Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges is
crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring
the consideration of the varying factors in each case.
The rule I advocate is generally similar :tJa in a limited way

.
·.'

to the special circumstances rule of Betts v. Jrady, 316 U.S. 455

,.

24.
(1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), which this Court
40

overruled in Gideon.

I am aware that one of the reasons for turning

,.
I •

:,

.. .

away from that rule was the failure of state courts to live up to
their responsibilities in determining on a case-byl-case basis whether
counsel should be appointed. See the concurring opinion of Mr.

'

,•,Ii.

t.

Justice Harlan in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 350-51. But this Court should

...
(,

not assume that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
..

rights of defendants will continue indefinitely. Certainly if the Court

',
·, ..
•,

.

'..J.
,,

41

continues to read prophylactic rules into the Constitution,

that

sq

.

I

the state cwrts will be unable to develop their own case law ap1plicable

\
to their particular local situations, there is no reason to think tl~at

\,,

insensitivity will abate.

'I

l
\ l

\

The according of some discretion to the courts will not 1ob,ha-te

.

I

all of the practical problems of expanding the indigent's right to ',
counsel in misdemeanor cases. But it will facilitate an orderly

'.
''

I

\

transition to a far wider availability of defense counsel. In this

\I

I

process, the courts of first instance which decide the misdemeanor

\

·,

,.

25.

type cases must recognize a duty to consider the need for counsel
in every case where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guidelines to
assure fairness as may be prescribed in each jw,dE.bi jurisdiction by
legislation or rule of court, should be considered where relevant.
The goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel
so that no person accused of crime need stand alone if counsel is
needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in accord
with the views expressed above, I concur in the result of today's
holding.

26.

FOOTNOTES
,.

1. While it iB true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the
Court in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was
quick to suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon
did not require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to
··,··

.;

appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U.S. at
. !,

351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed

,'t '

.'
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor

....

./

cases. See In Re Gault, 387UU. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,

,.,, .
•

389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas tic& 389 U.S. 109, 114
(1967); Loper v. Beto, _ _ U.S.

- - (1972).

2. I define "petty offense" as the Court defined it in
.,

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970): Any offense where
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months. I would
include in that definition all offenses not punishable by imprisonment,
regardless of the amount of any fine that might be authorized. To
this extent, I would differ with the Federal statutory definition of
"petty offense" which would include bffenses for which imprisonment

'

.,

27.
for more than six months was net authorized but in which a fine in
excess of $500 was. 18 U. S. C.

§

1.

.~.
3. 236 So. 2d 442 (1970).
4. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932).
'·

5. Although we have given retroactive effect to our ruling
in Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1953), we have
said that, "[t ]he values implemented by the right to Jury trial would
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons

.

'

convicted in the past by procedures not consistent withthe Sixth
Amendment right to rjury trial. " Destefano v. Woods, 392 U.S.
631, 634 (1958).
6. The Court extends the right to counsel to certain other
classes of misdemeanor or petty offenses depending upon the severity
of the likely punishment. The majority opinion attempts no definition
of these other classes of offenses. It does say, correctly, I think,
that "the risk of imprisonment is not the exclusive test of right
to counsel", and cites - as examples of cases where counsel should
be required - the revocation of a driver's license under certain
I

I

I

I

•.,

'

~

28.

circumstances, and cases where "stigma may attach to an offense
such as drunk driving or hit-and-run escapade." In commenting on
these examples, the Court states that "the same right must be extended

,,
••

also to other classes of which we have given some examples, ''but
suggests no guidelines for identifying such classes or their limits.
7. Supra note 4 at 68-9. (1932).
8. 372

u. s.

at 343-45.

•,·
•.

9. See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal

-,.,..
'

Cases in American state Courts, 132 (1965).

10. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

u. s.

at 344.
.,·

X

11. 11 petty offenses, there is much less plea negotiation

than in serious offenses. See Report by the President 's Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of XXXK Justice, The

'•

'•

Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 134 (1967). Hereinafter
cited as "Challenge". Thus, in cases where the evidence of guilt

.
'

is overwhelming, the assistance of counsel is less essential to
obtain a lesser sentence.

.•. '
'

29.
•·

12. Silverstein, supra note 9, at 125-26.
13. Challenge, supra note 10, at 128.
14. American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services, pp. 37-39 (1968).
15. Challenge, supra note 10, at 150.
16. ~ A B A standards, supra note 14, at 150.
The American Bar Association standard recommends that counsel
"should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable
.,

by loss of liberty, except those types of offenses for which such

k

punishment is not likely to be imposed• . •. " The accompanying
commentary notes that "the standard seeks to distinguish t hos\e classes
I

\

of cases in which there is real likelihood that

\

ir,lt,airc e rtaion
\ '

,.

may follow conviction from those types in which there is no s1:1c.h
likelihood. " Id. at 37.
\

\
\

17. The Court's opinion seems to depart from its own logi\-!
\

\

when it concludes that "losing one's driver's license may be more \'\
\

serious than spending 1a day in jail. " If this be true (and certttinly
"

,.
,.

·,

~-,

_:,:'"

'',

30.
it is in many instances), why should there be a rigid ''no-lawyer
no-jail" rule and a more flexible one with respect to driver's licenses?
Although the majority opinion is possibly ambiguous, I do not read
it as holding that counsel must be provided in every case - regardless

of the circumstances - where a driver's license may be revoked.
There aee countless traffic court cases in which revocation does

•

t~
...

not deprive one of a means of livelihood or do more than impose
a certain inconvenience. A teenager, living with his parents - for

·,

...

..

.
•,·

example - may present quite a different case from the father of
a family whose license to drive a truck is vital to his job.
18. SeeB. James, Crisis in the Courts, ch. 11 (1967);
Challenge supra 145-56.

,,
•.1'

.,,•
'7

19. See, e.g., James, supra note 18, at 27-30; Schrag,
On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New
York City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
20. In Cook County, Illinois, a secret study revealed that
the members of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the
Defense of Prisoners, which represents indigent defendants, when
appointecl as counsel, "go before a jury on 63 per cent o, their cases
that go to trial, retained and appointed counsel on 33 f.Jer cent

...

"'
,

31.

.
'"

and the public defender on only 15 per cent. One possible explanation
for this contrast is that committee counsel, who are sometimes
serving in part to gain experience, are more willing to undertake
a jury trial than is an assistant public defender, who is very busy
and very conscious of the probable extra penalty accruing to a
defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks and W.
Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158-59 (1968)
(footnotes XXIO!ll1mJlit omitted).
21.

For example, in the term beginning in October, 1960 and

.

'

ending June, 1961, this Court docketed 2, 291 appeals and petitions
for certiorari. Ten years later, the total was 4, 212.
2 2. See Irvin v. state, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283
(1967); Burrage v. Supreior Court, 105 Arz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313
(1969); Cableton v. state, 243 Ark. 351 , 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967);
\

, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 ( Fla. 1970); People v. 'pupree,
42 Ill. 2d 249, 246 II E. 2d 281 (1969); MacDonnel v. Commonwea1th,
230 N. E. 2d 821 (Mass. 1967); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich. 538,
147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); People v. Lettorio, 16 N. Y. 2d 307, 213

\

'

''·.
32.
N. E. 2d 670 (1965); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 142, 456

·'

I

•.
;•,,,\,

P. 2d 696 (196®; State ex rel. Plutshack v. state Department of Health

...•'

and Social Services, 37 Wisc. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 549 (1968).

'.

~

•:

23. See Hawaii st. Const. , Art. I,
Code Ann.,

§

§

11 (1968); Idaho

19-852 (1969 Supp. ); Kan. Gen. stat. Ann.

§

22-4503

(1970 Supp.); Kj. Crim. Proc. Rule 8. 04; La. Rev. stat. , Title 15,
·Art. 141 ( F); Me. R. Crim. P. 44; Md. R 719 (b)2(a); Neb. Rev.

1...,.,·, <·
,;-,_

·,,.'

~-:;-. '7

Stat., § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. · stat. §§ 171. 188, 193. 104
(1969); N. M. stat. Ann.
§

§

40-2017 (1970 Supp. ); Utah Code Ann.,

77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. state Ann., Title 13,

Supp. ); Va. Code Ann.,

§

§

6503 (1970)

19. 1-241. 1 (1970 Supp.).

,.4.

'

24. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:

·~..

Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded that
the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases. '1f no
such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned counsel
in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing' proposition,

"

,

..

' •.

~·.

33.

then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds and lawyermanpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that it be
'nothing'." But see state v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888
(1967).
25. See Cableton v. state, supra note 16, at 538-39;
l'[T]here are more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are
resident practicing lawyers and ..• there are counties in which
there are no practicing lawyers. The impact of [right to counsel
·,
in misdemeanorsJ would seriously impair the administration of justice

in Arkansas and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession."
26. See Silverstein, supra note 7, at 125-26.
27. The successful implementation of the majority's rule
would require state and local governments to appropriate sonsiderable
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three states with
21 %of the nation's population provide more than 50% of all state
appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense of
an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 (1970).

-.

.,

34.

•·.

-

'

For example, in 1971 the state of Kansas spent $570,000 defending
-~.

f,

indigents in felony cases - up from $376,000 in 1969. Although
the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature has
appropriated BJ only $400, 000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
Strange, Ma 71 ... 11. "In view of American resources the funds spent
on the legal services program can only be regarded as

~

trivial. " Cappelletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern

l

"·'

Theme, in Cappelletti and Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and
Variations, 24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 379 (1972).

"Although the

American economy is over eight times the size of the British and

•.

'..•...
,

•,..J,,,

.

:·'\,

the American population is almost four times as great, American
legal aid expenditures are less than two times as high." Id., n. 210.

....

,

'

• r.

•

28. Dollars and Sense, supra note 27, at 1260-261.

.

...'

}

··!,I!

..,

:;,

29. Application of Stevenson, _

Ore. _ , 458 P. 2d 41 4,

..,..,,

..
..

419 (1969).

...

•,

30. The practice in many, if not most localities is to appoint
counsel on a case-by-case basis. ¢ompensation is generally inadequate.

'.

Even in the Federal courts under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,

'

.

'

..
35.
18

u. S. C.

§

3006A, which provides for the most generous compensation
.,

of any system, the rates for appointed counsel - $10 per hour spent
' ,.

out of court, $15 per hour for court time, subject to a maximum
total fee of $300 for a misdemeanor ease and $500 for a felony - are

."

low by American standards. Consequently, the majority of persons
willing to accept appointments are the young and inexperienced.
See Cappelletti, supra note 27, at 377-78.

'•

31. Dollars and Sense, supra, note 27, at 1263.
The figures cited in this source and by the majority are,

;

,
"

of course only estimates. An earlier, but more thorough study than
the one cited by the majority estimated the annual cost of funishing
counsel for misdemeanant defendants, excluding traffic offenses,
at $62, 500, 000. Silverstein, supra note 9, at 125. And even then,
the study admitted that the figures as to what proportion of misdemeanor
defendants were indigent "are almost totally lacking. " Id. at 124.
32. Dollars and Sense, supra note 2g, at 1264.
In fiscll 1966, the federal government appropriate $27, 000, 000

tc> the OEO legal services program. Voorhees, The OEO Legal

·
..

.

:,

',.

.,
I

~

•

36.
Services Program: Should the Bar Support It?, 53 ABA J. 23, 24
n. 6 (1967). In fiscal 1971, this figure jumped to $61,849,000, and
for fiscal 1973, the estimated financing is $71, 500, 000. The Budget
of the United states Government, Appendix, Fiscal Year 1973, at 103
( 1972). The expenditures of private legal aid groups are also increasing.

.'

For example, for the calendar year 1967, The Legal Aid Society of
New York City spent

~

;'

$3, 001, 976. The Legal Aid Society -

'.

Annual Report - 1967. In 1969, the figure had increased to
$4, 822, 254. The Legal Aid Society 1969, 94th Annual Report.
>.

~.

...'

33. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 33.

•.

·:,,

.

...,

34. Id. , at 34-5.
35. Id., at i1bdac 36-7.

..,

•

36. Id. , at 39.

,·

..

\

!,•

37. It seems to me that such an individualized rule, w\llike
a six-month rule, does not present equal protection problems m1der
this Court's decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
Douglas v. California, 384UU. S. 436 (1963); and Mayer v. City of \

Chi~ago, - - u. s.

(1971).

\

37.
·.•

38. See, e. g. , Katz, Municipal Courts - Another Urban Ill,
20 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-6 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (('A 5 1965).
Although there is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see
note 9 supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that
the defendant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt,
can make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial.

..

39. Indeed, it may lead to a jail sentence if, the indigent
cannot pay the fine. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 495 (1971).
40. I am not backing away from the overruling of Betts in
Gideon with which I am in complete accord. Betts, like Gideon,
concerned the right to counsel in a felony case. See note

supra.

Neither case controls the result in this case.
41. E. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. s. 436 (1966); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.
263 (1967).

s.
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38.

·"

A similar recognition of the unwisdom - if not impracticality "

.

'li:.o,"'

of a universal rule is recognized in Rodridguez v. Rosenblatt, 58

,,' .

N. J, 2d 281, 295 (196 ), where the Court said: "The practicalities

' ,.

may necessitate the omission of a universal rule for the assignment
of counsel to all indigent defendants and such omission may be
tolerable in the multitude of petty municipal court cases which do
not result in actual imprisonment or in other serious consequence
such as the substantial loss of driving privileges. But, as a matter
of cimple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a

.

~· r •"
,if,.'

conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence

c.,i 1

,.

•'

~~.

.,..

•.

,(

rr_tagnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to hai;e

.,

•,.i.,
I

;,,

counsel assigned without cost. Our municipal court judges have had '
and continue to have broad discretion to assign free counsel to indigent
,,

•

defendants whenever justice so requires. That discretion may be
..

~· '

, exercised liberally under general guidelines without entailing the
teared inundations. "
I

I
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

.

)

April 12, 1972
Re: No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin

j

Dear Bill,

-'J

l
I

This case seems to me peculiarly one in which a Court
opinion is essential -- in order to give intelligible guidance to
the countless courts in the country where the problem involved
will arise every day. With that objective in mind, I take the
liberty of expressing my difficulties with your opinion in its
present form:
(1) While I may be alone in this view, I could not join

an opinion that says the entire Sixth Amendment is made
applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I would hope, therefore, that you might be able to tone down
the first sentence of the second paragraph on page 2 for my
benefit.

'

l
1
I

•'

- - (2) A much more basic difficulty is that I cannot agree
that counsel is constitutionally required "if the offense is in
the imprisonable class -- that is to say if the statute makes any
imprisonment a permissible penalty . . . " (page 9 of your
opinion). There are undoubtedly a myriad of statutes and ordinances that make imprisonment "a permissible penalty," but
for whose violation imprisonment is virtually never imposed -spitting on the sidewalk, jaywalking, smoking in the subway,
etc. I think the correct standard is the one you quote from
Application of Stevenson in the first quoted paragraph on page 12
of your opinion. That is, I think that a person cannot be actually sentenced to imprisonment unless he had a lawyer at his
trial.

·,

- 2-

.,.
(3) The issue before us is whether the Florida Supreme
Court was correct in holding that the Constitution permits a
prison sentence of up to six months even though the defendant
did not have a lawyer at his trial. I would confine our decision
to resolving that issue (in the terms expressed above), which
is difficult enough. I could not join an opinion that seems to
decide in advance that a lawyer is also required in various other
criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings -- whether involving the loss of a driver's license, revocation of parole or probation, the attachment of 1stigma," or
whatever.

•
'··

;,

'

.
J,,.~

'

Sincerely yours,

¥it,

\

Mr. Justice Douglas

.;~_,

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

April 17, 1972

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

I

Re:

...

No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin

I

.,,

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

r

I have received various suggestions

.,

I

from the Brethren, particularly from

,,

I

Bill Brennan and Potter Stewart, and on

I

the basis of their suggestions I have rather

.

•,.

drastically overhauled and rewritten the
opinion in this case narrowing the grounds
and limiting the reach of the new proposed
rule.

l

~v \

WilYi~.n/Y. Douglas
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Jla..-frm¢on. ~. <If. 2.0ffe"''
C HAMeEA S OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April HJ, 1972

70-5015, Argersinger v. Hamlin

Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Douglas
Copies to the Conference

/

.in.vrtmt <!f4ttttl of tq.e 'Jllnittb .§taus
~rulftingttttt, ~- <q. 2llffe'!~

j

CHAMBERS 01"

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

April 20, 1972

RE: No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin
Dear Bill:
I agree.
Sincerely,

;5d)
Mr. Justice Douglas
cc: The Conference

,,

··,

'

j;u.p-rrtnr (!Jam:f !ff tlri- ~ttitdt ;%,tnu.o

'J.'tl'rto!p.n~tcm, gl. <!J.

2.0~)1-~

CHAMee:ns OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 20, 1972

Re:

No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v.
Hamlin

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
Copies to Conference

fox:/ss 4/21/72

lee

Rider A, page 4
Stigma may attach to a drunken drivint conviction on a hit and
10

run escapade.

Losing one's driver's license is more serious for

some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell v. Brown, 402 U.S.
535, 539 (1970), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit
of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interests
of licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be
taken away without that procedural due process required
by the Fourteenth Amendment. "

,.

The bJI states must afford the individual due process for the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. When the deprivation of

..
'

I

property rights and interests are of sufficient consequence, denying
the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending
1

themselves, is a denial of due process.
10. See James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-35 (CA 5 J969).

•J,

\
70-5015-CONCUR
10

ARGERSIKGER v. HAMLIN

It may be that the dictates of fundamental fairness
occasionally demand) a -et"ottd, prophy!Mtie rule rather
than a more ,-,:P:<irrgw, flexible rule. ,(The Ct.mt t sirntd<l
fashion a prophylaoti ·ulewhen xp ,· 1ce tQaches;
that such an overbroad approach is the 011ly feasible way
of protecting due process. I am unwilling at this time
to join the rule the majority sets forth not only because
we have no experience with respect to the adequa.cy of
a more flexible approach, but also because of the disruption of the criminal justice system which the rule
prescribed by the majority will entail.
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Perhaps it will be said that I °kive m{clue , w~emifigh~ttttoo- - - -- -- - -~ ~ - .
the possibility of short term "chaos" and long term
adverse effects on the system. The ~ answer may
be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. If I believed that the guarantee of due process
required the assistance of counsel in every case or t 1at
t~e o~ly workable method of insuring justice was to
a opt ~ rule, I would not hesitate to join
the majority opinion despite my serious misgivings as
to its wisdom. But I believe thaJ, tbe majeiity's 1igicf-'?-.mle is a departure from tho requirnmeut" a£ d11e process-:0 - - - - - - - ~
Althougl,. the full consequences of that d"fl•rture are -<
~ k~
-4iiffieult to foresee, it is evident 17+1:rl there will ~serious
~
problems of availability of counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay in an already overburdened
·
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It may be that the dictates of fundamental fairness occasionally
''..

demand a rigid rather than a more flexible rule. But if such a rule
,)

is required, it should not be fashioned to ignore situations in which
serious punishments, other than imprisonments, are imposed. I

...;:z.,,.

am unwilling at this time to join the rule the majority sets forth not

., ~.
,

only because we have no experience with respect to the adequacy of

.

....- "

a more flexible approach, but also because of the disruption of the
criminal justice system which the rule prescribed by the majority
will entail.

n.
The majority opinion is remarkably barren in detailing how
its rule will be implemented after establishing the rule that no
•,·.

imprisonment may be imposed unless the accused is affordtdthe

. '

opportunity to be represented by counsel, it merely asserts that
state trial judges "will have a measure of the seriousness and
gravity of the offense and therefore will lmow when to name a
lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts. " The

...
.•./·

-

......

..

~·· '

'J~--

10.

"seriousness and gravity of the offense" charged is only a rough
indication of the likelihood of imprisonment. Sentencing is, or
at least should be, a personalized procedure ia'J[ tailored to fiti:
the crime and the individual. All too often we hear the complaint
that this nation's criminal courts result in "assembly-line justice";
indeed, the majority opinion makes this point.
Since it will be virtually impassible -* for judges in the

,,

lower criminal courts to pre-judge cases on an individual basis,
each judge will have to create two categories of offenses - those for
w hich he will impose sentences of imprisonment and those in which

he will not. In creating a category of offenses which are technically
imprisonable but for which he will not impose jail sentences, a judge
will make a de facto overruling of the legislative determination as
to what offenses are imprisonable. The majority notes that there
are categories of imprisonable offenses for which imprisonment
..'•

is rarely imposed, but the occasional imposition of sentences for
these offenses may serve a valuable purpose. Sending the traffic

11.
..
~-·.
i

offender with the unusually bad driving record to a few days in
jail may help deter others and rehabilitate the individual. At least
it can be said that legislatures and judges see the threat of
'

'1

imprisonment, even if rarely carried out, to serve a valid function.
In those categories of offenses in which imprisonment is

extremely rare, trial courts are unlikely to assign counsel. This
will mean that a judge will be unable to impose a sentence of

..

imprisonment in the rare case that so warrants he appoints counsel
and holds another trial. But a secmd trial, even with counsel, might

·~
be unfair if the prosecutor can make use of evidence which came

1'·,,'

'1,

'

-.;

.(

out at the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If the
second trial were held before the same judge, he might no longer
be open-minded.

1'

,••

"'.....,.

Finally, a second trial held for no other reason

that to afford the judge an map: opportunity to impose a harsher
sentence might run afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed
in jeopardy for the same offense. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
557 (1888). In all likelihood, there will be no second trial and

,,
" '

'

'

...

-.
I

12.
certain offenses classified by legislatures as imprisonable, will
19

be treated by judges as unimprisonable.
Another danger resulting from this classification will be
unequal treatment depending on whether the individual judge ilxx has
determined to leave open the option of imprisonment for a certain

'·

defense. Thus an indigent accused will be entitled in some courts
to counsel while in another court, an indigent accused of the same
offense will have no counsel. Since the services of counsel are
not strictly related to sentencing, the arbitrary results will raise
substantill equal prctection problems.
To avoid these equal protection problems and to preserve
the option to impose a prison sentence, most judges are likely
to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offenses
where jail sentences are extremely rare. It is doubtful that the
states possess the necessary le gal resources to meet this expansion
of the right to counsel The Solicitor General who, on behal of the
United states, urged the very rule the Court today adopts was
concerned by the

W.- One wonders what happens in those cases in which an indigent
is sentenced to Jail-because he cannot pay a fine. Cf. Tate v. Short,
401 u. s. 495 (1971).
-- -

..

"'

-

'

....

,.

Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight to the
possibility of short term "chaos" and long term adverse effects on
the system. The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires
the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial.
If I believed that the guarantee of due process required the assistance
1

of counsel in every case in which a jail sentence was imposed or
(

that the only workable method of insuring justice was to adopt the
majority's rule, I would not hesitate to join the majority opinion
:(

~

·,1.,,

,·

despite my serious misgivings as to its wisdom. But I believe that,
in addition to the resulting serious problems of availabltiity of
',,

counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay in an already

. •.

overburdened system, the majority's rigid rule does not satisfy due

•,;.,

'

1r, •. ~ ...

..
... r

.

~

~

'

·~'I'

process. For while the majority rule is undoubtedly too broad insofar
as it furnishes assistance of counsel in some UBIIBBk where it will
not be needed, it is also undoubtedly too narrow insofar as it will

'

,

not guarantee the assistance of counsel in some cases where the
assistance of counsel is essential to a fair trial, but where the offense

'

\-1, '

''
· .. •

..
...

~-....'
' •.

. ,,

t

20.

charged is either non-imprisonable or one in which the judge has
determined that he will not impose a jail sentence. Even if one
assumes that the slightest jail sentence is more severe than any
other legal punishment, it is not the severity of the sentence which

.

'

determines the requirements of due process. No punishment may
be

imposed in the absence of fundamental fairness. It would be

ludicrous to suppose that in every non-imprisonable case, a fair
trial will result without the assistance of counse. Due process
requires a rule that guarantees a fair trial in all cases. Neitm r
the Bid: six-month rule nor the majority rule achieves this
result. In my view the concept of fundamental fairness leads to
a middle way which will better serve the ends of justice.

,

,.

,
•

<
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April 22, 1972

Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Although the revision of the Court opinion (3/21/72) meets

•

I,

some of my concerns, I still intend to ccmcur in the result by a
separate opinion which I hope to circulate next week.

L. F. P., Jr.

.•.

.,

'•

...,.,

~u:p-rttttc {!J!11ttt of tlf t ~ttitth j,tafts

••'.

~l't$fringhtn:. ~. QJ. 2.0ffe'-1~
CHAMBERS OF

IUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

April 25, 1972

Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin

l

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

"11
,.. ..

Although the revision of the Court's opinion (3/19/72) meets
some of my concerns, I still intend to concur in the result by a
separate opinion which I hope to circulate after my return from the
Fifth Circuit Conference.

t 'ff

,

L. F. P., Jr.

.
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1st DRAFT

SUPUEME COURT O.F THE UNITED STATES
No. 70-5015
Jon Richard Argersinger,
Petitioner,
V.

Raymond Hamlin, Sheriff,
Leon County, Florida.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Florida.

[April -, 1972]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the result.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that
the States "·ere required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all
indigent defendants charged with felonies.' The question before us today is whether an indigent defendant
charged with an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000
or both is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to
the assistance of appointed counsel. More generally, we
must determine whether the Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged with a state petty offense 2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel.
1 While it i,; true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to
8uggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gault, 3 7 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,
3 9 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967);
Loper v. Beto, - - U.S. (1V72).
~ As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonment docs not exceed six months, Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses

,

'
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors wore entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.~
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
145 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which
we held that the due process right to a trial by jury in
state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the
offense charged was punishable by more than six months.
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel lino is to
be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is
a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial
before a j uclge experienced in piecing together disassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying dght to
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the
offense charged is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointee! counsel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Du11cn11, Baldwin,
and District of Columbfrt v. Gia.wans, 300 U. S. 617
( 1937), reveal that tho jury trial limitation has historic
not punishnble by imprisonment, regardless of the amount of any
fine that might be nuthorizrd. To this extent, the definition used
herein diffrrR from the federal stntutor)' definition of "petty offense" which includes offenses for which imprisonment for more
thnn six months is not :rnthorizccl but in which a fine in excess of
$500 is. 18 U. S. C. § 1.
3

236 So. 2d 442 (1970).

...

'.;
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origins at common law. No such history exists to support a similar limitation on the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felony cases.• Only as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover,
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a jury-tempering the possible arbitrary and harsh exercise of judicial power-while important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a
fair trial as is the right to counsel."
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the
new rule of due process. today enunciated by the Court,
that an accused indigent is entitled to have counsel provided by the States in every case "·here "the statute
makes any imprisonment a permissible penalty." G It
See Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45. 60-61 (1932).
Although we lia.vc given retroactive effect to our ruling in
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. lVainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have
8nicl that, "[t]he values implementrcl by the right to jury trinl would
not mcni"urnbly be serncl b~r requiring retrial of nil persons convicted in the pnst by prorednres not consistent with the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefa110 v. Woods, 392 U. S.
681, 68..J. (1068).
0 The Conrt extends the right to counsel to certnin other claf"ses
of misdem0nnor or J1<'tty offonses depending upon the severity of the
likely punishment. The mnjority opinion attempts no definition of
the,e other rlas~<'~ of ofkn~<'6. It clo0, i":1~·, rorrrdl~·. 1 lhink , that
"the risk of imprisomn0nt is not the exrluf'ive test of right to coun..1
sci," and cites-as examples of c:1scs \\'here rounsd should be required-the revocation of a drin•r's lirensc under certain cirrumRtanccs, and cases where "stigma may attach to an offense surh as
drunk dri1·ing or a hit-ancl-mn escapade." In commenting on thcl'e
examples, the Court stnt0s that "the same right must be extended
also to other classes of which we have given some examples," but
suggests no guidelines for identifying such classes or their limits.
4

r.

..
...

•
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seems to me that the line should not be drawn with
such rigidity. I think a middle course, between the
extremes of Florida's six-month rule and the Court's
rule as to imprisonable offenses, comports "·ith the
Constitution.
I
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Alabama 7 and Gideon ,8 both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately their own cases, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be only a
brief period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be easily dismissed by the label "petty." 9
As the Court notes, serious consequences also may result
from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. In
the face of such consequences, to deny the assistance of
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending
themselves, is to deny them a fair trial.
Whereas a flat six-month rule would rernlt in harsh
and unfair consequences, the rigidity of the Court's rule
Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932).
372 U. S., at 343-345.
9
See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965).
7

8

..

~
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as to imprisonable offenses is also unsatisfactory. Counsel is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no
means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases arc
complex, others are exceedingly simple. As a justification for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries." 10 Yet government often does
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
them on all petty charges. Where the possibility of a
jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small
or where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits. 11 It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases ·where the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonindigent defendants.
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not
so classified who are in low income groups where the
engaging of counsel in a minor petty offense case would
be a luxury the family could not afford. It is common
knowledge that the line between indigency and assumed
capacity to pay for counsel is an arbitrary one, drawn
differently from State to State and often resulting in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 344.
In petty offenses, there is much lc,;s plea negotiation than in
serious offenses. Sec Rrport by the Prc~idrnt's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of ,fo8ticc, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society, 1:34 (1967) (hereinafter cited ns "Challenge"). Thus, in cases where t.!1c cviclc•nre of guilt is overwhelming,
the assistance of counsel is less essential to obtain a lighter sentence_
10
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serious inequities to accused persons on both sides of
the line. The Court's new rule will tend to accent the
disadvantage in our society of being barely self-sufficient
economically.
A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are
tried showed that procedures were often informal, presided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the
prosecution was not vigorous. 12 It is as inaccurate to
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the
offense charged is only a petty one.
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be
applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
of its impact on the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when one
reflerts on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor offenses, the va.rying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan
centers.
\Ve should not adopt a rule with consequences of
unknown clirn.ensions unless it is clearly mandated to
protect a constitutional right. The majority adopts a
view of the Due Process Clause that requires the State
to furnish counsel in all cases whern "any imprisonment
12

Silverstein, supra, n. 9, nt 125-126.
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[is] a permissible punishment." This means that wherever a state statute or municipal ordinance authorizes
imprisonment, even of the briefest duration or as a rarely
used alternative to the customary fine, an indigent cannot be tried in any court in the land, or before any
justice of the peace or lay judge, unless counsel is provided or knowingly waived. I find no basis in the Constitution for such a far-reaching new interpretation of
the Due Process Clause.
The majority opinion cites with approval the reports
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice "' and the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice.'' Both of these studies recommended abandonment of distinctions based on whether an offense is
characterized as felony, misdemeanor (petty offense),
or traffic violation-a recommendation in which I concur. Both studies also emphasize, as every lawyer would
agree, the desirability of extending the right to counsel
beyond the arbitrary felony/misdemeanor line. But
neither \\'ent as far as the Court goes today. The President's Commission recommended that:
"The objective to be met as quickly as possible is
to provide counsel to every criminal defendant who
faces a significant penalty, if he cannot afford to
provide counsel himself . . . . The immediate
m.inimum, until it becomes possible to provide the
foregoing, is that all criminal defendants who are
in danger of substantial loss of liberty shall be provided with counsel.'"
The American Bar Association Sta.ndard relates only
to offenses punishable "by loss of liberty," and states that
1

Chnllrnge, supra, n. 10, nt 128.
American l3ar As~oria1ion Projrrt on Minimum Standards for
Criminnl J ustire, Providing Defense Services, pp. 37-30 (1968).
rn Chnllcnge, supra, 11. 10, at 150.
~
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"counsel should be provided" in all such cases except for
those "types of offenses for which such punishment is
not likely to be imposed." 1 6 Both studies recommended
desirab]c goals. Neither concluded that due process required the drawing of any particular constitutional line.
Indeed, a central thrust of both recommendations was
the abandonment of the then-existing line bet\\·een felonies and misdemeanors and a recognition that the seriousness of the likely punishment is a critical factor. The
President's Commission spoke of "a significant penalty"
and a "substantial loss of liberty." The American Bar
Association Standard, addressing only imprisonable offenses, would not extend the right of counsel to cases
where "such punishment is not likely to be imposed."
Neither supports a new inflexible constitutional rule.
The Court's opinion today does not limit the right to
counsel in petty or misdemeanor cases to those involving
a possibility of jail; it goes on to hold that counsel a]so
must be provided in other classes of cases in which the
offense is not imprisonable but the consequences of conviction are potentially serious. Examples mentioned include the revocation of one's driver's license, and convictions for "drunken driving or a hit-and-run escapade."
The Court then states:
"Thus while the right to counsel extends to the imprisonable class of offenses-whatever they may be
called by local law-the same right must extend also
to other classes of which we have given some examples. Only experience and time can give shape and
content to the entire class."
rn ABA Standards, supra, n . 14, at 150. Tho accompanying commentary notes that "tho Si:mrford socks 1o distinguish those classes
of cases in which there is rral likelihood that incarceration may
follow conviction from 1hose types in which there is no such likelihood." Id ., a1 37.
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The distinction which the Court makes between irnprisonable offenses and other "classes" of serious misdemeanors implicitly recognizes that the Due Process
Clause does not require an absolutist rule with respect
to any specified class of cases. 11 The result of the holding today is to create three categories of petty or misdemeanor offenses: (i) where there is any possibility of
a jail sentence, however remote its imposition or brief
its duration; (ii) "other classes"-of which a few examples are given-which "only time and experience" can
define; and (iii) offenses labeled "de rnininius" which,
although not precisely defined, presumably include minor
traffic charges. As to the first category, a lawyer must
be provided in every case regardless of circumstances; as
to the other two, a lawyer must sometimes be provided.
I cannot find in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment any justification for such esoteric distinctions. Admittedly, the question presented in this
case is an extremely difficult one, involving fundamental
rights which must be protected. But it seems to me that
the solution lies in adherence to principle-not in tlrn
drawing of inflexible lines which are nowhere delineated
in the Constitution. The due process principle of fundamental fairness in trials should be our guide.
The Court's opinion seems to depart from its own logic when
it concludes that "losing one's driver's license may be more serious
than spending a day in jail." If this be true (and certainly it is
in many instances), why should there be a rigid "no-lawyer no-jail"
rule and a more flexible one with respect to driver's licenses? Although the majority opinion is possibly ambiguous, I do not read
it as holding that counsel must be provided in every casc--regard-·
less of the circumstances-where a driver's liernse may be revoked.
There are count less traffic court cases in which rerncation doe.' not
deprive one of a mean:; of livelihood or do more than impose a
certain inconvenience. A teenager, living with his parents-for examplc--may present quite a different case from the father of a
family whose license to drive a truck is vital to his job.
17
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It may be that the dictates of fundamental fairness
occasionally demand a broad, prophylactic rule rather
than a more narrow, flexible rule. The Court should
fashion a prophylactic rule only when experience teaches
that such an overbroad approach is the only feasible way
of protecting due process. I am unwilling at this time
to join the rule the majority sets forth not only because
we have no experience with respect to the adequacy of
a more flexible approach, but also because of the disruption of the criminal justice system which the rule
prescribed by the majority will entail.

II
The majority opinion docs not adequately address the
effect of today's decision on the administration of .i t1stice
at the petty offense level. There are significant and wellknom1 benefits from the participation of counsel in appropriate cases. But it docs not follow that benefits
flow either to the defendant or the system in a11 cases.
It seems to me that the Court overlooks the potential
impact of its holding on our already over-burdened local
courts. 18 The single greatest problem is "assembly line"
justice resulting primarily from a volume of cases far
in excess of the capacity of the system to handle. The
Court's ab~olutist rule may well exacerbate this situation
in terms of delay and congestion. We are familiar with
the common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of
delay. 1 0 The absence of direct economic impact on the
18 Sre generally H . .Tamrs, Crisis in the Courts, c. 11 (1967);
Chnllcnge, supra, 145- 156.
rn Sec, e. g., James, suvra, n. 18, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her
Majesty's Secret Service: Protrrting the Consumer in New York
City, 80 Yale L . .T. 1529 (1971) .
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client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, frequently motivates a decision to litigate
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in
cases of petty offenses. The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice lawyer; and the recent constitutional explosion in procedural rights for the accused-all these factors a.re likely to result in the stretching out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the public, added delay and congestion in the courts,
and with no assurance that the defendant will benefit." 0
Affording indigents the right to counsel in felony cases,
with "·hich I am entirely in accord, often results in
even the simplest felony case being litigated through
denial of a writ of certiorari. It is not unreasonable to
believe that there will be a similar experience with
many petty cases which do not merit such exhaustive
examination.
The majority's consideration of the practical consequences of today's ruling focuses on the aggregate problem and largely ignores the ability of various States and
20 In Cook County, 1llinois, a recent study revealed that the members of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense
of Prisoners, who arc appointed to represent indigent defendants,
go before a jury on 63% of their trinl cnses while retained nnd ap-'
pointed coun~cl do so on 33% nnd the publir defender on only 15%.
"One po~ ·ible cxpl:mat ion for this contrast is that committee counsel,
who are sometimes serving in part to gain expcriencr, arc more
willing to undertnkc a jury trial than i~ nn assistnnt public defender,
who is Yery busy and very con~cious of the probable extra penalty
accruing to a defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks
:md W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158159 (1968) (footnotes omitted).

.•
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localities to furnish counsel. The ability varies widely.
Even if there were adequate resources on a national
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of lawyers, of facilities and available funding-presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the Court in this case,
and have been compelled to confront these realities.
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misderneanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places. and
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so,
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further.n
In other States, legislatures and courts through the enactment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority. 22 These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
of many States, who understand the capabilities of the
local judicial systems far better than this Court, that
21 See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967);
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42
Ill. 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); MacDonnel v. Commonwealth,
230 N. E. 2d 821 (Mass. 1967); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich. 538,
147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); People v. Lettorio, 16 N. Y. 2d 307, 213
N. E. 2d 670 (1965); Ilendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 142, 456
P. 2d 696 (1969); State ex rel. Plutshack v. State Department of
Health and Social Services, 37 Wisc. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 549

(1968).
22
See Hawaii St. Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 19-852 (1969 Supp.); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-.J5o:3 (1970
Supp.); K~,. Crim. Proc. Ruic 8.04; La. Rev. Stat., Tit. 15,
Art. 141 (F); i\Ic. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; Md. R. 719 (b) 2 (a);
Neb. Rev. Sta t. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stnt. §§ 171.188,
193.104 (1969); N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah
Code Ann . § 77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503
(1970 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1970 Supp.).

h
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
overtax these capabilities. 23
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for
certiorari serve as an example of what today's rulillg
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
could not afford to litigate the case.
Though perhaps smaller than most, Wood is not dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court system to deal with minor offenses. 21 It is
2 3 See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minne ota:
Somo Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observa1ions, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded
that tho right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases.
"If no such dividing lino can be drawn, if the question of as:oigncd
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing'
proposition, then, tho thrust of their views was that limited funds
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that
it be 'nothing.'" nut sec State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W.
2d 888 (1967).
21
' Sec Cableton Y. State, supra, n. 16, a1 5:3S-5:39: '·[Tlhcre arc
more justice::; of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and . . . there arc counties in which there arc no-

·'
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat. 25 It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished every indigent charged with an imprisonable
offense would be a practical impossibility for many smalltown courts. The community could simply not enforce
its own laws/ 0
The majority opinion does contain some fragmentary
estimates as to the need for lawyers, assuming-one
must suppose-that they are utilized full time and are
available exactly when and where needed. One source

r

practicing lawyers. The impart of right to counsel in misdeme:rnors] \YOnld serious!~, impair the admini~tration of justice in Arkansas
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession."
25
Sec Silverstein, supra, n. 7, at 125-126.
~ 0 The ~uccessful implcmcntat ion of 1he majority's rule would
require state and ]oral governments to appropriate considerable
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three States
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all
state appropriations for indigent dcfrnse. Note, Dollars and Sense
of an Expanded Hight to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kan.·as spent $570,000
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376 ,000 in 1969.
Although the budgetary request for 1072 was $612,000, the legislature
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds
spent on the legal sen-if'cs progr:1m can only be regarded as triYial."
Cappelletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, in
C'npprllrt1i :rnd Gordie~- , Lc•gnl Aid: }Iodcrn Themes and Ynrintions,
24 Stanford L. Re,·. :347, 379 (1972). "Although the Amerif'an
economy i~ 01·cr eight times the size of the Brit.ish and the Amerir:m
J)opulatio11 i~ nlmo~1 four time, :i, gre11t . .\mrri('afl legal aid expenditures are less than two times as high." Id., n. 210 .

.

'·

70-5015-CONCUR

ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN

15

is cited "1 which estimates that fewer than 2,300 counsel
would be required to represent indigent misdemeanants,
excluding traffic violators. In comparison to the steadily
increasing number of lawyers, this figure is said to be
"insignificant." But however one may characterize
these estimates, the essence of the problem- certainly in
terms of the day-to-day functioning of the system-is
whether lawyers willing to accept assignment will in
fact be available throughout the various communities
of our country. 28
The majority opinion also touches lightly on the estimated cost. It cites one source to the effect that the
cost of defending all indigent misdemeanants, excluding
traffic offense"', will cost between $31.5 million and $46
million per year. 2 n If indigent traffic offenders were afforded counsel, something which the majority does not
totally reject, the cost soars to between $392.920,000 and
$415,560,000 or between $260,120,000 and $274,620,000
Dollar~ and Sense, SUJ)ra, n. 27, at 1260-1261.
The prnct ice in mnny, if not most localities i. · to nppoint counsel
on :1 casc-by-rnsc ba8is. Compen~ation is gcncrnlly inadequate.
Evrn in the fc,deral courts undrr thr Criminnl Justice Act of 1964,
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which proYides for rrlatively generous compensation, the rates for appointed counsel-$10 per hour spent out of
court, $15 per hour for court 1ime, subject to :1 maximum total fee
of $300 for :1 misdcmr:111or rnse and $500 for a felony-are low by
rontcmporar~' Amcrirnn standnrds. Consequently, the mnjority of
persons willing to arrrpt appointments arc the young nnd inrxperienred. Sre Cnpprlletti, su])ra, n. 27, at 377-378.
2
n Dollars and Sense, SUJ)ra, n. 27, at 1263.
The figures citrd in this somcc and by the majority are, of course,
only estimates. An earlier, but more thorough study than the one
citrd by the majority e~timatrd the mrnual co~t of furnishing counsel
for misdemeanant dcfrndant8, excluding traffic offenses, at $62,500,000. Silver~tein, SUJ)1'a, 11. 9, nt 125. And even then, the study
:1dmitted that. the figures as to what proportion of misdemeanor
defendants were indigrnt "nrc almost toally lacking." Id., at 124.
27

28
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if counsel is furnished by expanding public defender
offices. :rn
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States,
urged the Court to adopt a new constitutional rule which
would require counsel ( or a new trial) "before any imprisonment is in fact imposed." 31 Although this is less
stringent than the rule announced today by the Court,
the Solicitor General nevertheless was concerned by the
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement of defense counsel will "require more
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 32
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"If . . . this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
Dollars and Sense, supra, n. 27, at 1264.
In fiscal 1966, the Federal Govemment appropriated $27,000,000
to tho OEO legal services program. Voorhees, The OEO Legal
Services Program: Should tho Bar Support It?, 53 ABA J. 23, 24
n. 6 (1967). In fiscal 1971, this figure jumped to $61,849,000, and
the fiscal 1973, the estimated financing is $71,500,000. Tho Budget
of the United States Government, Appendix, Fiscal Year 1973, at
103 (1972). The expenditures of private legal aid group arc also
increasing. For example, for the calendar year 1967, Tho Legal
Aid Society of Now York City spent $3,001,976. The Legal Aid
Society-Annual Report-1967. In 1969, expenditures had increased
to $4,822,254. The Legal Aid Society 1969, 94th Annual Report.
31 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 33.
32 Id., at 34-35.
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delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice.:i 3
Finally, the degree of the Solicitor General's concern
was reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion with
respect to the extraordinary demand for counsel which
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving
small sentences." 3 • Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50
States which require a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the
term "assistance of counsel" long required in our law.
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight to
the possibility of short term "chaos" and long term
adverse effects on the system. The short answer may
be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. If I believed that the guarantee of due process
required the assistance of counsel in every case or that
the only workable method of insuring justice was to
adopt a prophylactic rule, I would not hesitate to join
the majority opinion despite my serious misgivings as
to its wisdom. But I believe that the majority's rigid
rule is a departure from the requirements of due process.
Although the full consequences of that departure are
difficult to foresee, it is evident that there " ·ill be serious
problems of availability of counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay in an already overburdened
33
34

ld., at 36-37 .
Jd., at 39.
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system. In my view the concept of fu11clarnental fairness leads to a middle way which will better serve the
ends of justice.

III
I would hold that indigents have a right to appointed
counsel in all cases punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment, and in some petty cases as determined by
the trial courts on a case-by-case basis.a" The determination should be made before the accused formally
pleads; many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas in
which the assitance of counsel may be required.:w If
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to
scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court
should examine the case against him to insure that there
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defense
counsel, the court should intervene, when necessary, to
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the
facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being

'.

:ir, It seems to me thal such an individualized nile, unlike a sixmonth rule, does not pre~enl c(J11nl proteC'tion proble1m under this
Court's decisions in Gri!Jin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas
v. California, 384 U.S. 436 (1963); :rnd Mayer v. City of Chicaoo,
U.S. (1971).
:<G Soc, e. g., Katz, M1111icip:1l Comts-Another Urban Ill, 20 Ca8e
Western Hesor\'C' L. Hev. 87. 92-96 (1968). Cf. Ifamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Jlarvey v. Mississippi. 3-W F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965).
Although there i~ ks~ pica negotiating in petty rasos, sec n. 11,
suvm, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the defendant who is not faced with overwhelming eYidonce of guilt, ran
make an intelligent decision \\'hrther to go to tri,1I.
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overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow.
Jt is, of course, impossible to create a precise set of
guidelines for judges to follow in determining whether
the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair
trial. Certainly three general factors should be weighed.
First, the court should consider the complexity of the
offense charged. For example, charges of traffic law infractions will rarely present complex legal or factual
questions, but charges that contain difficult intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions, such as
search and sei:rnre problems, will usually be too complex
for an unassisted layman.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follo\\· if a conviction is obtained. The
more serious the likely consequences. the greater is the
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. Imprisomnent is not the only serious consequence the court
should consider; to some indigents, a substantial fine may
be more serious than a few days in jail.'" The revocation
of a license or a drunk driving conviction under certain
circumstances also could result in grave consequences.
Third, the court should consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the competency of the individual defendant to present his own
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular
defendant or particubr incident is another consideration.
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a
peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where the court ,vould
~. Indeed, it may !rad to a jail sentence if, the indigent cannot pay
the fine. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 495 (1971).
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normally think this unnecessary. Obviously. the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges is crucial to the
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the
consideration of the varying factors in each case.
The rule I advocate is similar in certain respects to
the special circumstances rule with respect to felony cases
of Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), and Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 ( 1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon. 38 Ono of the reasons for turning away
from that rule was the failure of many state courts to
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-caso basis whether counsel should be appointed. See
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon,,
372 U.S., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue indefinitely. Certainly if the Court follows the course of reading prophylactic rules into the Constitution, so that the state
courts will be unable to develop their own case law applicable to their particular local situations, there is less
reason to think that insensitivity will abate. 3 n
38

I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts in Gideon with
which I am in complete accord. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the
right to counsel in a felony case. See n. 1, supra. N eithC'r case
controls today's result.
3
n A similar recognition of the unwisdom-if not impracticality-of
a universal rule is recognized in Rodridguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N. J.
2d 281, 295 (1957), where the Court said: "The practicalities may
necessitate the omission of a universal rule for the assignment, of
counsel to all indigent defendants and such omis~ion may be tolerable in the multitude of petty municipal court cases which do not
result in actual imprisonment or in other serious consequences such
as the substantial loss of driying privileges. But, as n matter of
simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to n con-"
viction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have
counsel assigned without cost. Our municipal court judges have had

,-
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The according of some discretion to the courts will not
obviate all of the practical problems of expanding the·
indigent's right to counsel in petty offense cases. But it
will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider availability of defense counsel. In this process, the courts
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize
a duty to consider the need for counsel in every case
where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel
is needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the
result of today's holding.

and continue to have broad discretion to assign free coum;el to indigent defendants whenever ju,;tice so requires. That discretion may
be exercised liberally under general guidelines without entailing the
feared inundations."
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in the result.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all
indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 The question before us today is whether an indigent defendant
charged with an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000
or both is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to
the assistance of appointed counsel. More generally, ,rn
must determine whether the Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged with a state petty offense 2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel.
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justire Harlan was quick to
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigcnt's right to appointed counsel should e:--i;end to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
that the holding of Gideon has noi yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Tex(UJ, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967);
Loper v. B eto, U.S. (1972).
2
As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) . It also includes all offenses
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonmC"nt.=•
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
145 (1968), and in Baldwin Y. New York, 399 U. S. 66
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which
we held that the clue process right to a trial by jury in
state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the
offense charged was punishable by more than six months.
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is t(}
be drawn, it must be clra"·n so that an indigent has a
right to appointed counsel in all C'ases in ·which there is
a clue process right to a jury trial. An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a 1101ij ury trial
before a j udg<' experienced in piecing together disassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence i11to a coherent whole consistent with the bC"st case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the
offpnse chargC'd is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment docs not compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Bald'win,
and Di.strict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617
{U)37), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic
11ot punis1111ble by im11risonmr11t, rrgar<llr;:s of the amount of any
fine th:it mighi be authorizPd. To this extent, the definition used
herrin ·d-iffers from tl,e frdprn] statutory definition of "petty offen,c," which i11ch1dt•" off Pn."r~ puni,lwblc b)· not morr th:m six
mon.i'hH' iirnp:ri,onmc-111 -or hy a finr not exceeding $500. 18 U. S. C.

§L
3

236 'Sm.. :M. -442 \(['970).
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origins at common law. X o such history exists to support a similar limitation on the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felony cases.4 Only as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counf'el in felony caf'es. Moreover.
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a jury-tempering the possibly
arbitrary and harsh exercise of judicial power-while
important, is 11ot as fundamental to the guarantee of a
fair trial as is the right to counsel. 5
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged "·ith a petty
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree "·ith the
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court,
that "a person may not be imprisoned . . . unless he
\\·as represented by counsel at the trial." G It seems
to me that the line should not be drawn with surh
rigidity.
There is a middle course, between the extremes of
Florida's six-months' rule and the Court's rule. which
comports with the Fourteenth Amendment. I ,\'Ould
adhere to the principle of due process that requires
fundamental fairness in criminal trials, and extend this
principle to encompass the right to counsel in petty
Sec Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. 8. 45, 60-61 (1932).
Although we have giYen retroactive effect 1o our ruling in
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. TVaimcright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), \\'C haYe
said that, "[t]he rnluPs implemrntpc[ b)· the right to jury trial would
not mcasumbly be srn·ed b)· requiring retrial of all persons con-·
Yiclcd in 1hc pa~t by proredures not conHi,tent with the Sixth
Amendment right to jmy trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. 8 ..
(l:ll , o:~4 (HloR).
0
It is as~umcd that the Court mean~ no indiµ:cnt may be impri~onecl if he waR not represented pro,·iclcd lh::tt he did not waivehis right to coun,el.
1

5
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cases whenever the presence of counsel is necessary toassure fair trial.
I
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Alabama 1 and Gideon,8 both of \Yhich involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that fe\v laymen can present adequately their own cases, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they Le only a
brief period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be dismissed by the label "petty." n
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Nor arc the,
consequences of conviction necessarily more serious because the sentence is one of imprisonment. Stigma may
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade. 10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell
Y. Brown, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1970), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case,
their continued possession may become essential in
Supra, n. 4, at GS-69 (1932).
372 U. S., at 343-345.
9
See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in
American State Courts, 132 ( 19G5).
i 0 see James v. Ileadlry, 410 F. 2d 325, 334--335 (CA5 1969).
7

•
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of licensees. In such cases the·
licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment."
The States must afford the individual due process for
the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. When the
deprivation of property rights and interests are of sufficient consequence, n denying the assistance of counsel
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves,
may be a denial of due process.
This is not to say that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assessment of the possible consequences of conviction is the
sole test as to the need for assistance of counsel. The
flat six-months' rule of the Florida court and the equally
inflexible rule of the majority opinion do apply to all
cases within their defined areas regardless of circumstances. It is precisely for this reason that I find these
alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, perhaps the
most fundamental concept in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line drawing·
as to every aspect of a criminal trial. Counsel
is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no
11 A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor
convictions, such a~ forfriture of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed profession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists);
N. C. Gen. Stat. §93 A-4 (1965) (real es1ale brokers)), and loss of
pension rights (Fla. Stal. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension
denied when injury is result of participation in fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514
(1948) (teacher com·icled of misdemeanor resulting in imprisonment); Pa. Sta1. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 ( 1957) ( conviction
of crime or misdemeanor)). Ser generally Project, Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 2:3 Vane!. L. Rev. 929 (1970).

. ;...
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are
complex, others arc exceedinl!lY simple. As a j ustification for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend arc the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries."' " Yet government often does
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sentence is remote a11d the probable fine seems small, or
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits.'" It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases " ·here the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonincligent defendants.
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling "·ill be to
favor defendants cla8sificd as indigents over those not
so classified who are in low income groups where the
engaging of counsel in a minor petty offense case ,mule!
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line between incligcncy and assumed capacity to pay for counsel
is an arbitrary one. drawn differently from State to State
and often resulting in serious inequities to accused persons on both sides of the line. The Court's new rule·
"·ill tend to accent the disadvantage in our society of
being barely self-sufficient economically.
~ Gideon v. lraimcrioht, :372 C. R., :it 344.
'" In prtty offm~r~. thrrr i~ muC'h lr~~ plra nrgotiation than in

1

srrious offensr~. Rrr Re-port by thr Pre~ident's Commi~sion on Law
Enforrc-mr nt and thr Administration of Just irr. Thr Ch:illrngr of
Crime in 11 Frer Soriet~·, 134 (1967) (hrrcinaftrr rited a8 "Chalkngo"). Thus, in case:, whrro lhe CYiclcnc-r of p;uilt j,, overwhelming,
the assistance of r01111Rel i8 less c8~ential to obtain a lighter sentrnce.
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors arc
tried showed that procedures \\·ere often informal, presided over by lay judges. Jury trials ,Ycre rare, and the
prosecution was not vigorous.'' It is as inaccurate to
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the
offense charged is only a petty one.'"
Despite its overbrcadth, the easiest solution ,rnuld be
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appeali11g because it could be
applied automatically in every case, but the price of
purc::uing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
of its impact on the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when one
reflects on the ,ride variety of petty or misdemeanor offcn:-es. the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from
justices of the peace ancl part-time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a clay in the great metropolitan
centers.
Siln•rstrin. supra, n. 9, nt 125-1'..?G.
Nrilhrr thr Report b~· Prr~idrnt'~ Commi,~ion on La\\' Enforr<'mrnt nm! 1hr Admini~trntion of .T11~tirr, supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the
Americnn Bnr A,~oriation Project on :\1inimum Standards for Criminnl .Ju~t ire. Pro,·idiu~ Defcll,e Srn·icr,. 37--W (1968). went the
route thr Court t:i kc~ toda~·- The Prl'Ridcnt 's Commi~~ion rrcommrnclc•d that roun~cl be proYided to criminal defendant:; who face
"n Ri~nifirnnt prn:11t~-" ;1nd ;1t 11':tRI to thoRc \\'ho arc in dnn~er of
"R11h~t;1ntial lo~s of lihcrt)·." The American Bar ARSOC'intion stnncl:,rcl would not rxtrnd the ri1d1l to C'Onnscl 011]~- lo ca~r:; where "lo~:;
of librrt:v" iH not ''likl'I)· 1o be irnpm;ed." Neither supports a nrw,
inflexible constilutionnl rule.
14
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The rule adopted today does not go all the ,my. It
is limited to petty offC'nse cases in \Yhich the sentence
is some imprisonment. The logic of the Court's position indicates, however, that when the decision must
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations.
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need
for counsel if a jail sentence is to be imposed, one must
assume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty
offense cases. It would be illogical-and ,Yithout discernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense
cases which may result in far more serious consequences
than a few hours or days of incarceration.
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only
to the imprisomne11 t category of cases, the Court's
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. But even
today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact
upon the criminal justice system. We should not adopt
a rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions,
especially since it is supported neither by history nor
precedent.

II
The majority opm10n concludes "that a person may
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisonedhowever briefly-unless he was represented by or waived
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren
of details as to how this rule will be implemented.
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There arc thousands of statutes and ordinances which
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually
as an alternative to a fine. Those offenses include some·
of the most trivial of misdemeanors (ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses). They
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors.
This is the broad spectrum of petty offense cases which
daily flood into the lower criminal courts. The rule
laid down today will confront the judge of each of these·
courts with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not
appointed or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment of any duration may be imposed. The judge
·will therefore be forced to decide in advance of trialand without hearing the evidence-whether he will
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some
sentence of imprisonment. His alternatives, assuming
the availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without
counsel.
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice requires a personalized decision both as to guilt and tho
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tailored to fit the crime and tho individual would have
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in
which no such sentence will be gi vcn regardless of the
statutory authorization. In creating categories of offenses which by law are imprisonable but for which
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge would be
overruling de f aclo the legislative determination as to
the appropriate range of punisluncn t for the particu--

'·
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lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there
arc some classes of imprisonablc offenses for which imprisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a
valuable purpose. The mere possibility of jail may be
a deterrent. At least the legislatures, and until today
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonmenteven when rarely carried out--as serving a legitimate
social function.
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae,
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-justified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be
declared, counsel appointrd, and a new trial ordered.
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of evidence which came out at
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If
the second trial were held before the same judge, he
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offensc.' 0 In all likelihood, there
will be no second trial and certain offenses clasified by
legislatures as irnprisonable, will be treated by judges
as unimprisonablc.
The new rule announced today also could result in
equal protection problems. There may will be an unfair and unequal application of criminal statutes and
ordinances depending on whether the individual judge
10
See Callon v. H'ilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888): North Carolina v ..
Pearce, ;39.5 U.S. 711 (1960).
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has determined in advance to leave open the option
of imprisonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be
entitled in some courts to counsel while in other courts
in the same j uriscliction an indigent accused of the same
offense would have no counsel. Since the services of
counsel are not related solely to the sentences that may
be imposed. the results of this type of pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.
A different type of discrimination could result in the
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alternative is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no imprisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who
can pay a $100 fine, and does so, will have responded
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents."
To avoid these equal protection problems and to preserve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by
law, most judges arc likely to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offe11scs where ja.il
sentences are extremly rare. It is doubtful that the
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor
17
The type of prn:dty diRr11Rsrd aboYe (i1woh-ing the discretionary
alternat.i1·e of "j:1il or fine") prrRrnts srrious problems of fairnessboth to indigenlH and nonindigcnts :1ncl to 1he administration of
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 495 (1971). No adequate
resolution of these inherently diffirult problrm~ lrns yrt been found.
The rule adopted by the Court tocby, depriving the lower courts of
all discretion in 81tch cm,rs unle,;8 counsel is ayailnble and is appointed,
could aggrarnte the problem.
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General who, on behalf of the United States, urged
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement of defense counsel will "require more
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and
they are one of our ,vorst bottlenecks." 1 8
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice. 1 0
Finally, the degree of the Solicitor General's concern
was reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion with
respect to the extraordinary demand for counsel which
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving
small sentences." 2 0 Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50
Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 34-35.
Id., at 36-37.
20 Id ., at 39.
10

10

70-5015-CONCUR

ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN

States which require a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
The majority does not address the consequences of
its new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General.
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's
holding will be on our already overburdened local
courts. 21 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The
Court's rule may well exacerbate this situation in
terms of delay and congestion. We are familiar with
the common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of
delay. 22 The absence of direct economic impact on the
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, frequently motivates a decision to litigateevery issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in
cases of petty offenses. The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice lawyer; and the recent constitutional explosion in procedural rights for the accused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretchSee generally H. ,Jame;:;, Cri~i8 in the Courts, c. 11 (1967);
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156.
22 See, e. g., ,fomes, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Iler
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York
Ci Ly, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
21
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the public, added delay and congestion in the courts.~~
There is an additional prnblem. The ability of va.rious States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely.
Even if there were adrquate rcsourrc>s on a national
basis, the unernn distributiou of these resources-of la\\'yers, of facilities and available funding-presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the Court in this case,
and haYe been comprllecl to confront these realities.
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so,
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further.~•
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en~" In Cook Count~·. Illinoi~, a rrrrnt stud~· rc,·ralrd thflt the mrmbcrs of the Chicago Bar As~oriation's Committee on thr Defense
of PrisonNs, who arc appointrd to repre,ent indigrnt defendants,
go before a jury 011 63% of thrir trinl ra8e8 while retninrd and appointed roun~cl do so on 33% and the public clrfrnclcr on only 15%.
"One possible explanation for thi,;, contrnst is that committee counsel,
who :1re sometimes scn·ing in part to gain experience, :1re more
willing to unclrrl:1ke a jury trinl thnn is an assi8tnnt public defrndcr,
who is very busy and vrry ronscious of the probablr extra pemlty
accruing to a drfcnd:mt who losrs hi~ case brfore a jury." D. Oaks
and W. Lrhmnn, A Crimin:1! Justice System nnd the Indigrnt, 158159 (1968) (footnote., omitted).
4
~ See ln•in "· State, 44 Ah. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (19o7);
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. ;151, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Argersinger v. Ilamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42·
Ill. 2d 249, 2-!G K. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mallory, 2i8 l\firh.
538, l+i N. W. 2d 66 (196i); lfrndrix \'. City of Seattle, i(l \Va~h.
142, 456 P. 2d o9G (19<l9); State ex rel. Plutshark v. State Department of Ilea/th and Sotial Scn•ices, 37 WiH. 2d i13, 155 N. W. 2d
549 (1968).
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actrnent of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority."'' These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
of many States, who understand the capabilities of
local judicial systems better than this Court, that
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
overtax these capabilities."(;
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for
certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71- 5722, was
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication , raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the tO\\"ll of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the tom1 had not
rcsponclccl. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
has a population of 132, that it has no se"·er or water
~~ See Hawaii St. Con~t.. Art. I. § 11 (l9f\S); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 19-S.'52 (Hlf\!) S11pp.); K:111. C.rn. , tat . .\1111. § 22-4503 (Hl70
~11pp.): R\. Crim. Pror. H11lr ts.04: L:t. Hr\·. Stat., Tit. ];j,
!\rt. 141 (F); :\fr. Hulr Crim. Proe. 44; :\Id. H. 719 (b) 2 (:1):
Nl'b. Hr\·. Stat. § 29-1803 (l9fi7): N(',·. HrY. Stat. §§ 171.lSS,
Hl3.104 (1969); K. :\Irx. Sbt. An11. § 40-2017 (1970 S11pp.); Ptnh
Code Ann. § 77-G4-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § G503
(1970 Supp.); Vn. Code Ann. § 19.1-2-H.l (1970 Supp.).
~G Sre Knmisnr & Choper, Thr Hight to Coun~cl in Minnesota:
Some Field Finding~ and Lrgnl-Poliry Obsrrvations, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, GS (1963). Locnl judges intrn·irwrd by the author:,; concluded
that the right to roun;;cl should not be rxtendrd to petty cases.
"If no such di\·iding Jinr cnn br drawn, if the question of assigned
counsel in misdemeanor case., resoh·es itself into an 'all or nothing'
proposition, then, the thrust of their virws wn8 that limited funds
nnd lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial eeonom_\· dictate that
it be 'nothing.'" But 8ee State v. Bor$t, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W.
2d 888 (1967).

.
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system and is quite poor, that the office of the ncarC'st
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
had decided that contesting this case would be an un \\'ise
allocation of its limited resources.
Though uncloubteclly smaller than most, Wood is not
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court system to deal with minor offenses." 1 It is
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat." 8 It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal
procedures of these local courts ·when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for
many smalltown courts. The community could simply
not enforce its own la,Ys. 20
27 Src Cableton "· State, supra. n. 24, at 538-539: "[T]hrre arc
more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and . . . thrrc arc rountics in which there arc no
practicing lawyers. The impart of right to counsel in misdemeanors] would seriously impair the administration of justice in Arkansas
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession."
2 R Src Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
2 n Thr surcr,sful implrmrntnt ion
of the majority's rule would
require state and local governments to appropriate considrrnble
funds, something they have not bren willing to do. Three States
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, .55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000
defending indigents in felony casrs-up from $376,000 in 1969.
Although tho budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.

r
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Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" allcl to
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system.
The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the
guarantee of due process required the assistance of
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed
or that the only workable method of insuring justice
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay
in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth
Amendment problems than it resolves. For while the
majority rule is too broad insofar as it requires the
appointment of counsel in many cases where this is
not necessary, the rule could operate to impinge upon
the right to a fair trial where the offense charged is
either nonimprisonable or one in " ·hich the judge has
determined that he will not impose a jail sentence.
Although the Court's opinion does not deal explicitly
with any sentence other than deprivation of liberty
however brief, the according of special constitutional
status to cases where such a sentence is imposed mayunless the Court embraces an ever broader prophylactic
rule-derogate the need for counsel in other types of
Strange, No. 71-11. "In Yiew of Americnn resources the funds
spent on the legal sen ·ices progmm cnn only be regarded as trivial."
Cappelletti, Part One: The Emrrgcnrc of a Modern Theme, in
Cappelletti and Gorcllry, Legnl Aid: Modern ThemP~ and YnrintiOllH,
24 Stanford L. Re,·. 347, 379 (1972) . "Although the American
economy is oYer eight times the size of the British and the American
population i::l almost four timr~ n~ grr:1 t , Amrriean legal a id expenditure:, arc le~::l than two times as high." Id ., n. 210.

,,
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casC's. Due process rcqmrcs a fair trial m all cases.
XC'ithC'r the six-month ru]e approved below nor the
rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achicvC'
th is result.

III
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty
offense casC's is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts C'xercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis.:'° The determination
shoulr be made before the accused forma1ly pleads;
many pC'tty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m
which the a ~istance of counsel may bC' requirecl. 3 ' If
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to
scrutinize carefu1ly the subsequent proceedings for the
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court
should examine the case against him to insure that there
is admissible evidence tending to support the clements
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defense
counsel. the court should intervene, when necessary, to
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the
:w It serms to mr th:1t S\H'h an indi1·idw1lizcd rule, unlike' n Rixmonth rnlr nnd thr mn,iorit~·'s rulr, dors not prr~cnl rqnnl protrrt ion prohlrmR nnclrr this Comt ',, drri~ion~ in Griffin Y. lllinois, 351
U. R. 12 (1950); Dour;las \'. California. 384 U. 8. 430 (19fl3); nnd
Mayer\'. City of C'hirago, U.S. (1971).
:n Src, e. g., Kntz, l\foniripnl C'omi8-Anothcr Urbin Ill, 20 Cn~e
Wr~tcrn Rcserye L. Re\·. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Jlamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Ilan•ey v. Mississippi, 3·-10 F. 2d 2G3 (CA,5 1965).
Althongh lhrrr i~ lr~~ plm nrgoli:lling in prtt~- r:1~r~. srr n. 13,
supra, the assistanre of ronn~rl may still be neeclrd ~o thnt the defendant who is not farrd with O\'Prwhelming e1·iclcnce of guilt, can
make nn intelligent dcri~ion whcthrr 1o go to trial.
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facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellatr courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions
not to appoint counsel am! the proceedings ,Yhich follow.
It is impossible. as well as unwise. to create a precise
and detailed set of guiclclinrs for judges to follow in determining ,Yhrther the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges
of traffic law infractions "·ill rarely present complex legal
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult
intent elements or ,Yhich raise collateral legal questions,
such as search and seizure problems, will usually be too
complex for an uuassistcd layman. If the offense is one
where the State is represented by counsel and where
most dcfrnclants who can afford to do so obtain counsel,
there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs
the assistance of counsel.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The
more serious the likely consequences. the greater is the
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. Imprisonrn011t is not the only serious consequence the court
should consider; to some indigents, a substantial fine may
be more srrious than a few clays in jail. The revocation
of a license or a drunk driving conviction under certain
circumstances also could result in grave consequences.
Third, the court should consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These arc, of course, the most
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the competency of the individual defendant to present his own
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular
defendant or particular incident is another consideration.
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a
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peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where the court "·ould
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges are crucial to the
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the
consideration of the varying factors in each case.
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v.
v. Brady, 31G r. S. 455 (1942), and Bute Y. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948), ,Yhich this Court overruled in Gideon. 3 ~
One of the reasons for Eeeking a more definitive standard
in felony cases ,ms the failure of many state courts to
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See
tho concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon,
372 U. S., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the
Constitution, so that the state courts ,vill be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness as this concept of due process has evolvC'd,
there is less reason to think that insensitivity ·will abate. 33
3 t I do not di~ngrre wi1h thr ovrrruling of Betts in Gideon with
which I am in complete nccorcl. Betts, like Gideon, concrrned the
right to counsel in a felony cnsc. Sec n. 1, supra. N rither cnse
controls today's result.
33
A similnr rrcognition of thr unwisdom-if not impractirnli1y-of
a univer"al rule is recognized in Rodridguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N. J.
2d 281, 295 (1967), where tho CourL snid: "The prnctirnlities mny
necessitate the omission of a uni,·er8nl rule for the as::;ignmenl of
counsrl to all indigent defendants nnd such omi~sion may be tolerable in the multitude of petty muniripnl court cnscs which do not
result in actual impri"onment or in other serious consequences such
as the substantial loss of driYing privileges. But, as a matter of
simple justice, no indigent clefendnnt should be subjected to a conviction entailing impri::;onmrnt in fact or other consequence of magni-

70-5015-CONCUR
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN

21

The according of some discretion to the courts will not
obviate all of the practical problems of expanding the
indigent's right to counsel in petty offense cases. 34 But it
will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider availability of defense counsel. In this process, the courts
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize
a duty to consider the need for counsel in every case
where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel
is needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the·
result of today's holding.

tudc without fir8t having had due and fair opportunity to have
counsel assigned without cost. Our municipal court judges have had
and continue to have broad discretion to assign free counsel to indigent defendants whenever justice so requires. That discretion may
be exercised liberally under general guidelines without entailing the
feared inundations."
:H Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in
this opinion will result from any rni~ing of the st andard8 as to therequiremrnt of romwel. Is is my view that the rule of judicial
discretion to assurr foir trial of petty offense,; not only comports
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in the
courts whiC'h already are under the most severe strain.

'Y /- 1,
~DRAFT

SUPREME COURT Olf THE .UNITED STATES
No. 70-5015
Jon Richard Argcrsingcr,
Petitioner,
V.

Raymond Hamlin, Sheriff,
Leon County, Florida.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Florida.

[April -, 1972]
MR. JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in the result.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963), held that
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all
indigent defendants charged with felonies.' The question before us today is whether an indigent defendant
charged with an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000
or both is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to
the assistance of appointed counsel. More generally, we
must determine whether the Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged with a state petty offense 2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel.
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in Gideon is not na.rrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was · quick to
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U. S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967);
Loper v. Beto, U. S. (1972).
2
As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Bal,dwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) . It also includes all offenses
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six mouths' imprisonment.~
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, follo\\·cd
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Lou-isiana, 391 U. S.
145 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 6G
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which
we held that the due process right to a trial by jury in
state criminal cases was limited to cases in ,Yhich the
offense charged was punishable by more than six months.
It is clea.r that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to
be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a
right to appointed counsC'l in all cases in which there is
a clue process right to a jury trial. An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial
before a judge experienced in piecing together disassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right torounsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting thC' right to jury trial to cases in ,vhich the
offense chargC'cl is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment doC's uot compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Bald,win,
and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617
( 1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic
not punishable by imprisonment, rrgardh:>Rs of the amount of any
fine that might be aulhorizrd. To this Pxtent, the definition used
herein differd from the frdpral 8tatutory drfinition of "petty offcn~c" whirh imlndrs off Pn,,es puni~hable by not more t hnn six
months' imJ)ri~onm('nt or b~, a fine not pxrccdin~ $500. 18 U. S. C.
§ 1.
3

236 So. 2d 442 (1970).
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origins at common law. No such history exists to support a similar limitation on the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felony cases:' Only as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover,
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a jury-tempering . the possibly
arbitrary and harsh exercise of judicial power-while
important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a
fair trial as is the right to counsel."
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the/
new rule of clue process, today enunciated by the Cou -t,
hat '''a--i~~R-flttl,¥-,l~berimprisoned . . . Ul11CSS he
ms represented by counsel at the trial." a It seems
to me that the line should not be dram, with such
rigidity.
There is a middle course, between the extremes of
~tJ,iV(rt~
.L
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which
comports with t 1e Fourteenth Amendment. I would
--~~I
adhere to the prillciple of due process that requires
;~ ~~ fundamental fairness in criminal trials~a.JJ.cl xtond th·
~ ~ ~
princ~
eneom·pa;s""""the right to taunsel in petty

CI

l

C

L.Lly

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. -1:5, 60-61 (1032).
"Although we have gi,·en retroacti,·e efTeC't to our ruling in
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have
said that, "rt]he values implrrnrntrd by the right to jury trial would
not measurably be served by requiring rrtrial of ::di persons conYictrd in the pa~t b:v proredurrs not ron~istent with the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S.
631, 5:34 (1968).
6 It is as~umrd that the Court mr:111~ no indi!);ent mn.y be imprisonrd ii' he was not represrntcd provided that he did not waive
his right to roun~e\.
4
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of counsel is necessary to

I
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Alabama 1 and Gideon,8 both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately their own cases, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will
be incapable of defending themselves. The conseque!1~
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be e.uzy.) a
brief period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be dismissed by the label "petty." 0
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Kor are the
consequences of conviction necessarily more serious because the sentence is one of imprisonment. Stigma may
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade. 10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell
v. Brown, 402 U. S. 535, 539 ( 1970), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case,
their continued possession may become essential in

C

7

Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932).

372 U. S., at 343-345.
See L. Silverstein, Dcfrnsc of the Poor in Criminal Cases rn
American State Courts, 132 (1965).
10
See James v. Tleaclley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334--335 (CA.5 1969).
8

0
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of licensees. In such cases the
licenses arc not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment."

~

-

The States must afford the individual due process -for- " - the- deprivationAof life, liberty, or property. When the ~
deprivation of property rights and interests t¥'e 1of sufficient consequence, 11 denying the assistance of counsel
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves.,
1t,y -be~ a denial of due process.
This 1s not to say that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assessment of the possible consequences of conviction is the
sole test as to the need for assistance of counsel. The
flat six-month/' rule of the Florida court and the equally
inflexible ru~ of the majority opinio1~ apply to all
cases within their defined areas regardless of circumstances. It is precisely j~i ~,r,bat I find these
alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, perhaps the
most fundamental concept in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line drawing
as to every aspect of a criminal trial. Counsel
is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no
11 A wide range of civil di~abilities may result from misdemeanor
convictions, such a~ forfei1 ure of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919)), disqualification for a licensed profession (Cal. Bu:, . & Prof. Code§ 3094 (West 1962) (optometrist8);
N. C. Gen. Stat . § 93 A-4 (1965) (real estate broker::,)), and loss of
pension rip;h1 8 (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension
denied when injury is re:ouli of participa1 ion in fight:, , riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Incl. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514
(194 ) (teacher convicted of mi~demeanor re:,ulting in imprisonment) ; Pa . Stat. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957) (conviction
of crime or mi~demeanor)). Sec genrrally Project, Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction , 23 Vand. L. Rev . 929 (1970).

..
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases arc
complex, others are exceedingly simple. As a justification for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
,viclespreacl belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries." '" Y ct government often docs
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
petty charges. \.Yhere the possibility of a jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits.'" It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases where the right to cou 11sel would rarely be exercised by nonincligen t clefenclan ts.
Indcecl, one of the effects of this ruling will be to
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not
so cln,ssified~,Yho are in low income groups ,\·here th
engagin~ counsel in a minor petty offense case would
be a luxury the family could not aff orcl. The line between indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel
is an arbitrary one. drawn differently from State to State
and often resulting in serious inequities to accused persons, @..n.-botlrsidm;-1,f-thQ fo~0'!' The Court's new rule
wil~nd to accent the disadvantage i.11 o~r see~ of
being barely self-sufficient economically.
e_
Gid<'O?l v. ll'aimcright, 372 U. 8., at 344.
In petty offen~es, thrrr i~ m11rh le~s plea negot1at1on than in
scriouR offen~es. 8rr Report br t hr Prr~ident's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challrnge of
Crime in a Free Soricty, 134 (19o7) (hereinafter cited as "Challrnge"). Thus, in cnscs where the r,·idenrc ol' guilt is overwhelming,
the as~i~tance of counsel is less esscntinl to obtnin a lighter sentcnre ..
1~

11
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are
tried showed that procedures were often informal, presided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the
prosecution was not vigorous. 14 It is as inaccurate to
say that 110 defendant can obtain a fair trial without
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the
offense charged is only a petty one.'"
Despite its overbrcadth, the easiest solution would be
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be
applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
oT~impact on the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when one
reflects on the \Yide variety of petty or misdenwanor offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their jurisdictions. ranging from
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan
centers.
Silver:,;tein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
Neither the Report b~· Prc~ident's Commi~sion on Lnw Enforcement and the AclminiRtration of Justice, supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the
American Bar ARsociation Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, PrO\·iding Defen,e SetTiceR, 37-40 (1968), went the
route thr Comt ta krs today. The President's Cornrni~sion rccommrndecl that coun~cl be prO\·iclccl to crimin;il clef Pncl:ints who face
"n, Rignificant penalty" and at lrast to those who arc in clanger of
"substantial loss of liberty." The Amrrican Bar Assorintion stnnd_.--,
arcl "·ould not extrnd thr right to coun:,;cl ~ - to case;; where "]oRs ~
of liberty" is not ''likrly to be imposed.'~Ncither supports a new,
inflexible constitutional rule.
14
1

"
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The rule adopted today does not go an the ,my. It
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence
is some imprisonment. The logic of the Court's position indicates, however, that when the decision must
be 1nade, the rule will be extended to all petty offeuse
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations.
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need
for counsel if a jail sentence is to be imposed, one must
assume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty
offense cases. It would be illogical- and " ·ithout discernible support in the Constitution- to hold that no
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense
cases which may result in far more serious consequences
than a few hours or days of incarceration.
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. But even
today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact
upon the criminal justice system. We should not adopt
a rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions,
especially since it is supported neither by history nor
precedent.
II
The majority op1111on concludes "that a person may
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisonedhowever briefly- unless he was represented by or waived
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren
of details as to how this rule will be implemented.
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There are thousands of statutes and ordinances which
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some
of the most trivial of misdemeanors [ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to certain tra'ffic offenses]. They
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors~
This i ~ broad spectrum of petty offense cases ~
daily floo~ ~ the lower criminal courts. The rule
laid down today will confront the judge;of each of these
courts with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not
appointed or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonm~ er- any duration may be imposed. The judge
~ o-&~ ~
ill therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial~
and without hearing the evidence-whether he will ~ ~ -f dJ.
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some ~
p.,--,..,...,,. J~
entence of imprisonment His alternatives, assuming ~~4-/..#.J.
:t)t_
the availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel
~,hr,..(.
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to
~
·
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without
counsel.
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice requires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tailored to fit the crime and the individual would have
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the
statutory authorization. In creating categories of offenses which by law are imprisonable but for which
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge ,vould be _
overruling de Jaclo the legislative determination as to
the appropriate range of punishment for the particu-

C

j ~~~;l,z
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lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which imprisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a
valuable purpose. The mere possibility of jail may be
a deterrent. At least the legislatures, and until today
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonmenteven when rarely carried out-as serving a legitimate
social function.
In the brief for the United States as arnicus curiae,
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-justified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered.
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of evidence which came out at
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If
the second trial were held before the same judge, he
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run
afoul of the gua.r antee against being twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense.rn In all likelihood, therf;l. -@
will be no second trial and certain offenses cla~ed by
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges
_
~
as unimprisonable.
--;li ~
The new rule announced today also could result in
~ ~ e ual protection problems. There may will be an un(
.
fair and unequal irpplioation of-crimi11a:l,,t~t,es a11d --'c6f-ordi1Htnecfl' dependrng on whether the individual judge

j

+, _

iG See Callon v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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I

has determined in advance to leave open the option
of imprisonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be
entitled in some courts to counsel while in other courts
-----......... in the same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same
offense v,:ould have no counsel. Since the services of
counsel a-re net re1atee-selel¥ -t9 the -:eut.e.1:;H~e.1,..t h a ~
~e in'lposed, the results of this type of pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.
A different type of discrimination could result in the
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alternative is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no imprisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will of ten
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who
can pay a $100 fine, and does so. will have responded
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents. 11
To avoid these equal protection problems and to preserve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by
law, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offenses where jail
sentences are extremly rare. It is doubtful that the
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor

--~------~

The type of penalty di8cu~scd aboYe (invoh·ing the discretionary
alternatfre of "jail or fine") presents serious problems of fairnessboth to indigent~ and nonindigent~ and to 1he administration of
jnRtice. Cf. Tate v. Shni-t, 401 U. S. 495 (1971). No adequate
resolution of these inherently diffirull problrms has yet been found.
The rule adopted by the Court today, depri,·ing the lower comts of
all discretion in sneh casrs unless counsel i8 available and is appointed,
could aggrarnte the problem.
17

•'
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General who, on behalf of the United States, urged
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement of defense counsel will "require more
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 18
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice. 19

t i< ) (5 Fi:11al~ the degree of the Solicitor General's concern
\.!:..!--~eflected by his admittedly unique suggestion~
""4.respe'"lt -4;o the extraordinary demand for counsel which
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35.
Id., at 36-37.
20 Id., at 39.
18

10
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States which require a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
The majority does not address the consequences of
its new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General.
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's
holding will be on our already overburdened local
courts. 21 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The
~ G ( court's rule may well exacerbate th-is 5itaa:tion in C2.
,.,,,.
~rms of delay and congesti~~ We are familiar with
1----t...he common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of
delay. 22 The absence of direct economic impact on the
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assista11ee oi 1.ef'.Ji'-tt . . /
counsel claim, frequently
iva~ecision to litigate
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school will receive most of the appointments in
cas~
petty offensesl The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice_~; and the recent constitutional explosion in ;rBcedural rights for the accused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-

b'

JI

See generally II. James, Crisis in the Courts, c. 11 (1967);
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156.
22
Sec, e. g., James, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her·
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
21

'.

t
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the pub]~ added delay and congestion in the courts. 2 ~
There is an additional problem. The ability of various States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely.
Even if there ,vere adequate resources on a national
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of lawyers, of facilities and available funding-presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the C'ourt in this case,
and have been compelled to confront these realities.
Many have concluded that the incligent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and
most have acknowledged that they ,rere moved to do so,
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 2 •
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en2 " In Cook County, Illinoi~, a recent stud)' rc,·ealcd that the members of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense
of Prisoners~ who are :rr,pointcd to repreRcnt indigent defcndnnts ~
~~ hclore- e, .iury flf1 G3% of heir tria 1 cases while retained and appointed coun:;;c co SO'jH½ 33% and thr public defender~[only 15%. "'::::J
"One possible cxplana ion for this contra8t is that committee c01mscl 1
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, are more
willing to undert:1 kc a jury trial than is :111 assistant public defender,
who is very busy and vrry ronsrious of the probablr cxtm penalty
accruing to a drfendant who loses hi,; casr before a jury." D. Oaks
and W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158159 ( 1968) (footnotes omitted).
24 Sec Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (19G7);
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (19G7); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42
Ill. 2d 249, 24G N. E. 2d 281 (19G9); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich.
538, 1-!7 N. W. 2d G6 (19G7); IIcndrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash.
142, 45G P. 2d 696 (19G9); State ex rel. Phitshack v. State Department of II ealth and Social Services, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d
549 (19GS).
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actrnent of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority." 3 These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
of many States, who understand the capabilities of
local judicial systems better than this Court, that
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
overtax these capabilities.~"
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for
certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling
will mean in some localities. In November 1!)71 the
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a la.vyer occasionally employed by the town filed with
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water
20

See Hawaii St. ConRI ., Ari. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 19-852 (19G9 Supp.); K:in. <7rn. St:it. A1111. § 22--t-.5m (Hl70
Supp.); E\. Crim. Pror. Hulr 1-.04; L:1. Hr,·. Stnt., Tit. 1.5,
Art. 141 (F); ~fr. Huie Crim. Pror. 4-1-; Md. H. 719 (b) 2 (n);
~ob. Rev. Rtnt. § 29-180:~ (l!)G7): Nrv. Hr,·. Sl:il. §§ 171.188,
1!)3.104 (1969); N. Mex . S1at. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.): Utah
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 650S
(1970 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1970 Supp.}.
2 n Sec Knmi~ar & Chopcr, The Right to Counsel in MimieRota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Polir)' Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 68 (1963). Local judges intrrviewed by the author:,; concluded
I h:1t the right to roun:,;cl shou Id not be extended to petty cases.
"If no such didding line can be drawn, if the question of assigned
counsel in misdeme:mor cases rrsolves itself into :m 'a 11 or nothing'
proposition , then , the thrust of their views wns th:1t limited funds
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial rconomy dictate that
it be 'nothing.'" But sec State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W.
2d 888 (1967).

...
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system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwiseallocation of its limited resources.
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court system to deal with minor offenses.~ 7 It is.
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat. 28 It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for
many smalltown courts. The community could simply
not enforce its own laws. 29
27 See Cableton V. State, supra, n. 24, at 538-539: "rTJhcrc arcmore justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and . . . there are counties in which there are no
practicing lawyers. The impact of [right to counsel in misdemeanors] would seriously impair the administration of justice in Arkansas
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession."
28 Sec Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
29 The succe,,sful implementation of the majority's rule would
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable
funds , something they have not been willing to do. Three States
with 21% of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all
state appropriations for indigrnt defense. Note, Dollars and Sense
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969.
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
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Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and to
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system.
The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the
guarantee of due process required the assistance of
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed
or that the only workable method of insuring justice
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay
in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth
Amendment problems than it resolve..§. }For while th
majority rule is too broad insofar as it requires the
appointment of coullsel in many cases where t!y,s is
not necessary, the rule could operate to impinge""upon
the right to a fair trial where the offense charged is
either nonimprisonable or one in which the judge has
determined that he will not impose a jail sentence.
Although the Court's opinion does not deal explicitly
with any sentence other than deprivation of liberty
however brief, the according of special constitutional
status to cases where such a sentence is imposed may- -unless the Court embraces an ever broader prophylactic
rule-derogate the need for counsel in other types of
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds
spent on tho legal services program can only be regarded as trivial.".
Cappelletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, in
Cappelletti and Gordley,. Legal Aid: Modern Them<:~ and Variations,
24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 379 (1972). "Although the American
economy is over eight times the size of the Brilish and the American
populatiou is almost four times as grent, American legal aid expenditures are le~s than two times as high." Id., n. 210.

_o
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cases. Due process requires a fair trial in all cases.
Keither the six-month rule approved below nor the
rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve
this result.
III

I\

I would hold that the right to counsel in petty
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discreti, on a case-by-case basis.''° The determination
shou be made before the accused formally pleads;
man petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m
which the assistance of counsel may be required.:i' If
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to
scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court
should examine the case against him to insure that there
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defensecounsel. the court should intervene, when necessary, to
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the
:io It seems to me th:.t sneh an incliYidufllized rnlc, unlike a sixmonth rule and the majority's rule, docs not pre8ent equal protect ion problems under this Comt '~ deeision~ in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U. S. 12 (1956); Douolas v. California, 384 U.S. 436 (1063); and
Mayer v. City of Chir-ago, - U. 8. (197n.
:n See, e. g., Kntz, l\Tuni<"ipfll Courts-Another Urbin Ill, 20 Case
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-9fi (1968). Cf. Ilamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. l\Jarylcmd, 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Ilarvey v. Missi.ssi])pi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965).
Although there is Jrss 11lca negotiating in petty raseR, sec n. 13,
su])ra, the assistanrc of r01111sel mny still be needed so that the de-.
fondant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guil~ can
fV
make an intelligent deri~ion whether to go to trial.
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facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow.
It is impossible. as well as unwise, to create a precise
and detailed S('t of guidelines for judges to follow in dctermini ng "·hcther the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges
of traffic law infractions will rarely present complex legal
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult
intent elements or "·hich raise collateral legal questions,
such as search and seizure problems, will usually be too
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense is one
where the State' is represented by counsel and where
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel,
there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs
the assistance of counsel.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that "·ill follow if a conviction is obtained. The
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the .,,)robability that a lawyer should be appointed.
mprisonment is not the only serious consequence the court
should consid~' to sonw i, igents, a substantial
may )
/ be mor~rious than . cw clays in jail.
revocation
~ of ~. Hccnse or a.... runk driving con · 1011 under certain
l:~:.:i-~t,i,~f-4-':>
tf'
~curnstances also could result in grave consequences.
Third, the court should consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the competency of the individual defendant to present his own
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular
defendant or particular incident is another consideration.
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a

c
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peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where the <'Ourt ,rould
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges are crucial to the _
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the
consideration of the varying factors in each case.
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v.
Y. Brady, 316 "C. S. 455 (1942), and Bute Y. Illinois, 333
U. S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon. 32
One of the reasous for seeking a more definitive standard
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon;
372 U. 8., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness as this concept of due process has evolved,
there is less reason to think that insensitivity will abate~
I do not di,mgrrc with thr overruling of Bettsr+r+ Oi.1e0n with ~
~ ·hidrl am in complete accorc\A Betts, like Gided1i, conrrrned the
right to counsel in a felony case. Sec n. 1, supra. Neither case
eontr~ls today's result.
•n: similat tet"O',.,"fflli<ID.~,ullwi:>dom-if.no.L impracticality-of
a universal rule is rec gnized in Rodridguez v. osenblatt, 58 N. J.
/ 2d 281, 295 (1967), here tho Court said: " ie practicalities ma
necessitate the o ssion of a univer~al n
for the assignmen of
counsel to all · aigent defcndnnts and · ch omission mny be olerable in tho ultiludc of petty mun· pal court cases whir do noy
result in ctual impri8onment or . other seriou8 con~eq1 ces suer
as th substantial loss of driv · g privileges. But, as , matter of
sim e justice, no indigent .9 fendnnt should be subj led to a con1
viction entailing imprisonn<cnt in fact or other con~uencc o~u.i
32

)
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The according of some discretion to the courts will no~
obviate all of the practical problems of expanding the
indigent's right to cou11sel in petty offense cases ..... ~But it
will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider availability of defense counsel. In this process, the courts
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize
a duty to consider tho need for counsel in every case
where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel
is needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the
result of teday's fl0lEl.¼1~ .xh> d..A<~ ~ :,J....,, ,tJA-1 ,

tude withoj .fir::;t having had ue and fair opportunity to have
counsel as ·gned without cost. ,Gur municipal c,purt judges ha e had
- ~ r and co mue to have broad .discretion to a · n free counseJ:' to indige defendants whene;JM"'justice so re ires. That discretion may
e exercised liberally }lnder general g idelines without entailing th
---faa.red- iuundaJjons "J
3 3, IN Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in
this opinion will result from any rnising of the standard;; as to the
reqmremenL of counsel.AM i · my view thn0ae 1o¼e o.f judicial discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which othcrwi::;e
?'~
could affect adversely the aclminist ration of criminal justice in the
'-.:::::-:-::/7\courts which already arc under the most severe strain.
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MR. J US'l'ICE PowELL, concurri11g in the result.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963), held that
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendrnrnt to furnish counsel to all
_ indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 Tho question before us today is whether an indigent defendant
~
) an offense carrying a maximum punish• I t, //t't.4 ,
/ rnent of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000
.,J1~
1I or botl is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to
1
the ass1s ance of appointed counsel. More generally, we
;:;:;-i-- nlll:s~ €19.tcrmine)whether the Due Process Clause re- I
quires that an mdigent charged with a state petty offense~ be afforded the right to appointed counsel.

o-/';-

1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
tll.'lt the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967);
Loper v. Beto, U.S. (1972).
~ As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonmmt does not exceed six months, Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.~
The state court, in drmving a six-month line, followed
the lead of this Court in Duncan Y. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
145 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which
we held that the due process right to a trial by jury in
state criminal cases ,vas limited to cases in which the
offense charged was punishable by more than six mouths.
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to
be drava1, it must be dra"·n so that an indigent has a
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is
a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial
before a judge experienced in pieci11g together disassembled facts, but before a jury the guidi11g hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the
offense charged is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment docs not compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin,
and District of Columbfo Y. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617
( 1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic
not punishable by imprisonmrnt, reµ:artlbs of the amount of any
fine that miµ:ht be m1lhorizecl. To thi8 extent, the definition used
herein differs from the frtlernl 8latutory definition of "petty offense" which inrlndc,.; offcnsc8 pnni,,hable by not more thnn six
months' imprisomnrnt or b)· a fine not cxrceding $500. 18 U. S. C.

§ 1.
3

236 So. 2d 442 (1970).
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origi11s at common la,\'. No such history exists to support a similar limitation 011 the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felony cases:' Only as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover,
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a .i ury-tempering the possibly
arbitrary and harsh exercise of j uclicial power-while
important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a
fair trial as is the right to counsel."
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree ,Yith the
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court,
that under no circumstances may a person "be imprisoned ... unless he was represented by counsel at the
trial."" It seems to me that the line should not be
dra,rn with such rigidity.
There is a middle course. between the extremes of
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which
comports ,vith the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of clue
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal
trials, a principle ,Yhich I believe encompasses the right
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, G0-61 (1932).
"Although we haYc gi,·en retroactirn effect to our ruling in
Gideon, Pickelsimer \'. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we ham
said that, "[t]hc nlues implemented by the right to jury trial would
not measurably be served by requiring rctri/1 l of all persons conYicted in the past by prorcclurrs not ron~istent with the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 3!)'.l U. S.
(tn , 63-l (1968).
6
It is n~~umrcl that the Court nmrns no indigent may br im11riso11ed if he wns not rrpresrntccl pro1·iclecl that he did not waivehis right to cournrl.
1
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to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial.

I
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Alabama 1 and Gideon,8 both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately their own cases, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief
period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be dismissed by the label "petty." 0
Serious consequences a.lso may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Nor are the
consequences of conviction necessarily more serious because the sentence is one of imprisonment. Stigma may
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade. 10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell
v. Brown, 402 U. S. 535, 539 ( 1970), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case,
their continued possession may become essential in
Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932).
372 U. S., at 343-345.
0
Sec L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965).
10
See James v. Ifeadley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969).
7

8
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that acljudicatC's
important interests of licensees. In such cases the
licenses arc not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.''
The States must afford the individual due process before depriving him of life, liberty, or property. When
the deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient consequence, 11 denying the assistance of counsel
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves
is a denial of due process.
This is not to say that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assessment of the possible consequences of conviction is the
sole test as to the need for assistance of counsel. The
flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances.
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process,
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. Counsel
is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no
11 A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor·
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed profession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (oplometrists);
N. C. Gen. Stat. § 93 A-4 (1965) (real e;:;tatr brokers)), and loss of
pension rights (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension
denied when injur~· i · resull of participation in fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514
(1948) (teacher com·ictcd of misdemeanor rc:sulling in impriHonment); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957) (conviction
of crime or misdemeanor)). Sec grnerally Project, Collateral ConRequenccs of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970).
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases a.re
complex, others are exceedingly simple. As a j ustifica.tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend arc the ~trongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries." -'~ Y rt government often does
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
prtty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benrfits. '~ It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases where the right to counsel would ra.rely be cxerci~cd by nonindigent defendants.
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not
so classified yet "·ho arc in low income groups "·here
engaging counsel in a minor petty offense case "·ould
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line between incligency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel
is an arbitrary one, drawn differently from State to State
and often resulting in serious inequities to accused persons. The Court's new rule will accent the disadvantage
of being barely self-sufficient economically.
lraimrright, :-372 U. 8., nt 344.

1~

Gideon

1

In petty offense~. thcrr i~ murh Jr~.- pll':1 nrgoti:1tion th:111 in

~

Y.

serious offenses. Srr Report by the President's Commi~~ion on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society, 13-4 (19G7) (hrreinafter cited ns "Challenge"). Thus, in cnses where the e,·idrncr of guilt is overwhelming,
the assi.,tanco of coun~el is lc~s essential to obt:-iin n light er sentence.
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A survey of state courts i11 which misdemeanors arc
tried sho\\'C'd that procedures "·ere of ten informal, presickcl over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the
prosecution "·as not vigorous.'" It is as inaccurate to
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial "·ithout
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the
offen"e charged is only a petty one.'"
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be
a prophylactic rule that ,rnuld require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be
applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
of its ad verse impact on the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when
one reflects 011 the ,\·ide variety of petty or misdemeanor
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in vi<'\\' of the variations
in types of courts and their j urisclictions, ranging from
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a cby in the f!reat metropolitan
centers.
8iln•rstrin, supra, n. 9, at 125-12fi.
Nrithrr thr Rrport b~· Prrsidrnt',; Comrni~~ion on Law Enforrrmc•nt and the Admini~tr:ttion of .Tttstirr. supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the
Amrrican Bar .\~~oriation Projret on :\Iinimum Standards for Criminal .Tu~t ire, Prcn·iding; Drfrn~r Service~. 37--10 (1968), went the
routr the Court takrs today. Thr Prrsidrnt's Commission reeommrnded that rounsrl be proYiclrd to criminal drfrnd:mts who face
"a sig;nifirant prnalt~·" and at lrnst to tho~r \Yho nrr in danii;rr of
"::;ubstantial lo~s of librrt~·." Thr Arnrri<'nn Hnr A~~orialion stnndnrcl \l'Ottld uot Pxtrud 1hr rig;ht to rottn~rl to ca~r~ whrrr "loss
of liberty" iH not '']ikrl~· to br impo~cd." ~eithrr supports a nrw,
inflexible consl itutional rule.
1'

10

..

'
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The rule adopted today does not go all the way. It
is limited to petty offense cas s in which the sentence
is some imprisonment. The
of the Court's position indicates, however, that when the decision must
be made, the rule " ·ill be extended to all petty offense
t'es except perhaps the most minor traffic violations.
If 1e Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has
tocla the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need
for cou "el if a jail sentence is to be imposed, one must
assume a "milar rejection of discretion in other petty
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without discernible suppor in the Constitution-to hold that no
discretion may eve be exercised where a nominal jail
sentence is contempla l and at the same time endorse
I the legitimacy of discret1 1 in "non-jail" petty offense
cases which may result in fa
ore serious consrquences
·1. ~\ than a few hours or days of in ceration.
J-7 Thus, although the new rule is tended today only
to the imprisonment category of c ,s, the Court's
o )inion foreshado,\·s the adoption of a oad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. But even
today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact
upon the criminal justice system. We should n o t ~
~ with consequences of such unknown dimensions,
especially since it is supported neither by history nor
precedent.
II

.LiJn~

~.,

( --

p. /

/

The majority oprn10n concludes "that a person may
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisonedhowever briefly-unless he was represented by or waived
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren
of details as to how this rule will be implemented.

5/17/72
No. 70-5015, Argensinger v. Hamlin, Rider p~ 8.

is unwilling to go all the way and adopt,·, a
prophylactic rule even though the logic of its position would
seem to call for such a result.

With no apparent constitution 1

only to irtdigents who are actually sentenced to imprisonment
for petty offenses.

There are serious questions whether such

-

~ : . . J . h e Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken from
a person without affording him due process of law. The majority
~
.
.
1 ..e,.. ... ,;,,
f or1ct·istinguis
.
. h"ing
&.iKlAsuggest7' no constitutiona
FAai8R1~g
~

0

between deprivations of liberty and property , f9r trdeeg ~a.ere
i~ ~ -

In fact, the majority suggests no reason at all for

drawing this distinction,

The logic it advances for extending

the right to counsel to all cases in which the penalty o f ~
imprisonment is imposed applies equally well to cases in which
other penalties may be imposed® xxitxxxxltl!'§lfXXHSX Nor does the
majority deny that some "non-jail" penalties are more serious
than brtef jail sentences,
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There are thousands of statutes and ordinances ,Yhich
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors.
This broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today
will confront the judges of each of these courts
·with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trialand without hearing the evidence-whether he will
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility
to consider the full range of punishments established
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel
and retain the discretion vested in him by la,v, or to
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without
counsel.
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the·
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice requires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tailored to fit the crime and the individual would have
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in
·which no such sentence will be given regardless of the
statutory authorization. In creating categories of offenses which by law are imprisonablc but for which
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge would be

70-5015-CONCUR
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overruling de facto the legislative determination as to
the appropriate range of punishment for the particular offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there
arc some classes of imprisonablc offenses for v,1hich imprisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a
valuable purpose. The mere possibility of jail may be
a deterrent. At least the legislatures, and until today
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonmenteven when rarely carried out-as serving a legitimate
social function.
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae,
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility
could be preserved through the technique of trial de novo
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-justified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered.
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of evidence ·which came out at
the first trial when the accused ,rn.s uncounselled. If
the second trial were held before the same judge, he
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge
an opportunity to impoi:,c a harsher sentence might run
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense. 1 a In all likelihood, there
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges
as unimprisonable.
The new rule announced today also could result in
equal protection problems. There may will be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual defendants
ia Sec Callon v. 1Vilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888); North Carolina v ..
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969).
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depending on "·hethcr the individual judge has determined in advance to leave open the option of imprissonment. Thus. an accused indigent would be entitled
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the
same jurisdiction an indigrnt accused of the same offensr
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which
no jail sentc11cc is imposrd, the results of this type of
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.
A different type of discrimination could result in the
typical petty offense case "·here judgment in the alternative is prescribed: for example\ "five days in jail or
$100 fine." If a .i udgc has predcterm incd that no imprisonment will be imposed with resprct to a particular
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will oftrn
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who
can pay a $100 fine, and clors so, will have responded
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the
indigent "·ho commits the identical offense may pay
no penalty. Nor ,vould there be any deterrent against
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents."
To avoid thcsr equal protection problems and to preserve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by
law, most judges arc likely to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offenses where jail
sentences arc extremly rare. It is doubtful that the
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor
17

The lrpe of prnalt>· diHrussrd aboYr (inrnh-ing the discretionary
alternative of "jail or fine") prrsrnt:; Hrriou:; problems of fairnessboth to indigrnl:; and nonindigrnts and to the administration of
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 lT. S. 495 (1971). No adequate
rrsolution of these inherent]>· clitrirult problems ha~ yet bren found.
The rule adopted by the Court toda>·, drpriving 1he lower courts of
all di:;cretion in ~ueh case~ unlc~~ cotmscl is :l\·:1ilablr and is appointrcl,
could aggrnvnte the problrrn.

'·

,.
'
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General who, on behalf of the United States, urged
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement of defense counsel will "require more
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 1 8
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice.in
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regarding the extraordinary demand for counsel which
\vould result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving
small sentences." w Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of a.mending the laws of each of the 50
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35.
Id., at 36- 37.
20 Id., at 39.

18
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.
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The majority's treatment of the consequences of the new
rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is

net' reassuring.

In a footnote, it is said that there are presently 355, 200 attorneys
and that the number will increase rapidly, doubling by 1985.

This

is asserted to be sufficient to provide the number of full-time
counsel, estimated by one source at between 1, 575 and 2,300,
to represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic
offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 335, 200 lawyers
are potentially available.

Thousands of these are not in practice,

and many of those who do practice work for governments, corporate
legal departments, the Armed Services and are unavailable for
criminal representation.

Of those in general practice, we have

no indication how many are qualified for or willing to accept
prove ~ He•·"21
assignments which m a y ~ y lucrative for most.
It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementation

of the Court's new rule will require no more than 1, 575 to 2, 300

2.
"full-time" lawyers. In:a few communities are there full-time
public defenders available for or private lawyers specializing
in petty cases.

Thus, if it were possible at all, it would be

necessary to coordinate the schedules of those lawyers who are
willing to take an occasional misdemeanor appointment with the
c rowded calendars of lower courts in which cases are not
schedule weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the
day after arrest.

Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate

'•

figures ignores the heart of the problem which is the distribution
and availability of lawyers especially in the hundreds of small
)

localities ac r oss the country.
. ...,.

.f

~

(~-s/1T/,°lj

21.

The custom in many, if not most,

is to appoint counsel on a case-by-case basis.
is generally inadequate.

~

localities

Compensation

Even in the Federal courts under the

Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S. C. §3006A, which provides
one of the most generous compensation plans, the rates for
appointed counsel - $10 per hour spent out of court, $15 per hour
of court time, subject to a maximum total fee of $300 for a
misdemeanor case and $500 for a felony - are low by American
standards.

Consequently, the majority of persons willing to

accept appointments are the young and inexperienced.

See

Cappelletti, Part One:; The Emergenc'f of a Modern Theme,

.

..~-,

in Cappelletti and Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and
Variations, 24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 377-78 (1972).

Mr.

Justice Brennan suggests, in his concurring opinion, that law
students might provide an important source of legal representation.

He presents no figures, however, as to how many students

l

_;

'

,.

2.

would be qualified and wilhi.g to undertake the responsibilities
of defending indigent misdemeanants.

Although welcome

progress is being made with programs, supported by the American
Bar Association, to enlist the involvement of law students in
indigent representation, the problems of meeting state requirements and of assuring the requisite control and supervision,
are far from insubstantial.

~

.

..,

~

Moreover, the impact of student

participation would be limited primarily to the 140 or less

\ ..

;

communities where these law schools are located.

,1

'.,,
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States which require a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of tlrn
't erm "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
_1:::.,,.-- ;--. Th~ majority: clQBi - B Q ~ ~
~
(it.kne.w- r w ~ ~ o l i e i t0!."--Geil eral.)
f/~aps the most serious potential impact of today's
holding will be on our already overburdened local
courts.j~he primary cause of "assembly line" justice
is a volume of cases far in excess of the 9apacity
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The
·Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and congestion in these courts. We are familiar with the
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of
delay.1~J The absence of direct economic impact on the
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time·
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent constitutional explosion in procedural rights for the accused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch:n..
:.i.rsee generally H. James, Crisis in the Comts, c. 11 (1967);
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156.
;:iJ ,i'!'Sec, e. g., James, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York_
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the public and added delay and congestion in the
courts.""'~'t
There is an additional problem. The ability of various States and localities to fnrnish counsel varies widely.
:Even if there ,yere adequate resources on a national
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of lawyers, of facilities and available funding-presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the C'ourt in this case,
and have been compelled to confront these realities.
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so.
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further.1-s
In other States, legislatures and courts through the 0n-

.;:J1n

Cook Count>·, Illinoi~, a re<·ent Hhtd>· re,·mled that the members of the Chirago Bar A,soriation'~ Committee on the Defense
of Prisoners, who are appointed to represent indigrnt dcfenct:rnts,
c>IPet a jur.,· t ri:tl in (l;{% of t lwir t rinl ea~C'~. while' retninpd and nppoi11tc>d ro11n~rl do ~o in 33r; and 1he p11blir ddender in 011I>· 1/io/c.
"One po,;siblc cxplmwtion for thi8 conlr:1sL is that committee cotmsel,
who :uc sometimes scrYing in part to gnin experiencr, arc more
willing to undertake a jury trial than is an assistant publir clefendrr,
who is nry busy nnd nr>· consrions of the probable rxlrn prmt!ty
accruing to a defendant who Josr,; his ra~c before a jury." D. Oaks
:ind W. Lehman, A Criminal Ju lice System and the Indigent, 158159 . (1968) (footnotes omitted) .
.,:A- Sec Irvin "· State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967);
Bia-rage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Argersinger v. llamlin. 23G So. 2d 4-+2 (Fla. 1970); People v. DupreP, 42"
Ill. 2d 2-!9, 2-+fi "X. K 2d 281 (HlG9): l'eople "· Mallory, 27S Mirli.
53S, 147 N. W. 2d GG (1907); llendrix \'. City of Seattle, 7fl 1Yash.
142, 45G J>. 2d 696 (1969); State ex rel. Plutshac/.- v. State Depa.rlmenl of lien/th and Social Srrvices, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d
549 (1968).

',
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actment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority __;i., These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
of many States, "·ho understand the capabilities of
local judicial systems better than this Court, t h a t /
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
overtax these capabilities_..,.~,.,
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for
certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, Xo. 71-5722, wa
filPd with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed "·ith
the clerk an a.ffidavit explaining why the town had not
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
has a population of 132, that it has no smYer or ,rnter
!JRrr Hawaii Rt. Const.. Art. I. § 11 (HlflR); Idaho Codr Ann.
§ 19-R,32 (1969 Supp.); Kan. Gc•11. Stat. . \1111. § :22-450:~ (1970
Supp.); K~·. Crim. Proc. Hulr 8.04; La. Hr,·. Rtat. , Tit. 15,
Art. HI (F): ".\fr. Hulr Crim. Proc·. 44; Md. H. 719 (b) 2 (a):
'\"rb. Hr,·. Rt:11. § 29-rnm (1007); Nrv. HPv. Rt:1t. §§ 171.188,
19:U04 (1909): N. ".\kx. Stat. Alln. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); 1Ttah
Code Ann. § 77-04-2 (19fl9 Supp.); Vt. Stal. Ann., Tit . 13, § 650J
(1970 Snpp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1970 Supp.).
-i81 See Kami~ar & Choprr. The Rig;hl to Coun~el in Mi11110.•ota.:
Rome Field Finding:; and Lrgal-Polie~· Ob~crrntionR, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1. 68 (1903). Loral juclgrs intrn·icwrd by thr authors concluded
that the right to counsel should not be rxtcndecl to petty cases.
"If no such dividing line ran be drawn , if thr quc,,lion of assigned
coun~el in misdemranor case~ rn;ol\'C's itsrlf into an 'all or nothing'
propo~ition, thrn, the thrust of thrir views was that limited funds
and lawyrr-manpower and thr need for judici1il economy dictate that
iL be 'nothing;.'" But see State v. Borst, 27 Minn. 388, 154 N. W.
2d 88 (1907).

•.
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system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise
allocation of its limited resources.
Though uudoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court system to deal with minor offenses.'1 ;).! It is~
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrate~'
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat.'t ~~ It is uncloubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal'
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for
many srnalltown courts. The community could simplY.
not enforce its own laws.lM, JP •
1

~«

-?' See Cableton V. State, supra, n. 24, at 538-539: "rT]here are
more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and . . . there are counties in which there are no
practicing lawyers. The impact of [right to counsel in misdeme::mor:;J would seriously impair the administration of justice in Arkansas
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession."
, See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
'/- The successful implementation of the majority's rule would
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three States
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969.
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, tho legislature

\
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Perhaps it \\·ill be said that I give undue weight
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and tothe possibility of long term adverse effects on the system.
The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule annouuced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the
guarantee of due process required the assistance of
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed
or that the only workable method of insuring justice·
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay
in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however
brief, the according of special constitutional status,
----rto=-c=-=ases where such a sentence is imposed may!fu'nless)
the Court embraces an ever broader prophylacti'd
ru
derogate the need for counsel in other types of
cases Due process requires a fair trial in all cases.
Nenier the six-month rule approved below nor the
rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve
this result.
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds
spent on the lrgal services program can only be regarded as trivial ,,.
appelletti,).l['?ryOnC': Yhe Emergen9 of a Mode~hemg,.,
~'lct'ti7r1Jil"Uorclly~LC'gal Aid: :M'odern ThC'ITIC'i:i flncl Vflriflfions,
lu.,..
_
.....
-·~_,,_to..._nf,.._a~ni
_
L. n,ev. 347 379 ~ . rA though the American
economy is oYer eight times the size of the British and the American
population is almost four time.,, as great, Amcricau legal aid ex~
penditure,:; are less than two times as high." Id., n. 210.

i~) e
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III
1 would hole! that the right to counsel in petty
offe11 ·e cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discrrtio11 011 a casr-by-ca~r hasis ..,.,., 3 1 The determination
should be made before thr accused formally pkacls;
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas in
which the assistance of counsel may be required.'j 1• If
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to
scrutinize carefully the sub~rquent proceedings for the
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court
should examine the case against him to insure that there·
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements
of the offense. If a case goes to trial ,Yithout defense
counsel, the court should intrrvene, "·hen necessary, to
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the
facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being·
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied
ll

It ~eems to mC' thnt ~11ch nn indi,·idualizrd rule, unlike n sixmon1 h rule and the m:ijorit ~-'s ru IC', doC'H not present erprn I prolrrt ion prohlrms nndrr 1hiH Court·~ cleci~iorn in Griffin Y. Illinois, 351
U. S. 12 (1956): Doualas v. Cnlifornin, 384 U.S. 436 (1!)63); and
Mayer Y. City of Chirago, - U.S. (1971).
3~ SrC', e. g., Eatz, :i\IuniC"ipal Comts-Another Urbin Ill, 20 Case
Western Re~cn·C' L. ReY. 87, 92-90 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1968);
11arvey v. Missi.~sippi, 340 F. 2d 263 ( CA.5 1965) .
Although there' is IC'~~ plC'ii negotiating in pC'tt~· ca~r~. ~C'P n. 13,
supra, the assistanrC' of counsPl mny still be necdrd so that the dri'C'ndant who i~ 110I f:trC'd with ovNwhC'lming c•,·idC'llC'C' of g11ilt (':lll
make an intelligrnt der.i~ion whC'thrr to go to trial.
...wt
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strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decision
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow.
It is impossible, as ,Yell as unwise, to create a precise
and cletailecl set of guidelines for judges to follow in determining "·hether the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors
should be weighed. First. the court should consider the
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges
of traflic la,Y infractions will rarely present complex legal
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult
intent elements or ,Yhich raise collateral legal questions,
. uch as search and seizure problems, will usually be too
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense is one
where the State is represented by counsel and where
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel,
there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs
the assistance of counsel.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follm,· if a conviction is obtained. The
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious
consequence the court should consider.
Third, the court should consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the competency of the individual defendant to present his own
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular
defendant or particular incident is another consideration.
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a
peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where the court would
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges are crucial to the

;

•
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operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the
consideration of the varying factors in each case.
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v.
Y. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 ( 1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948), "·hich this Court overruled in Gideon!" 3 3
One of the reasons for seeking a more definitive standard
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon,
372 U. S., at 350--351. But this Court should not assurne
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness as this concept of due process has evolved,
there is less reason to think that insensitivity will abate.
1
o e courts w1Tl noy
· g
e ·~
viate all of theiractical proplems of expanding the .
indigent's right to ounsel in p e t ~ f f ~ f f l 3 u t it
will facilitate an or erly transition to a far wjder _a ·1
abilit· of defense counsel. In this process, the courts
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize
a duty to consider the need for counsel in every case
3j

...?" I do not disagree with thr overrnliug of !3etts; I am in romplel e
accord with Gideon. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the right to
rot1nsrl in a felony casr. Srr n. 1, s11pra. Neithrr ca~r controls
1oda y's re.;;ult.
~ a+l rnclerd , it is rrcognized 1ha I m:rny of the problrms idrnl ificd in
--ihis opinion will result from any raising of the standards as to the
requirement of counsel. II is m~· Yirw that rcl~·ing t1po11 judicial
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports
with the Constitution but will minimize problem which otherwise
could affect advrr~ely the administration of criminal justice in the
yery courts which already arc under the mo,t ~eycrc ~train .

Rider A, p. 20 (Argersinger) 5/18/72

In concluding, I emphasize my long held conviction that

the adversary system functions best and most fairly only when
all parties are represented by competent counsel.

Before:,tire

becoming a member of this Court, I participated in efforts to

3fl The correct

enlarge and extend the availability of counsel.

dispo~ition of this case,~

heen a matter of the

~WU...
H...e_ ~
grea.tA4t concern to me - as it has to~ l members of the Court.
We are all strongly ~

.J

to the ide! of extending the right

"

to counsel, bu~ differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what the

criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities and HuLthousands of police, municipal and justice of the peace courts
across the country.
The view I have expressed in imB this opinion will
~

~

accord

~

discretion to the courts, and will allow the

"
flexibility and opportunity for adjustment which seems so
necessary when we are imposing new doctrine on the lowest
3

aw and Poverty, National Conference on Law and Poverty
Washington, D. C. 51 ABA Journal 3 (x
1965).

?cru.><A1

j·

.

2.
level of courts of 50 states. Although this view will not

4

~ ~ , j _ , ~AAP~
precipitate the "chaos" predictedAas the probable result of

...I ,

the Court's absolutist rule, there will remain serious practical
problems

F

..'-

l

~

....

It from the expanding of indigents'

~

~i4S-)
rights to counsel in petty offense cases.

·v

But the according of

,-.

1

~
I\

¾,

·.,

discretion to the Courts in determining when counsel is necessary

for a fair trial, rather than mandating a completely inflexible

' .

rule, will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider

,I
,,

.-

_-,,.

availability and use of defense counsel.

,l

~
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where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel
is needed.
s the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the
result of the decision in this case.

.st~
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL~_concurring in the result.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963), held that
the States were required by the .J)ue Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all
indigent defendants charged with felonies.' The question before us today is whether an indigent defendant
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000
or both, and sentended to 90 days in jail, is entitled as
a matter of constitutional right to the assistance of appointed counsel. More generally, we face the question
whether the Due Process Clause requires that an indigent
charged with a state petty offense 2 be ~orded the right
to appointed counsel.
While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967);
Loper v. Beto, U. S. (1972).
2
As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonment docs not exceed six months, Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses
1

.,

.
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment."
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed
_ ....~--~..::_
_ _~_~_........_,
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Lou-isiana, 391 U. S. _,_:zk
145 (1968), and i1{Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66
(1970)~decided shortly after the opinion below, in which
we held'that the due process right to a trial by jury in
state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the
offense charged was punishable by more than six months.
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to
be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there 1s
a due process right to a jury trial. An miskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial
before a judge experienced in piecing together disassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the
offense charged is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin,
and D-istrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617
( 1937), revea.l that the jury trial limitation has historic

·,

',
'•.

'

.

not punishable by imprisonment, regardless of the amount of any
fine that might be authorized. To this extent, the definition used
herein differs from the federal statutory definition of "petty of-·
fcnse" which includes offenses punishable by not more than six
months' imprisonment or by a fine not exceeding $500. 18 U. S. C.
§ 1.
3
236 So. 2d 442 ( 1970) .

·,. r
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origins at common law. No such history exists to support a similar )imi at10nA61't the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felony cases. 4 Only as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover,
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a jury-tempering the Q9f3sih1Y
arbitrary and harsh exercise of{ .iudicial power.,.. while
important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a
fair trial as is the right to counsel.\ 6
am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the
new rule of due process, today e1~mcjated by the C~o urt
that under tt0 eiPm-unstam,ei-ffiEW a. µ ~ b e im~ J
oned . . . unless he was represented by counsel at
trial.'J It seems to me that the line should not be
drawn with such rigidity.
There is a middle course, between the extremes of
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due·
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right

.!_~

l16~,
_ _ _ _ ___.c...---,..4 See Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45, 60-61 (1932) .

..§./• Although we have giYen retroactive effect to our ruling in
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have
said that, "f t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would
not mP.asurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S ..
u:n 634 (1968).
6
It is ·sume that ~'- Court means no indigent may 1,,1 imrisone if he as not / presented pr 1ded that e did n t waive
~ · ht to
unscl. C

1

)
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to counsel in petty cases ,vhenever the assistance of
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial.

I
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Alabama 1 and Gideon, 8 both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately their own cases, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief
period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be){Jismissed by the label "petty." 0
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonmentJ Nor are fee} ~
conse~uences 0f convigjitm necessar'ily mg.re serioifs beca se the sentenceJS"one of imprisonment. Stigma may
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade.1° Losing one's driver's license is more serious
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell
~~, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1970), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case,
their continued possession may become essential in

f

7

Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932).

372 U. S., at 343-345.
See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965).
10
See James v. Ileadley, 410 F . 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969).
8

9
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of licensees. In such cases the
licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment."
The States must afford the individual due process before depriving him of life, liberty, or property. When
the deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient consequence, 11 denying the assistance of counsel
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves
is a denial of due process.
This is not to say that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assessment of the possible consequences of conviction is the
sole te~~ the need for assistance of counsel. The
flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances.
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process,
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line- /\ _
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. )Jlcmnsel
this is by no
is often essential to a fair trial,

7"'

11
A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed profession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists);
N. C. Gen. Stat. §93 A-4 (1965) (real estate brokers)), and loss of
pension rights (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension
denied when injury is result of participation in fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514
(1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor resulting in imprisonment); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957) (conviction
of crime or misdemeanor)). Sec generally Project, Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970).

L?1' ~ f
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are
cornple1 others are exceedingly simple. As a j ustification for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries." 12 Yet government often does
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits. 13 It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonindigent defendants.
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not
so classified yet who are in low income groups where
engaging counsel in a minor petty offense case would
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line between indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel
is an arbitrary one, drawn differently from State to State
and of ten resulting in serious inequities to accused persons. The Court's new rule will accent the disadvantage
of being barely self-sufficient economically.
Gideon v. lraimcright, 372 U.S., at 344.
rn In petty offenses, thrrc i~ much le~s plra negotiation than in
serious offenses. See Report by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and tho Administration of ,Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society, 134 (1967) (hereinafter cited as "Challenge"). Thus, in cases whrre the cvidrnce of guilt is overwhelming,
the assistance of counsel is less essential to obtain a lighter sentence.
12
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are
tried showed that procedures were of ten informal, presided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the
prosecution was not vigorous. 14 It is as inaccurate to
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel/ if the
offense charged is only a petty one.rn
('
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be
applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
of its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan
centers.
Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
Neither the Report by Prrsident's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense SerYicc~, 37-40 (1968), went the
route the Court takes today. The President's Commission recommended that counsel be prO\·ided to criminal defendants who face
"a significant penalty" and at lenst to those who are in danger of
"substantial loss of liberty." The American Bar Association standard would not extend thP right to eoHnsel to ra,.:es whrrr "loss
of liberty" is not ''likrly to be imposed." Neither supports a new,
inflexible constitutional rule.
11

15
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The rule adopted today does not go all the way. It
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's position indicates, however, that when the decision must
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations.
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need
for counsel if a jail sentence is ~ imposed, one must
assume a similar i:ejection of discretion in other petty
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without 1scernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense
cases which may result in far more serious consequences
than a few hours or days of incarceration.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken
from a person without affording him due process of law.
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis
for distinguishing between deprivations of liberty and
property. In fact, the majority suggests no reason at
all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "nonjail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences.
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of
the constitutional right to free counsel. But even to-
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day's decision could have a seriously adverse impact
upon the criminal justice system. We should not fashion
a new constitutional rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions, especialy since it is supported neither
by history nor precedent.

II
The majority opinion concludes "that a person may
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisonedhowever briefly-unless he was represented by or waived
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren
of details as to how this rule will be implemented.
There are thousands of statutes and ordinances which
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some·
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors.
This broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today
will confront the judges of each of these courts
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trialand without hearing the evidence-whether he will
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility
to consider the full range of punishments established
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without
counsel.

·''
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If the la.t ter course is followed, the first victim of the
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice requires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tailored to fit the crime and the individual would have
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the
statutory authorization. In creating categories of offenses which by law are irnprisonable but for which
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge would be
overruling de facto the legislative determination as to
the appropriate range of punishment for the particular offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which imprisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the
ccasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a
valua~rpose. ~:mere possibi1it:l'- o j.ail rn
~ ~t
At least the legislatures, and until today
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonmenteven when rarely carried out-as serving a legitimate
social function.
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae,
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova·
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-justified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered.
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of evidence which came out at
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If
the second trial were held before tho same judge, he·
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might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense. 16 In all likelihood, there
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges
as unimprisonable.
The new rule announced today also could result in
equal protection problems. There may~.,,(?e an unfair and unequal treatment of individual aefendants
depending on whether the individual judge has determined in advance to leave open the option of imprissonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the
same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which
no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this type of
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.
A different type of discrimination could result in the
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alternative is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no imprisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who
can pay a $100 fine, and does so. will have responded
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents. 17
See Callon v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
11
The type of penalty discussed above (involving the discretionary
alternatirn of "jail or fine") presents serious problems of fairness10

14V' ~
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To avoid these equal protection problems and to pre-·
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by
law, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offenses where jail
sentences are extremly rare. It is doubtful that the
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The SolicitorGeneral who, on behalf of the United States, urged
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the·
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement of defense counsel will "require more
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 1 8
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice. 10
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regardboth to indigents and nonindigents and to the administration of
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 495 (1971) . No adequate
resolution of these inherently difficult problems has yet been found.
The rule adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of
all discretion in such cases unle8s counsel is available and is appointed,
could aggravate the problem.
1 8 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35.
10 Id., at 36-37.
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ing the extraordinary demand for counsel which
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50
States which require a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the·
'term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is
not reassuring. In a footnote, it is said that there are
presently 355,200 attorneys and that the number will
increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel,
estimated by one source at between 1,575 and 2,300, to
represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic
offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 335,200
lawyers are potentially available. Thousands of these
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice
work for governments, corporate legal departments, the
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal repre__s_ n_tation. Of those in general practice, we have no
indication how many are qualified ~~or willing to accept
assignments which may prove less than lucrative for·
most. 21
20

Id., at 39.

The cu8lom in many, if not most, localitie8 is to appoint counsel
on a case-by-ra~e ba:si:s. Compensation is generally inadequate.
Even in the federal court::; under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which provide:, one of the most generous com11en:salion pl::ins, the rates for appointed counscl-$10 per hour spent
"1
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It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementation of the Court's new rule will require no more than
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few communities
are there full-time public defenders available for or private lawyers specializing in petty cases. Thus, if it were
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the
schedules of those lawyers who arc willing to take an
occasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded
calendars of lower courts in which cases are not schedule
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate
figures ignores the heart of the problem which is the
distribution and availability of lawyers, especially in the
hundreds of small localities across the country.
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's
holding will be on our already overburdened local
courts. 22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity
out of romt, S15 prr hour of court time, l'11bjrct 1o a maximum total
fee of $300 for a mi~drmranor ea c and $500 for a frlony-are low
b:v American standards. Consequently, 1he majority of per~ons
willing to aecrpt appointments ar€' the young and inrxprrieneed.
Rec Capprllrtti, Part One: Tlw Emergencr of a l\Iodrrn Thrmr, in
Cappelletti and Gordle~·. Lrgal Aid: Modrrn Themes and Varia1 ions,
24 Stai1ford L. Rev. 347, 37i-378 (1972). l\lH . .Tm,TrCE BRENNAN
H11gg€'sts, in his roncmTing opinion, that law s1ndent · might provide
an importan1 sourer of legal rrpm,entation. He presrnts no fignres,
however, as to how many Rtudrnts would br qualifird nncl willing
to undertake the rrspon8ibilitir:,; of dd'rncling indigrn1 rnisdrrnranants. Although welcome progre:,;:,; i;; bring made with programs,
suppor1€'d by thr Arnrrican Bar A~~ociation, to enli~t the i1wolvemen1 of law Rtnclrnts in indigrnt reprn,rll1ation , the problems of
meeting stn1r requirrment:,; and of as;uring the requi::;ite control
and ~11prrvision, arr far from i11sub1:,tnntia I. l\Iorrover, the impact
of student part icipa1ion would be limited primarily to the 140 orless communities where thc:,;r lnw schools are !orated.
22
Sec generally H. James, Crisis in the Courts, e. 11 (1967) ~
Challenge, supra, 11. 13, 145-156.

,.
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of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The
Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and congestion in these courts. We are familiar with the
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of
delay. 2 ~ The absence of direct economic impact on the
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent constitutional explosion in procedural rights for the accused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretching out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the public and added delay and congestion in the
courts. 2·1
2 3 See, e. ff ., James, supra , n. 21, at 27-30: Schrag, On Her
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
24
In Cook County, Illinois , fl reeent study revealed that the members of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense
of Prisoners, who are appointed to represent indigent defendants,
rleet fl jury trial in 63 % of thrir trial ca1'eH . while retained and appointed conn~rl do ~o in :t~o/,- nnd the public drfrndrr in on!~· 15% .
"One possible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel,
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, arc more
willing to undrrtakc a jury trial than is an assistant public defender,
who is very busy and very con, cious of the probable e:-..i,ra penalty
accruing to a defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks
rmd W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158159 (1968) (footnote-; omitted).
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There is an additional problem. The ability of vari-ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely.
Even if there were adequate resources on a national
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of lawyers, of facilities and available funding-presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the Court in this case,.
and have been compelled to confront these realities.
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-·
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so,
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 2 5
In other States, legislatures and courts through the enactment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority. 26 These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
of many States, who understand the ..~ ~ { o f
local judicial systems better than this Court, that
2 ~ Seo Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967);
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42"
Ill. 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich.
538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash.
142, 456 P. 2d 696 (1969); State ex rel. Plutshack v. State Department of Health and Social Services, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d
549 (1968).
6
" See Hawaii St. Const., Art. I, § 11 (196 ) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 19-852 (1969 Supp.); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-4503 (1970
Supp.); Ky. Crim. Proc. Rule 8.04; La. Rev. Stat., Tit. 15,
Art. 141 (F); l\Ie. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; Md. R. 719 (b) 2 (a);
~ob. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.1 ,
193.104 (1969); N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503
(1970 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1970 Supp.).
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
•
overtax ~ capabilities. 21
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for
;ertiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling:
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, as
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise·
allocation of its limited resources.
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court system to deal with minor offenses. 28 It is
27 Sec Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases.
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing'·
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that
it be 'nothing.'" But see State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W.
2d 888 (1967).
28 See Cableton v. State, supra, n. 24, at 538-539: "[T]lwrc arc
more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and . . . there arc counties in which there are no,
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat.w It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for
many smalltown courts. The community could simply
not enforce its own la,Ys.'i
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and to
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system.
The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the conse-

'.

0

prncticing lawyers. The impart of [right to counsel in misdem~rnors] would scriou~l.v impair the administration of justice in Arkansas
and impose an intolerable burden upon Uw legal profession ."
29 Sec Silver;;tein, supra, n. 9, nt 12!"-126.
:,o The suece,8ful implementation of the majorit~·'s rule would
require state and lorn! governmrnt;; to appropriate considerable
funds, something they have not been willing to do . Three States
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all
state appropria1 ions for indigent defrnse. Note, Dollars and Sense
of an Expanded Right to Counsel. 55 Iown L. Rev. 1249, 1261>
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000
defending indigent s in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969.
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislaturn
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
Strange, No. 71-11. "In Yiew of American re;;ources the funds
spent on the legal services program ran onl? be rrgarded as trivial."
Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at :~79. "Although thr Amrrir:111 eronomy is over cigth times the size of the Briti~h and the American
population i~ aJmo~t four time~ a~ great, .:-\mcriran legal aid expenditure~ are le~s than t\\"o times as high." Id., n. 210.
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quences arc immaterial. If I were satisfied that the
guarantee of due process required the assistance of
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed
or that the only workable method of insuring justice
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay
in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however
brief, the according of special constitutional status
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate
the need for counsel in other types of cases, unless the
Court embraces an ever broader prophylactic rule. Due
process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the
six-month rule approved below nor the rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result.

III
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis."' The determination
should be made before the accused formally pleads;
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m
v,·hich the assistance of counsel may be requirecl." 2 If
31 It scrms to me that such nn individualized rnlc, urilike a sixmonth rule and the majority's rule, docs not present equal protection problems under this Court's decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 384 U. S. 436 (1963); and
Mayer v. City of Chicago, U.S. (1971) .
32
See, e. g., Kaiz , Municipal Courts-Another Urban Ill, 20 Caso
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Ala-
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the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved
for review. The trial court then becomes oblig~tecl to
scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court
should examine the case against him to insure that there
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defense
counsel, the court should intervene, when necessary, to
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the
facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow.
It is impossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise
and detailed set of guidelines for judges to follow in determining whether the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges
of traffic law infractions will rarely present complex legal
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions,
such as search and seizure problems, will usually be too
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense is one
where the State is represented by counsel and where
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel,
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965).
Although there is le::;s plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. 13,
supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the defendant who is not faced with overwhelming c-vidc-nre of guilt ean
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial.
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there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs.
the assistance of counsel.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The·
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious
consequence the court should consider.
Third, the court should consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the competency of the individual defendant to present his own
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular
defendant or particular incident is another consideration.
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a.
peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where the court would
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges are crucial to the
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the
consideration of the varying factors in each case.
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v.
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon. 33
One of the reasons for seeking a more definitive standard
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon,
372 U. S., at 350--351. But this Court should not assume
33
I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts; I am in complete
accord with Gideon. B etts, like Gideon, concerned the right to
counsel in 1~ felony case. Sec 11. 1, supra. Neither case controls
today's result.
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that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness a,s thifl em,eer,il e,f dttei,rocess-has-evolved,
there i~~ re~son to think that insensitivity will abate.
In concluding, I emphasize my long held conviction
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly
only when all parties arc represented by competent
counsel. Before becoming a member of this Court, I
"--\----p_a_rticipated j_n efforts to enlarge and exten
1e availd
ability of counseP-t The correct disposition of this case,
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to
me--as it has to the other members of the Court. We
arc all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right
to counsel. but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what
the Constitution requires, and (ii) the effect upon the
criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities
and the thousands of police, municipal and justice of the
peace courts across the country.
l.-L-UO•I...P.t~ /
The view I have expressed in this opinion W½+l. accord A
.Q. /
. lerable c1·1scret1011
. to t ]1e courts, an d ~
. ,-;...--,.h
..-t-v-rr •'- lj __.
cons1c
a ow e J ,_I ____
flexibility and opportunity for adjustment w uch seems
so necessary when ,ve arc imposing new doctrine on the
L,wcrJ.el ) lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view
~not precipitate the ''chaos" predicted by the Solicitor
-~btO. [ General as the probable result of the Court's absolutist
·;:!trule, there )win remain serious practical problems result- '-*""'7N"""'<IJ-"""
ing frorn the oxp1tn€lifl'g[of indigents' rights to counsc1 in
petty offense cases... But the according of reviewable

,~1

I

l

.-iM

CV

~

cll,

Law · id PoYerty, Nat19nal Confcr.911ce on Law and)
·
· · · ·
C. 51 ABA Journal 3
Inde~cl, it _is rerognizrd that ma_n~ of 1hr problems idcntifircl in
tins opunon will result from any ra1~mg of the standards as to the
n'quircment of counsel. It is my Yiew that rrlying upon judicial
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discretion to the courts in determining when counsel is
necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a completely inflexible rule,
acilitate an orderly transition
to a far wider availab1 ity and use of defense counsel.
In this process, the courts of first instance which decide these cases ~~ recognize a duty to consider the
need for counsel in every case where the defendant faces
a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above, and
such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as -1mtY,(5e
prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or rule of
court, should be considered where relevant. The goal
hould be, in accord with the essence of the adversary
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that no person accused of crime
must stand alone if counsel is needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the
result of the decision in this case.

----

discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in the
very courts which already arc under the most severe strain.

:§u:prtmt <!Jou.rt of tlrt ~ l t .itu±til
1llasqingfon, to. <!J. 2.0b1'-1~
CHAMBERS OF

May 11, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin

Dear Bill:
I agree with your footnote 7
on page 12.

. Sincerely,(_
T.M.

Mr. Justice Douglas
cc:

The Conference

.
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CHAM BE RS O F

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 11, 1972

Re:

70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin
t "'

Dear Bill:

!

The footnote suggested in
your May 10 memorandum suits me.
Sincerely,

,&
,/2.;--·-__,'
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Mr. Justice Douglas
Copies to Conference

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Hamilton Fox

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 14, 1972

Argersinger
..
J

As this ease may well be ready for final decision at Friday's

~

Conference, please make such suggested changes as you think
appropriate to meet recent changes in Justice'sDouglas' opinion.
Perhaps the main point is to state explicitly, and more strongly
than we have, that the Fifth Amendment itself draws no distinction
between "life, liberty and property"; and that therefore there is no
coostitutional justification for drawing a line differently from the Fifth
Amendment.
We should respond - perhaps in a note - to note 7 added on p.
12 of Justice Douglas' 11th draft. We may find some helpful language
in the first draft of our dissent. Points which may merit mentioning
include: (1) it is misleading to suggest that 335,200 lawyers are
potentially available. This is the total number licensed in the United
states. I cannot cite the source, but the highest estimate I have ever
seen of those engaged in the ''practice" in any form was about 250,000.
This included tens of thousands of lawyers who are not in the general

'•

''

.

2.
practice and hence not available. They work for governments at all
levels, for corporate legal departments, in the Armed Services, and
the like. ( ii) Expressing the availability of lawyers in terms of
"2300 full-time counsel" also misapprec:lates the problem. No one
is talking about "full-time lawyers" except in the relatively rare city
which will finance a full-time public defender. We are talking, rather,
about the difficulty of having lawyers available in the several thousand
police, municipal and justice of the peace courts in large, medium and
small sized communities across the country - having them when and
where they are ndeded. The problem with respect to misdemeanors
is not comparable to that with respect to felonies, where cases normally
are set down for trial several weeks in advance. The typical police
court. ts confronted every morning with scores of cases involving .
arrests made the night before. If each and every one of these cases,
where there la IIIIY possibility of a jail sentence, requires the appointment of crunsel - the backup and log-jam in the system can only be
imagined. The result, obviously, will be a judicial rewriting of
statutes and ordinances across the country - eliminating de facto jail
sentences.
My language may be a little extreme. It 1s intended merely
to, be suggestive.
L. F. P., Jr.

, ,j

T'.:
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 18, 1972

Re:

No. 70-5015

Argersinger v. Hamlin

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
I have had difficulty in coming to a conclusion
in this case, primarily because I have been concerned
about retrospectivity and the Loper v. Beto aspect.
•
Both are necessarily present here and I assume that
all members of the Court are aware of this. On the
other hand, the nature of these lesser offenses perhaps
minimizes the problem. I am still somewhat uncomfortable, but the result you propose is perhaps the
practical one.
Sincerely,

I tt- if.

-

Mr. Justice Douglas

cc:

The Conference

·'.
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j;uvreme <!):curt t1f tire :tlnitch .§tHtcg
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CHAMBER S OF

.

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

>

May 18, 1972

No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin
Dear Bill,
I should appreciate your adding my
name to your concurring opinion in this case.
Sin• :~rely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

..
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Hamilton Fox

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: May 21, 1972

No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin

....'
On sec ood thought, it seems a little nervy for a rookie justice

..

to be citing himself. Accordingly, when you put Argersinger in its
final draft, please make the changes indicated in page 22 of the

''

'

,•l

'

-~

attached copy of draft No. 4.

,'

I have not reread the entire opinion in this draft. As
-r
.

'

. Argersinger will probably come down on Tuesday, May 30, I will
leave it in your hande to see that all cites and quctes are correct and
that we haven't dropped a line or fouled up our syntax too badly.
I do appreciate your "sweating" this one out with me. From
my viewpoint, the choice has been between the "lesser " of various
I •

unattractive solutions. I still believe that ours is measurably the
~

,,

• J

best.

L. F. P., Jr.

.

.
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-',,;

.

~

.

.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 23, 1972

Re:

No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your concurring opinion in this
case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~u:pr.cmt <!Jonrt of tltt ~nittlt ~tattg
~asqingtcn. 10. <!J. 2!lb1'~~
CHAMBERS

or

/

May 31, 1972

,.

..

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

..

•

'

No. 70-3015--Argersingerv. Hamlin

Dear Bill:
I enclose some concurring observations in
the above.

I have sent it to the printer.

Should

anyone join me, I can add them later.

,,

Regards,

I>-

.
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;

'

'

Mr.

Justice Douglas

Copies to Conference
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June 9, 1972
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM O . DOUGLAS

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
The following cases have been held for Argersinger v. Hamlin:
70-50

City of Jacksonville v. Wooley

70-5052

Kammerer v. Washington

70-5053

Fox v. City of Bellevue

71-5722

Wright v. Town of Wood

71-5723

McAllister v. Virginia

Nos. 70-50, 71-5722, and 71-5723 are clear reversals on
Argersinger, as all involved indigent misdemeanants sentenced to a jail term
w/o counsel.

There is an additional claim in No. 71-5723 that Virginia's

statute making non-support a crime is an invidious discrimination based on
sex, as it applies only to husbands who don't support their wives, not to
wives who don't support their husbands.

But this claim need not be reached.

In No. 71-5052, the indigent misdemeanant has been convicted
of possession of dangerous drugs, but apparently has not yet been sentenced.
The Clerk's office is checking, but it appears that the trial proceedings were
halted pending the outcome of petitioner's writ of prohibition in Washington
Supreme Court and were not completed pending disposition of the cert.

In

No. 71-5053, petitioner is charged with three misdemeanors punishable by jail
sentences, but his trial has been stayed pending outcome of the cert •

..

...

. . ..,

- 2 -

Inasmuch as the Washington Supreme Court ruled that neither
of the petitioners in No. 71-5052 or 71-5053 had any right to counsel at
all, these cases should be vacated and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion in Argersinger.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 70-5015
Jon Richard Argersinger,
Petitioner,
V.

Raymond Hamlin, Sheriff,
Leon County, Florida.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Florida:

[June 12, 1972]

MR. J USTICE PowELL, with ,vhom Mn. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring in the result.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all
indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 The question before us today is whether an indigent defendant
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000
or both, and senten ed to 90 days in jail, is entitled as
a matter of constitu ional right to the assistance of appointed counsel. The broader question is whether the
Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged
with a state petty offense~ be afforded the right to appointed counsel.
While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967); Burgett v. T exas, 389 U. S. 109, 114
(1967); Loper v. B eto, U.S. (1972).
2
As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonment docs not exceed six months, Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses
1

,i, ~ 'L-
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonmcnt. 3
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
145 (1968), and in the subsequent case of Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), which was decided
shortly after the opi11ion below, in which we held that
the due process right to a trial by jury in state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the off~~,---...,:=
nse
charged was punishable by more than six month . It
is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is o be
drawn, it must be dra,vn so that an indigent has
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is
a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled la man may be able to defend himself in a nonj ury rial
before a judge experienced in piecing together disassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the
offense charged is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin,

not punishable by imprisonment, regnrdlrss of the nmount of any
fine that might be authorized. To this extent., tho definition used
herein differs from tho fcdcrnl statutory definition of "petty of.--r-..,--:,--'"":':'I
fonse" which includes offcn,;cs punishable by not more than six
months' imprisonment or by n fine not exceeding $500. 18 U. S. C.
§ 1.
3
236 So. 2d 442 (1970).
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and D-islrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617
( 1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic
origins at common law. No such history exists to support a similar limitation of the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felony cases. 4 Only as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover,
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a jury-tempering the possibly
arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and judicial
power 5- while important, is not as fundamental to the
guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.G
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court,
·that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned . . . unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial." A nle, at 12. It seems to me that
the line should not be drawn with such rigidity.
There is a middle course, bet,veen the extremes of
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60-61 (1932).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (196 ).
0 Although we have giYen rctroartiYe effect to our ruling in
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have
said that, "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Si:\'lh
Amendment, right to jury trial." D e Stefano v. Woods, 392 U. S.
631, 634 (1968).
4

5
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to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of
counsel is necessary to assure ·a fair trial.

I

I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's lleed for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Alabama 7 and Gideon ,8 both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately their own case~, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. · Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
n6t be fairly tried if the defe11dant is not assisted by
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend- ',
apts, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 1
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief .
period served under the sometimes deplorable con- .
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
record on employability, arc frequently of sufficient mag:nitucle not to be casually dismissed by the- label "petty." 0-,
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma may
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run
es9apade. 10 Losing one's ddverts license is more serious
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1970), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case,
their continued possession may become essential in
the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
Suvra, n. 4, at 68- 69.
372 U. S., at 343-345.
0
Sec L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965).
10 See James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969).
7

8
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licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of the licensees. In such cases
the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id., at 539.

•',;

When the deprivation of property rights and interests is
of sufficient consequence, 11 denying the assistance of
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a denial of due .process.
This is not to say that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assessment of the possible consequences of conviction is the
·sole test for the need for assistance of counsel. The
flat six-month rule qf the Florida court and the equally
·inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances.
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process,
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable linedra wing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. While
counsel is often essential to a fair trial, this is by no
11 A wide range of civil disabilit ies may rosult from misdemeanor
convictions, such a,; forfeiture of public office (Stat e v. Krug er, 280
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed pro'fession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists);
N. C . Gen. Stat.§ 93 A-4 (b) (1965) (real estate brokers)) , and loss
of pension rights, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (West 1966) (police
disability pension denied when injury is result of participation in
fights, riots, civil in8urrcctions, or while committ ing crime); Burns
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28- 5414 (1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor
resulting in imprisonment); 53 Purdon Pa. Stat. Ann.§§ 39323, 65599
(1957) ( conviction of crime or misdemeanor)). See generally Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand.
L. Rev. 929 (1970).

,.
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are
complex; others are exceedingly simple. As a justification for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
l;:i,wyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries.'~ 12 Y ct government often does
not hire lawyers to. prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor docs every
defendant who can a..fford to do so hire lawyers to defend
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
of assistance of counsel may exceed· tho beuefits. 1 3 It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend.
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonindigent defendants.
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not
so classified yet who are in low inc01ne groups where
e'i.1gaging counsel in a minor petty offcnPe case would
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line between indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel
is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from
State to State and often resulti11g in seriouP inequities to
accused persons. The Court's new rule will accent the
disadvantage of being barely self-sufficient economically.
12

Gideon v. Wainwright, 3i2 U. S., at 344.

13

In petty offon~es, there i~ much Jr~~ plra nrp;otia tion than in

serious offrnses. SC'r Report by the Pre~i<lent',; Commis~ion on Law
Enforcement and the Admini8tration of Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society, 134 (1967) (hereinafter cited as "Challenge"). Thus, in ca He~ where ( he e\'idcnce of guilt i~ O\Crwhrlming,
the assistance of coun8cl i8 lC8s e8sentinl to obtain a lighter sentence.
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are
tried showed that procedures were often informal, presided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the
prosecution was not vigorous. 14 It is as inaccurate to
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel if the
,offense charged is only a petty one.15
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be
applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
of its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from
justices of the peace and part~time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
· which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan
centers.
Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
Neither the Report y President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice nor the American Bar Association went the route the Court takes today. The President's Commission recommended that counsel be provided to criminal defendants
who face "a significant penalty" and at least to those who arc in
danger of "substantial loss of liberty." Challenge, supra, n. 13.,....
at. ...,_
150. The American Bar Association standard would not extend the
right to counsel to cases where "loss of liberty" is not ''likely to be
imposed." American Bar As~ociation Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services, 37-40 (1968).
Neither supports a new, infiexible constitutional rule.
H
15

70-5015-CONCUR
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The rule adopted today does not go all the way. It
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's position indicates, however, that when the decision must
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations.
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need
for counsel if a jail sentence is imposed, one must assume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without dis~
cernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense
cases which may result in far more serious consequences
than a few hours or days of incarceration.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken
from a person without affording him due process of law.
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis
for distinguishing between deprivations of liberty and
property. In fact, the majority suggests no reason at
all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "non-·
jail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences.
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of
the constitutional right to free counsel. But even today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact

•,,
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upon the day to day functioning of the criminal justice
system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitutional rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions, especially since it is supported neither by history
nor precedent.

II
The majority opm1on concludes that, absent a valid
waiver, a )erson ma not be imprisoned even for lesser
offenses unless .he was rep ented by counsel at the trial.
In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisonedhowever briefly-unless he was represented by or waived
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren
-pf details as to how this rule wijl be implemented.
· There are thousands of statu~es and ordinances which
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some
·of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They
·also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors.
'T his broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today
will confront the judges of each of these courts
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trialand without hearing the evidence- whether he will
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility
to consider the full range of punishments established
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel
and retain the discretion vested in him. by law, or to
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without
counsel.

70-5015-CONCUR
10

ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN

If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice requires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tailored to fit the crime and the individual would have
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the
new rule, judges will be tempted arbitrarily to divide
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the
statutory authorization. In creating categories of offenses which by law are imprisonable but for which
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge will be
overruling de facto the legislative determination as to
the appropriate range of punishment for the particular offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which imprisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a
valuable deterrent purpose. At least the legislatures,
and until today the courts, have viewed the threat of
imprisonment-even \\ hen rarely carried out-as serving
a legitimate social function.
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae,
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-justified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered.
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of evidence which came out at
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If
the second trial were held before the same judge, he

.
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might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense.rn In all likelihood, there
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by
legislatures as imprisonable, will be' treated by judges
·as unimprisonable.
The new rule announced today also could result in
equal protection problems. There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual d e f e n d a n t r·
,depending on whether the individual judge has determined in advance to leave open the option of impri · sonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the
:same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense
would have no counsel. Since 'the services of counsel
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which
no jail sentence is imposed, tho results of this type of
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.
A different type of discrimination could result in the
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alternative is prescribed: for example, "five clays in jail or
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no imprisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who
can pay a $100 fine, and does so, will have responded
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents. 11
16 See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1880); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969).
17 The type of penalty discussed above (involving the discretionary
alternative of "jail or fine") presents serious problems of fairness-
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To avoid these equal protection problems and to preserve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by
law, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offenses where jail
sentences are extre~ rare. It is doubtful that the
States possess the necessary resources to meet this sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor
General, who suggested on behalf of the United States
the rule- the Court today adopts, recognized that the
consequences could be far reaching. In addition to the
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the· man• datory reqt1ir,e ment of defense counsel will "require more
·pre-trial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time, and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
,Court reporters will be nMded as well as counsel, and
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 1 8
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"[I] f ... this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pileup in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice.''"10
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regardboth to indigents and · nonindigC'nts and to tho admini::;traiion of
justice. CL Tate v. Short , 401 U. S. 395 (1971). No adequate
resolution of these inherently difficult problems ha s yet been found .
The rnle adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of
all discretion in such cases unless counsel is aniilable and is appointed,
could aggravate the problem.
1 8 Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 34-35.
10 Id., at 36-37.

I

•

70-5015-CONCUR
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN

ing the extraordinary demand for counsel which
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be used
"as counsel in certain types of cases involving relatively
small sentences." 2 0 Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50
States which require a licen se to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the·
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is
not reassuring. In a footnote, it i~ said that there are·
present y 3 ,200 attorneys and that the number will
in~reasc rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel,
estimated by one source at Lctween 1,575 and 2,300, to
represent all indigent mi clemcanants cxclucli11g traffic
offenders. It is totally unrea 1st1c to imply t 1at 33-5, Q
lawyers are potentially available. Thousands of'i'i.rnse
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice
work for governments, corporate legal departments, the
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal representation. Of those in general practice, we have no
indication how many arc qualified to defend criminal
cases or willing to accept assig11ments which may prove
less than lucrative for most. 21
Id., at 39.
The custom in many, if not most , loealitics is to appoint counsel
on a case-by-case basi~. Compensation is gcnrrally inadequate.
Even in the federal courts unclrr the Criminal Ju~tiee Act of 19G4,
18 U. S. C. § 300GA, whieh proYidc~ one of the mo~t gc1wrous compensation phm8, the ratc8 for appointed coun~cl-$20 per hour spent
20

21
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It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementation of the Court's new rule will require no more than
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few communities
are there full-time public defenders available for or private lawyers specializing in petty cases. Thus, if it were,
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the
schedules of those lawyers who are willing to take aa
9ccasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded(c3}:
calendars of lower courts in which cases are not schedul
_ J.
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day,
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate.
figures ignores the heart of the p r o b l e m ~
· distribution and av,ailabilit~ of lawyers, especially in the
J O rt
4
hundreds of small loca 1ties across the courrtr .
,
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's
holding will be on our already overburdened local.
courts. 22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity
out of court, $30 per hour of court time, subject to a maximum total
fee of $400 for a misdrmeanor case and $1,000 for a felony-are low
by American standards. Consequently, the majority of persons
willing to accept appointments arc the young and inexperienced.
,Sec Cappelletti, Part One: ;r11e Emrrgencc of a Modern Theme, in
Cappelletti and Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations,
24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 377-378 (1972). MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN
suggests, in his concurring opinion, that law students might provide
an im11ortant source of legal representation. He presents no figures,
however, as to how mnny s_tudents would be qualified and willing
to undertake the respon;ibilitics of defending indigent misdemean-,
ants. Although welcome progress is being made with programs,supported by the American Bar Association, to enlist the involvement of law studcntti in indigent rcpretirntation, the problems of'
meeting state requirements and of atisuring the requisite control ~
and supervision,_ ~re (ar from insub~tantial. l\for~over, the impact.
of student part1c1pat1on would be hm1tccl pnmanly to the 140 or
less communiticti where' these law schools arc located. _ _ _ _ _
__
22
,
Sec. gt>nerally II. i1me::;, Crisis in the Courts, €)2 (1967);
~
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156.
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of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The
Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and congestion in these courts. We are familiar with the
-common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of
·delay. 23 The absence of direct economic impact on the
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent constitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac·CUsed-all these factors are likely to result in the stretching out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the public and added delay and congestion in the
-courts. 2•1
See, e. g., James, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
21 In Cook County, Illinois, a recent study revealed that the members of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense
of Prisoners, who are appointed to represent indigent defendants,
elect a. jury trial in G3% of their trial casc,;, while retained and appointed connsel do so in 33% and the public defender in only 15%.
"One possible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel,
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, arc more
willing to undertake a jury trial than is an assistant public defender,
who is very busy and very conscious of tho probable extra. penalty
accruing to a defendant who loses bis case before a jury." D. Oaks
and W. Lrhman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158
(1968) (footnote omitted).
23

'•
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There is an additional problem. The ability of vari~
ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely.
Even if there were adequate resources on a natio11al
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of lawyers, of facilities and available funding- presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the Court in this case,
and have been compelled to confront these realities.
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so,
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 25
In other States, legislatures and courts through the enactment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority. 26 These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
pf many States, who understand the problems of
local judicial systems better than this Court, that

.,·

~,.,

25 See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967);
S ·urrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
(]ableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 4-20 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42
Ill. 2d 240, 2,JG N. E. 2d 281 (19<3\:l); People v. Mallory, 378 Mich.
538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash.
2d 142, 456 P. 2d 69<3, cert. denied, 397 U. S. 948 (1969); Sta.te ex
rel. Plutshack v. D epartment of Health and Social Services, 37 Wis.

2d 713 , 155 N. W. 2d 549 (1968).
26
See Hawaii St. Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann.
§§ 19-851, 19-852 (1971 Supp); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-4503
(1970 Supp.); Ky. Crim. Proc. Ruic 8.04; La. Rev. Stal., 15141 (F) (West 1967); Mr. Ruic Crim. Proc. 44; l\Id. R. 719 §b2
(a); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.188,
193.140 (1969) ; N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1971 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503
(1971 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1971 Supp).

.:
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
overtax capabilities."'
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for a
writ of certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise
allocation of its limited resources.
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court system to deal with minor offenses. 28 It is
27 See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota :
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases.
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing'
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that
it be 'nothing.'" (Footnote omitted.) But sec State v. Borst, 278
Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (1967).
28
Sec Cableton v. State, supra, 11. 24, at 358: "[T]here are more
justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and . . . there are counties in which there are no
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat. 20 It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for
many small town courts. -T he community could simply
n'o t enforce its own laws. 30
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight
both to the lik~lihood of short term "chaos" and to
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system ..
The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the m;ajority, the consepracticing lawyers. The impact of [right to. counsel in misdemean°
,.________o..,r"- would s~ri~usly impair the administration of justice in Arkansas
an impo8~ a11 intolerable burden upon the legal profession." · (Fo note omitted.)
29 See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
30 The successful implementation of t he majority's rule would ·
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable
funds , something they have not been willing to do. Three States
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969.
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds
spent on the legal services program can only be regarded as trivial."
Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at 379. "Although the American economy is over 8 times the size of the British :111d the American population is almost 4 times as great, American legal aid expenditures
are less than 2 times as high." Id., at 379, n. 210.
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qucnces are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the
guarantee of due process required the assistance of
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed
or that the only workable method of insuring justice
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay
in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however
brief, the according of special constitutional status
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate
the need for counsel in other types of cases, unless the
Court embraces an even broader prophylactic rule. Due
process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the
six-month rule approved below nor the rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result.

,

..

.,'

III
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. 31 The determination
should be made before the accused formally pleads;
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m
which the assistance of counsel may be required. 32 If
31
It seems to me that Ruch an individualized rule, unlike a sixmonth rule and the majority's rule, does not present equal protection problems under this Court's deci8ions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U. S. 12 (195G); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963); and
May er v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
32
See, e. g., Katz, Municipal Court~-Another Urban Ill, 20 Case
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Ilamilton v. Ala-

'"

70-5015-CONCUR
20

ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN

the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons so that the issue could be preserved for review.
Tho trial court would then become obligated to scrutinize
carefully tho subsequent proceedings for the protection
of tho defendant. If an unrepresented defendant sought
to enter a plea of guilty, the Court should examine
the case against him to insure that there is admissible
evidence tending to support the elements of the offense. If a case went to trial without defense counsel,
the court should intervene, when necessary, to insure
that the defendant adequately brings out the facts in
his favor and to prevent legal issues from being overlooked. :Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly
against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appel¼,te
courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to
appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow.
It is impossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise
and detailed set of g,uidelines for judges to follow in determining whether the, appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial, Certainly three general factors
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the
complexity of the offense,charged. For example, charges
of traffic law infractions would rarely present complex
legal or factual questions, but.charges that contain difficult
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions,
such as search and seizure problems, would usually be too
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense were
one where the State is represented by counsel and where most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel,
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (196q);
Harvey v. Mi,ssissippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965).
Although there is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. •13,
supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the defendant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt can
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial.

./,·
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there would be a strong indication that the indigent also
needs the assistance of counsel.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious
conseq~ence the court should consider.
· Third: the court should, consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the
most difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor would be
the competency of the individual defendant to present hie
o~n case. The attitude ·of the community toward a particular defendaut or particular incident would be another
consideration. But there might be other reasons why a
d.e fendant would have a peculiar· need for a lawyer which
w'ould compel the' appointment of counsel in a case where
the court would_ nor~nall:y think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges
would be crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental
fairne_ss requiring the consideration of the varying factors
in each case.
· Such a ~ule is similar in certain respects to the special
circumstances rule applied to felony cas(;ls ~n Betts -y.
v._ .Brady, 316. U. S. 455 (194~), and B?!,te v. Illinois, 333
U'.. S. 640 ( 1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon. 33
Qne of tJ:ie reas(?ns f\ll' seeking a more definitive standard
~n felony cases was the failure of many state courts to
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-:case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon,
372 U. S., at 350- 351. But this Court should not assume
33
I do not disagree with the overruling of B etts ; I am in complete
accord with Gideon. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the right to
counsel in a felony case. Sec n. 1, supra. N ciLher case controls
today's result.
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that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness, there is little reason to think that insensitivity will abate.
In concluding, I emphasize my long held conviction
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly
only when all parties are represented by competent
counsel. Before becoming a member of this Court, I
participated in efforts to enlarge and extend the availability of counsel. The correct disposition of this case,
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to
me-as it has to the other members of the Court. We
are all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right
to counsel, but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what
the Constitution requires, and (ii) the effect upon the
criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities
and the thousands of police, municipal and justice of the
peace courts across the country.
The view I have expressed in this opinion would accord
considerable discretion to the courts, and would allow the
flexibility and opportunity for adjustment which seems
so necessary when we are imposing new doctrine on the
lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view
would not precipitate the "chaos" predicted by the Solicitor General as the probable result of the Court's absolutist
rule, there would still remain serio~ractical problems
r.esulting from the expansion of indigfents' rights to counsel in petty offense cases. 3 •1 But the according of review-

----

34
Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in
this opinion will result from any raising of the standards as to the
requirement of counsel. It is my view that relying upon judicial
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise

.
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able discretion to the courts in determining when counsel
is necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a completely inflexible rule, would facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider availability and use of defense counsel.
In this process, the courts of first instance which decide these cases would have to recognize a duty to consider
the need for counsel in every case where the defendant
faces a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above,
and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as
might be prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or
rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The
goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that no person accused of crime
must stand alone if counsel is needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the
result of the decision in this case.

,.
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could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in the
very courts which already are under the most severe strain.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring in the result.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all
indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 The question before us today is whether an indigent def end ant
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000
or both, and sentenced to 90 days in jail, is entitled as
a matter of constitutional right to the assistance of appointed counsel. The broader question is whether the
Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged
with a state petty offense 2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel.
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 114
(1967); Loper v. Beto, - V. S. (1972).
2
As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious mio:demcanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.~
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Lou-isiana, 391 U. S.
145 (1968), and in the subsequent ca~e of Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), which was decided
shortly after the opinion below, in which the Court held
that the due process right to a trial by jury in state criminal cases was limitC:'cl to cases in ,vhich the offense
charged was punishable by more than six months' imprisonment. It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel
line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent
has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there
is a due process right. to a jury trial. An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself i11 a nonjury trial
before a judge experienced in piecing together disassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the·
offense charged is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointed com1sel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin,
not punishable by impr.isonmont, rrgardlrss of the am0tmt of any·
fine that might be authorized. To this extent, the definition used'
herein differs from the federal statutory definition of "petty of-·
fcnse." whirh inrl11c!Ps offrn,r~ punishable b~· not more than six
months' imprisomnrn1 or b.,· a fine not exrecding $500. 18 U. S. C ..
§ 1.
3
236 So. 2d 442 ( 1970).
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and D1strict of Columbia v. Clawa11s, 300 U. S. 617
(1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic
origins at common law. No such history exists to support a similar limitation of the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felony cases.~ Only as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover,
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a jury-te1npering the possibly
arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and judicial
power "-·while important, is not as fundamental to the
guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counscl.6
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agrw with thenew rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court,
that "absent a knowinp.; and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned . . . unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial." Ante, at 12. It seems to me that
the line should not be drawn with such rigidity.
There is a middle course, between the extremes of
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right
See Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45, 60-61 (1932).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 14,5, 156 (1968).
6
Although we huYc giYcn retro:wtirn effect to our ruling in
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have
said that, "[t]hc values implemented by the right to jury trial would
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth
Amendment ri11:ht to jmy trial." De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U. S.
631, 634 (1968).
4
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to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial.

I
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys-teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense·
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-bama 7 and Gideon,8 both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre-sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief
period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label "petty." 9'
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma may
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade. 10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1970), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case,
their continued possession may become essential in
the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
Supra, n. 4, at 68-69.
372 U. S., at 343-345.
9
See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in.
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965).
10
See James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969).
7

8
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licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of the licensees. In such cases:
the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id., at 539.
When the deprivation of property rights and interests is·
of sufficient consequence, 11 denying the assistance of
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a denial of due process.
This is not to say that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assessment of the possible consequences of conviction is the
sole test for the need for assistance of counsel. Theflat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances~
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process,.
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line-·
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. While
counsel is often essential to a fair trial, this is by no
A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State v. Kruger, 280
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed pro-fession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists);
N. C. Gen. Stat.§ 93 A-4 (b) (1965) (real estate brokers)), and loss
of pension rights, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (West 1966) (police
disability pension denied when injury is result of participation in
fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Burns
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-5414 (1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor
resulting in imprisonment); 53 Purdon Pa. Stat. Ann.§§ 39323, 65599
(1957) (conviction of crime or misdemeanor)). See generally Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand ..
L. Rev. 929 (1970).
11

.

.
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are
complex; others arc exceedingly simple. As a justification for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend a.re the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries." 12 Yet government often does
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor does every
defendant who can afford to do so hire lawyers to defend
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits. 13 It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonindigent defendants.
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not
so classified yet who arc in low income groups where
engaging counsel in a minor petty offense case would
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line between indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel
is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from
State to State and often resulting in serious inequities to
accused persons. The Court's new rule will accent thedisadvantage of being barely self-sufficient economically.
Gideon Y. Wainwright, 372 U. S., nt 344.
In petty offenses, there is mt1l'h Jes~ plea negotiation than in
serious offenses. Sec Report by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Soriety, 134 (1967) (hereinafter rited as "Challenge"). Thus, in rases where the eYidcnce of guilt is oYerwhelming,.
the assistance of counsel is less essential to obtain a lighter sentence.
1~

13
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are
tried showed that procedures were of ten informal, presided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the
prosecution was not vigorous. 14 It is as inaccurate to
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant nreds the assistance of counsel if the
offense charged is only a petty one. 1 "
Despite its overbreaclth, the easiest solution would be
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be
applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
of its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal justice system s of 50 States. This is apparent when
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan
centers.
14

Silverstein, supra , n . 9, at 125-126.
Neithrr the Report by the Prrsidrnt '::< Commis~ion on Law Enforr emen t and the Administration of .lustier nor thr Ameriran Bnr
A8soriation went the route thr Court tn krs today. Thr President's
Commission recommended that ro1msrl be provided to criminal defend ants who far e " [L signifir11nt prnnlt:v" nnd 11t lrn st to those who are
in danger of "suhst:mtial lo~s of liberty." Challenge. supra, n . 13, at
150. The American Bar A~sorintion standnrd would no t extend the
right to counsel to cases where "loss of liberty" is not "likely to be
impo ' ed ." Americnn Bar Association Project on :'.\Iinimum Rtandards
for Criminal .Justice, ProYiding Defense Sen ·ires, 37-40 (1968) .
Neither supports a new, inflexibl e constitutional rule.
15
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The rule adopted today docs not go all the way. It
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's position indicates, however, that when the decision must
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations.
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need
for counsel if a jail sentence is imposed, one must assume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without discernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no·
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense
cases which may result in far more serious consequences
than a few hours or days of incarceration.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken
from a person without affording him due process of law.
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis
for distinguishing between deprivations of liberty and
property. In fact, the majority suggests no reason at
all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "nonjail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences.
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of
the constitutional right to free counsel. But even today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact
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upon the day to day functioning of the criminal justice·
system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitu-tional rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions, especially since it is supported neither by history
nor precedent.
II
The majority opm10n concludes that, absent a valid
waiver, a person may not be imprisoned even for lesser
offenses unless he was represented by counsel at the trial.
In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,.
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisonedhowever briefly-unless he was represented by or waived
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren
of details as to how this rule will be implemented.
There are thousands of statutes and ordinances which
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some·
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors.
This broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today
will confront the judges of each of these courts
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed·
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trialand without hearing the evidence-whether he will
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some·
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility
to consider the full range of punishments established
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the·
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without
counsel.
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If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice requires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tailored to fit the crime and the individual would have
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the
new rule, judges will be tempted arbitrarily to divide
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the
statutory authorization. In creating categories of offenses which by law are imprisonable but for which
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge will be
overruling de f aclo the legislative determination as to
the appropriate range of punishment for the particular offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which imprisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a
valuable deterrent purpose. At least the legislatures,
and until today the courts, have viewed the threat of
imprisonment-even "hen rarely carried out-as serving
a legitimate social function.
In the brief for the United States as arnicus curiae,.
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility
could be preserved through the technique of trial de novo
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-justified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered.
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of evidence which came out at
the first trial ,vhen the accused was uncounselled. If
the second trial were held before the same judge, he
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might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense. 16 In all likelihood, there
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges
as unimprisonable.
The new rule announced today also could result in
equal protection problems. There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual defendants
depending on whether the individual judge has <letennined in advance to leave open the option of imprisonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled
in some courts to counsrl while in other courts in the
same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which
110 jail sentence is i1nposecl, the results of this type of
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.
A different type of discrimination could result in the
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alternative is prescribed: for example, "five clays in jail or
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no imprisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who
can pay a $100 fine, and does so, will have responded
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents. 11
16
Se<.> ('al/an "· ll'ilson. 127 r. S. 540 (IS.SO); l'v·orth Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969).
17
The type of pennlty diH<'llssed nboYe (im·olving the discretionary
alternatiYe of "jnil or fine") presents serious problems of fairness--
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To avoid these equal protection problems and to preserve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by
la\Y, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offenses where jail
sentences are extremely rare. It is doubtful that the
States possess the necessary resources to meet this sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor
General, who suggested on behalf of the United States
the rule the Court today adopts, recognized that the·
consequences could be far reaching. In addition to the
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement of defense counsel will "require more
pre-trial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time, and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 18
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule·
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"[I] f ... this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pileup in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice." 19
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regardboth to indigents and nonindigents and to the administration of
juHlice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971). Ko adequate
resolution of these inherently difficult problems has yet been found.
The rule adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of
all discretion in such cases unless counsel is available and is appointed,
could aggravate the problem.
18
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35.
19 Id., at 36-37.
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rng the extraordinary demand for counsel which
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated v,·hether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be used
"as counsel in certain types of cases involving relatively
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50
States which require a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the
'term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the·
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is
not reassuring. In a footnote, it is said that there are·
presently 335,200 attorneys and that the number will
increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to·
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel,
estimated by one source at between 1,575 and 2,300, to
represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic
offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 335,200·
lawyers are potentially available. Thousands of these
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice
work for governments, corporate legal departments, the·
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal representation. Of those in general practice, we have no
indication how many are qualified to defend criminal
cases or willing to accept assignments which may prove
less than lucrative for most. 21
Id., at 39.
The custom in man~·, if not most, localities is to appoint counsel
on a case-by-case basi::;. Compensation is grnerally inadequate.
Even in the federal courts under the Criminal ,Justice Act of 1964,
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which pro\·ide::; one of the most generous compensation plans, the rates for appointed counsel-$20 per hour spent
20
21
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It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementation of the Court's new rule will require no more than
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few conununities
are there full-time public defenders available for or private lawyers specializing in petty cases. Thus. if it were
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the
schedules of those lawyers who are willing to take an
occasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded
calendars of lmver courts in which cases are not scheduled
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate
figures ignores the heart of the problem, which is the
distribution and availability of lawyers, especially in the
hundreds of small localities across the country.
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's
holding will be on our already overburdened local
courts. 22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity
out of rourt. $30 prr hour of court time, subject to a maximum totat
fee of $400 for a misdemeanor rnsc and $1,000 for a felony-arc low
b)' Amerirnn stnndarcls. C'on~<"qu<"ntly, the majorit)· of persons
willing to arrept appointments are the )·oung nm! inexpcrienred.
Sec Cappelletti. Part One: Thf' Emergence of a Modern Thf'mc, in
C'nppellctti :md Gordley. Legal Aid: Modnn Themes and Vnriations,
24 Stanford L. RcY. 347. 377-378 (1972). Mn. JmnTCE R1rnNNAN
suggests, in his ronrmring opinion, that law students might proYide
nn important sourrr of leg:il rcpre"entntion. He pre:-ents no figures,
however, as to how mall)' . tudf'nt:; would be qualified and willing
io undertake the respon~ihili(ies of defending indigent mi,:demc-annnts. Although welcome progress is being made with progrnms,
s11pported by the Amcric:m Bar Assoriation , to enlist tlw im·oh"ement of law students in indigent reprCilC'nta tion, the problems of
IDC'C'ling state requirement~ and of :1ssuring the requi~ite control
and ~upcrvi~ion , arc far from i11~uh;;:t:111tial. ::'lfon'<l\"t'r, tlw imp:tct
of stndf'nt partiripation would be limited primarily to the HO or
less communities where these law schools are lor::i tcd.
"" See generally H. J:,mC'~. Crisis in the Court,;, r. 2 (1!)67);
Ch::tllenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156.
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of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The
Court's rule may ,Yell exacerbate delay and congestion in these courts. We are familiar with the
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
cl uty; in other cases it will be clone for purposes of
clelay. 2 3 The absence of direct economic impact on the
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time
their 11ot-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent constitutional explosion in procedural rights for the accused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretching out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the public and added delay and congestion in the
courts. 2 •
2
James. supra. n. 21, ::it 27-30; Schrag, On Her
~ Sre, <'. g.,
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
21
• In Cook County, Illinois. a rC'rent study rC'Yra.lrd that the mcmbC'rs of the Chicago B::ir Association's Committee on the Defense
of Prisoners, who are appointrd to represent indigent defendants,
clrct, a jnr~· trial ill 6~1 % of thPir tri,11 <·:1~r,. whilr rrtaillrd am! appointrd rounRrl do so in 33' ~ and the puhlir defrnder in on!~- 1:i%.
"One posdible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel,
who arc sometimes serving in part to gain cxperienre, are more
willin11: to undertn kc a jury trial than is an assistant public defender,
who is Ycry busy and very conscious of the probable extra penalty
accruing to a defendant who loses his rase before a jury." D. Oaks
:rnd W. Lrhman , A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158(1968) (footnote omitted).
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There is an additional problem. The ability of vari-ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely.
Even if there were adequate resources on a national
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of lawyers, of facilities and available funding-presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the Court in this case,
and have been compelled to confront these realities..
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places. and
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so,
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 25·
In other States, legislatures and courts through the enactment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority. 26 These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
of many States, who understand the problems of
local judicial systems better than this Court, that

'•.,

See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967);
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42
Ill. 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mallory. 378 Mich.
538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Ilendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash.
2d 142, 456 P. 2d 696, cert. denied, 397 U. S. 9-!8 (1969); State ex
rel. Plutshack v. Department of Health and Social Services, 37 Wis.
2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 540 (1968).
26 See Hawaii St. Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann.
§§ 19-851, 19-852 (1971 Supp); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-4503
(1970 Supp.); Ky. Crim. Proc. Rule 8.04; La. Rrv. Stat., 15141 (F) (West 1967); Me. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; Md. R. 719 §b2
(a); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.188,
193.140 (1969); N. l\Iex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1971 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 13, § 6503
(1971 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1971 Supp).
25

'·

.
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
overtax capabilities." 7
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for a
writ of certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling will mean in some localities. In November 1971 thepetition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise
allocation of its limited resources.
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United·
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court systern to deal ·with minor offenses. 28 It is,
27
Sec Kamisar & Chopcr, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded'
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases.
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing'·
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that
it be 'nothing.'" (Footnote omitted.) But sec State v. Borst, 278
l\1inn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (1967).
28
See Cableton v. State, supra, n. 24, at 358: "[T]here are more
justice:, of the peace in Arkansas than there arc resident practicing lawyers and . . . there are coU11ties in which there are no ,

.,
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat.~ 9 It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonab]e offense would be a practical impossibility for
many small town courts. The community could simply
not enforce its own la\,·s." 0
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and to
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system.
The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consepracticing l::iwycrs. Tile' irnpnct of [right to rounr-rl in mir-drmcnnor
cases] would srriousl~· impnir thr admini8tration of justice in Arlrnnsas
and impose an intolnable bnrdm upon the legal profrr-r-ion." (Footnote omittrd.)
~n See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-12G.
:,o The surcesr-ful implcmcntntion of the m11jorit~1 's rule would
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable
fonds, something they hnve not been willing to do. Three States
with 21 % of the Nation's popnlation provide more than 50% of all
stnte appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense
of nn Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansns spent $570,000
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969.
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
Strange, No. 71-11. "In Yiew of American resources the funds
spent on the legal services progrnm ran only be rrgarded as trivial."
Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at :~79. "Although the Arneriran economy i~ O\'er 8 time~ 1hr 8i1.e of the British :me! the American popuhtion is almost 4 times as grral, American legal aid expenditures
arc less than 2 times as high." Id., at 379, 11. 210.
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qucnces arc immaterial. If I were satisfied that the
guarantee of due process required the assistance of
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed
or that the only workable method of insuring justice
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay
in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however
brief, the according of special constitutional status
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate
the need for counsel in other types of cases. unle~s the
Court embraces an even broader prophylactic rule. Due
process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the
six-month rule approved below nor the rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result.

III
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis.:IJ The determination
should be made before the accused formally pleads;
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas 111
which the assistance of counsel may be required. 32 If
H seems to me tlrnt surh :m indiYidnalized rule, unlike a sixmonth rule and the majorit?'s rule. does not present equal protection problems under this Court's derisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
lT. S. 12 (19.5G); Douglas Y. California, 372 U. S. 353 (19G3); and
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40-1- U. S. 189 (1971).
32
Sec, e. g., Ka11,, 1foniripal Courts-Anotlwr Urban Ill, 20 Case
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Ala31
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the trial court should conclude that the assistauce of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons so that the issue could be preserved for review.
The trial court would then become obligated to scrutinize
carefully the subsequent proceedings for the protection
of the defendant. If an unrepresented defendant sought
to enter a plea of guilty, the Court should examine
the case against him to insure that there is admissible
evidence tending to support the elements of the offense. If a case went to trial without defense counsel,
the court should intervene, when necessary, to insure·
that the defendant adequately brings out the facts in
his favor and to prevent legal issues from being overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly
against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate
courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to
appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow.
It is impossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise
and detailed set of guidelines for judges to follow in determining whether the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges
of traffic law infractions would rarely present complex
legal or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions,
such as search and seizure problems, would usually be too
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense were
one where the State is represented by counsel and \Vhere
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel,
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Ilarvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965).
Although there is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. 13,

supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the defencbu t who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt c-an
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial.
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there would be a strong indication that the indigent also,
needs the assistance of counsel.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follow if a conviction is 9btained. The
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the·
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious
consequence the court should consider.
Third, the court should consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the
most difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor would be·
the competency of the individual defendant to present his
own case. The attitude of the community toward a particular defendant or particular incident would be another
consideration. But there might be other reasons why a
defendant would have a peculiar need for a lawyer which
would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where
the court would normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges
would be crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental
fairness requiring the consideration of the varying factors
in each case.
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v.
v. Brady, 316 U. S. 45,5 ( 1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333.
U.S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon. 33
One of the reasons for seeking a more definitive standard
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See·
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon,
372 U. S., at 350--351. But this Court should not assume
33

I do not disagree wit h the overruling of B etts; I am in complete
accord with Gideon. B etts, like Gideon, co11 e('l'llC<l lhc ri gh1 to
counsd in a felony case. Sec n . 1, sup ra. Neither case ron t rnls
t oday's result.

'.
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that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness, there is little reason to think that insensitivity will abate.
In concluding. I emphasize my long held conviction
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly
only when all parties are r<'presented by competent
counsel. Before becoming a member of this Court, I
participated in efforts to enlarge and extend the availability of counsel. The correct disposition of this case,
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to
me-as it has to the other members of the Court. We
arc all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right
to counsel, but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what
the Constitution reqilires, and (ii) the effect upon the
criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities
and the thousands of police, municipal and justice of the
peare courts across the country.
The view I have expressed in this opinion would accord
considerable discretion to the courts, and would allow the
fkxibility aml opportunity for adjustment which seems
so necessary when we arc imposing new doctrine on the
lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view
would not precipitate the "chaos" predicted by the Solicitor General as the probable result of the Court's absolutist
rule, there would still remain serious practical problems
resulting from the expansion of indigents' rights to counsel in petty offense cases."·1 But the according of review3

~ Indeed, it is recognized that rnnny or the problems identified in
this opinion will rr,11lt from auy raiHing of the standards a8 to the
rrquirrmenL of counsel. It is my view that rel.\·in~ upon judicial
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise
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able discretion to the courts in determining when counsel
is necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a completely inflexible rule, would facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider availability and use of defense counsel.
In this process, the courts of first instance which decide these cases would have to recognize a duty to consider
the need for counsel in every case where the defendant
faces a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above,
and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as
might be prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or
rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The
goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that no person accused of crime
must stand alone if counsel is needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the
result of the decision in this case.

could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in th~
very courts which already are under the most severe strain.
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free Lawyer Rulirug Stirs Concern
William Wright has had his
passing moment of fame in
the nation's affairs, but there
are observers here who will
remain curious to know what
happens to him ultimately.
His story may tell whether
"small town America" can
adjL1st to the G~nstitution.
1'be minor drama revolving
aro und Wright i;wolves a major qnestion in the law: Does
the Constitution guarantee a
lawyer even to a person accused of a petty crime? The
Supreme Court gave a modified "yes" to that question recently, and the reverberations
are continuing across the
country.
In hundreds of municipal
courts, scaaered through as
m any villages and towns, the
word is just getting around
that free lawyers may have to
be provided in scores of pelly
cases for offenders who want
an attorney but can't afford
to hire their own.
The Supreme Court has decreed that the right to a lawyer, and a free one if necessary, c1pplies to any case in
which the sentence could be a
jail term, however brief. The
town fathers in many communities are wondering .if that
is beyond local capacity.

*

Willia,n Wright's story, so
far, suggests that it may be a
luxury in many towns. 13ut his
story also indicates that 1t
could often be a necessity,
too. IIis is an interesting case
study:
On Oct. 27 , 19G9, Wright had
had too much to drink. lfe was
pickc'<l up as a drunk, and
jailed al While Hiver, S.D.
The next d:1 v, he was taken
15 miles to tlie t'.lwn of Wood,
to be tried before the police
mag-islratc, llow:ml Piper.
All hough Wright said ne
would like to have a lawver
for the c:1se, none \\"1S rirovidc<l bec,1use Wright could
not afford his own. The town
of \\'nod made no pro\'liiion for
free l:nvyrrs in such cases.
So Wr:°gitt pleadt•d g1tilly. llc
was gi\'rn a scntent'L'-n f:iirly
typical one for small con1111L;11itic;;-w111ch gave him the option of -.1·oddn1-: off his ''<kht to
society." l\!:1g1,;lrale Pi1,cr
gavC' him a ch<liC'c of 10 dnys'
labor on the ~trccts of Wood,

By LYLE DENNISTON
followed by 60 days on probation, or else a 30-day jail term
plus $100 fine .
He chose the street labor.
Wright might have served out
his time, and remained forever unknown in hislory. But
it snowed heavily in Wood on
the fourth day· of Wright's
street work, and the town m::irshal told him he could not
finish serving his "time" until the spring thaw had come.
Four months later, Wright
was arrested by lhc town marshal, and appeared again before Magistrate Piper-this
time at the local filling station.

*

Because he had not completed his 10 days on the
streets, Wright was ordered
to begin foe 30-day sentence,
and pay the $100 tine.
His case was then taken up
by an antipoverty program
lawyer from nearby Hosebud,
S.D., and appealed to the state
supreme court. Wrigl1t's demand for a new trial, on the
ground he had been deprived
of a trial lawyer unconstitutionally, was rejected by the
state tribumd.
"It is a malter of common
knowledge,·• the state justices
said, '·that the number of
cases in which appointed
counsel c1ppear for indigents
charged with crime in our
trial coul'ls and 0·1 ::ppcal or
review has mus!J1'•:i0mcd in
late yea.rs.
''Thoughtful students of the
situation arc be~inning to
wonder if we in South Dakota
arc going to ha1·c enough lawyers to serve them and how
long our rounlies will be able
to p3y their eompcns.ition.
Addimi lo this burden the
municipal ordinance offenders
would, we t.hink. be more than
we could provide for."
When Wrighl's case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
it attracted the .:itlcntion of
al lea:,t srmc of the just.ices.
And so. when the court rnlcd
(in another nwn's case) that
the rit\ht lo a lawyer e:---tcnded lo pl'lty tl'i:lls in municipal
c,)urt.~. Wr ight's c,1sc w;1s pol'lrn:,-ed by I.he disscnli11g justic,._•s J'., an exhibit of the folly
of tire 1ww court ruling.
It \I :1s pointed oul Lhat the
town of Wood had only 1;:2
people, that the m•nrc:,t law-

yer came from a town 40
miles away, and that the town
had so little money it would
not even pay a lawyer to de·
fend the case in the Supreme
Court. (The lawyer from the
nearby town, Ruben G. Maulis, had handled the town's
legal chores for about three
years, but in all that time had
been paid only $224.62.)
But no attention was paid,
by those who thought Wright's
case proved the error of the
court's way, to a very significant facet of his case.
The town magistrate had
given Wright a sentence which
includod 60 days on probation,
but SouU1 Dakota law forbade
that in a case like Wright's,
since he was obli ged to serve
time as a street laborer. And
the $100 fine imposed as part
of the alternative sentence was
twice as high as the S50 maximum for the crime of intoxication.

*

It would be a fair assumption that a lawyer represent-·
ing Wright (or even a law student) would have been able
to protect his client from such
errors. At the least, the mag-·
istrate might have been impelled to cite chaptcr-andverse for the punishment he
was meting out.
Now Wright's case has been
sent back to South Dakota's
courts. No doubt, it could pose
a dilemma for them, just as
thousands of similar cases
right now arc troubling hund1 eds of other local courts.
It seems possible that some
towns will choose lo avoid lhe
dilemma by simply refusing to
enforce some of their petty
crime laws. If lhc offenses
really an• minor, it could be
that it w:.is extravagant for the
town to treat them ,is crimes,
bringing in the full panoply of
constilPI 1onal rights.
But towns may ct1oose, instrnd, lo keep their laws, and
resort only to fines as puni5h- ·
ment. That would seem io
s:1lisfy lhe Supreme Courl, at
least for the time being. And,
concciv:1bly, it · could make
municipal courts :wmewhat
sclf-sus!:iining.
Bul some new way will have
to be found to keep 'the slrcets
repaired in towns like Wood,
S.D.

